Public Administration Review

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Volume XVIII SPRING 1958 Number 2

Published quarterly, in Winter, Spring, Summer, and Autumn, by the American Society for Public Administration, 6042 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois. Second class privileges authorized at Chicago, Illinois, with additional entry at Brattleboro, Vermont.

The contents of Public Administration Review are indexed in Public Affairs Information Service, International Index to Periodicals, and Index to Legal Periodicals. They are microfilmed by University Microfilms.

Subscriptions: $8 a year.

Single copies: $2.

Annual membership dues: basic services $10; added services $20; full services $30; student members $5 discount on any membership. Of the amount paid for membership dues, $4 is allocated to the subscription to Public Administration Review. Address: American Society for Public Administration, 6042 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

POSTMASTER: Send Form 3579 to Public Administration Review, 6042 Kimbark Ave., Chicago 37, Illinois.

LEONARD D. WHITE: TRIBUTE

This meeting of the American Society for Public Administration will wish, I am sure, to pause to pay tribute to the memory of one of its former presidents, whose death a few weeks ago in Chicago ended one of the most distinguished careers in American public administration.

The youth of public administration as a field of education and research is indicated by the fact that Leonard D. White was the first American scholar to give it comprehensive and systematic study. But the age of the subject—the historical depth and continuity of the essential problems of public administration—are shown in the research to which he devoted the final years of his life.

To generations of college students he was known for his classic textbook on public administration and for his many writings on public personnel problems.

Among his scholarly and professional colleagues he won even higher regard for the breadth of the intellectual interests which he brought to the study of public administration. His book, *The City Manager,* was the first study of that new profession; *Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service,* written at a time when students of public administration were supposed to be unaware of the connection of their subject with politics, sketched out its relationship with the growing power of trade unions and socialism in the United Kingdom; and his analysis of *The Prestige Value of Public Employment in Chicago* was one of the first to make use of the techniques of the social sciences in the study of public personnel problems.

But for all his prolific output, he did not confine his interests to scholarship. As a member of the United States Civil Service Commission, and later, of the Loyalty Review Board, Leonard White made his contribution to the practical operation of the machinery of government.

Internationally, in the years between the two world wars, his name was almost synonymous with public administration in the United States. For years he carried the main burden of representing America in the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and was one of its vice presidents.

In the closing years of his career, as if feeling that any merely contemporary study of public administration would fail to appreciate its depth, perspective, and connection with the fundamental values and problems of our civilization, he turned to the research that produced his magnificent series of studies in American administrative history. These volumes, of which the last is being published today, will long remain classics of American history as well as public administration.

This Society can take special pride in recalling that Leonard White served as its president in 1947-1948. It should also recall—and this is the recollection which for me brings the richest memories—that he served as the first editor-in-chief of *Public Administration Review,* and in that capacity set the high intellectual standard that will, I hope, characterize that journal for many years to come. It is therefore fitting that the American Society for Public Administration give some formal recognition to our loss, and that of the nation, in his death.

I therefore propose, Mr. President, that this meeting now adopt a resolution in appreciation of the distinguished service which Leonard D. White rendered to American government, to world scholarship, and to the founding and advancement of our Society, and communicate it to his family with an expression of our deepest sympathy and great sense of corporate and personal loss.

DON K. PRICE
Vice President
The Ford Foundation

This tribute was presented to the annual membership meeting of the Society March 24, 1958. The resolution of appreciation and sympathy proposed by Mr. Price was unanimously approved.

LEONARD D. WHITE: OUTLOOK

Preface, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (1926)

Curiously enough, commentators on American political institutions have never produced a systematic analysis of our administrative system except from the point of view of the lawyer. Until the last few years even the textbooks have obstinately closed their eyes to this enormous terrain, studded with governmental problems of first magnitude and fascinating interest; and even today they dismiss the subject with a casual chapter. But certainly no one pretends that administration can still be put aside "as a practical detail which clerks could arrange after doctors had agreed upon principles."

. . . . [This] book rests upon at least four assumptions. It assumes that administration is a single process, substantially uniform in its essential characteristics wherever observed, and therefore avoids the study of municipal administration, state administration, or federal administration as such. It assumes that the study of administration should start from the base of management rather than the foundation of law, and is therefore more absorbed in the affairs of the American Management Association than in the decisions of the courts. It assumes that administration is still primarily an art but attaches importance to the significant tendency to transform it into a science. It assumes that administration has become, and will continue to be the heart of the problem of modern government.

None of the technical phases of administration are developed. The student of public health administration, highway engineering, income tax collection, educational administration will consult the many admirable volumes dealing with these specialties. Running through all branches of administration, however, are certain common underlying problems: organization, personnel, control, finance, which it is the purpose of this book to explore. The particular audience to which it is directed is on the one hand the college and university student of political science, on the other hand the citizen who wishes to understand the basis of the executive phase of public affairs. The public official also may find that a systematic presentation in general terms will have the value of lending significance to his own task by disclosing it in a larger context.—(The Macmillan Company, 1926. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829-1861 (1954)

. . . there could be no doubt in 1860 that a new force had been introduced into the system established by the Federalists and generally maintained by the Jeffersonians. This new element was democracy. It altered profoundly the character and spirit of the old system, for better and for worse. It was an innovation that deserves to rank in its influence, both in its own time and in succeeding generations, with the original doctrines on which the system was based. Moral reform, science, technology, and management were in due course of time to bring new accretions of a different order, but the democratic character of governmental administration was to persist. This was the great contribution of the Jacksonians. It brought endless sources of vitality into the body administrative directly from the body politic, granting all the confusion and waste that were finally to be corrected by more orderly and systematic methods, themselves democratic in character. The relationship between the people and their administrative system was not again to suggest preference to the well-born and the well-to-do. —(The Macmillan Company, 1954, p. 566. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

in this number

Marshall E. Dimock, in Great Britain on an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation grant, is writing a book on institutional vitality and the relation between enterprise and bureaucracy. Late this spring, Harper & Brothers will publish his *Philosophy of Administration.* He is professor of government, New York University.

James R. Bell, with the California state government for almost twenty years before joining Sacramento State College as professor of government and public administration coordinator in 1957, was for ten years assistant executive officer, California State Personnel Board. His doctoral dissertation in 1956 dealt with the executive office of the Governor during Earl Warren's administration.

Wallace S. Sayre is professor of public administration, Columbia University. He was a member of the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey, New York City, 1951, and director of research, New York Temporary State Commission to study the Organization and Structure of the Government of the City of New York, 1953.

Rufus E. Miles, Jr., has been director of administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare since its establishment in 1953. In 1956, he received a Rockefeller Public Service Award to explore the development of improved methods for orienting presidential appointees to top policy positions in the federal government. He has served for twenty-four years with the federal government.

Robert L. Morlan is professor of government at the University of Redlands, California. In 1956-57 he was visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands. Former city councilman and vice mayor, City of Redlands, he is author of *Intergovernmental Relations in Education* (1950), *Capitol, Courthouse and City Hall* (1954), and *Political Prairie Fire* (1955).

John D. Montgomery is head of the academic instruction section, Michigan State University Vietnam advisory group. His particular responsibilities center on the National Institute of Administration which offers graduate and undergraduate instruction in public administration and economics to civil servants and prospective civil servants. His books include *The State Versus Socrates* (1954), *The Purge in Occupied Japan* (1954), *Forced to be Free* (1957).

John Clarke Adams is visiting professor of political science at Syracuse University. From 1953-56 he was professor of public administration and director of the in-service training program in public administration at the American University of Beirut. In 1956-57 he was professor of public administration at the Corso di Specializzazione in Scienze Amministrative of the University of Bologna.

John D. Young, management consultant, McKinsey & Company, is a Ph.D. candidate in public administration at American University. From 1951-54 in the Office of Defense Mobilization, he served as a staff member to the President's Advisory Committee on Government Reorganization and as assistant to the chairman, Committee on Reorganization of the Department of Defense.

Egbert S. Wengert has been professor and head of the Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, since 1948. He has been a faculty member at Wayne University, Sweet Briar College, and the University of Wyoming, a consultant to the AEC, 1946-48, and NSRB, 1948, and an advisory member of Oregon's "Little Hoover Commission," 1949-50.

Hubert Marshall is associate professor of political science, Stanford University. He was assistant professor of political science, University of Florida in 1950-52. In 1952-53 he was a member of the program staff, Office of the Secretary, U. S. Department of the Interior. He is co-author of *Public Administration of Florida's Natural Resources* (1953) and *The Undergraduate in the University* (1957).

Letters and Manuscripts

The Editorial Board welcomes letters of comment from PAR readers on articles in the *Review* and other public administration matters. Some will be published, depending on subject, quality, and space. All will be helpful in planning and evaluating *Review* policies.

The Board also welcomes manuscripts from the practitioners, researchers, and teachers of public administration based on their experiences and studies. These will be considered for publication as articles, subject to the Board's judgment on substance, style, length, and other editorial matters.

Both letters and manuscripts should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief at the ASPA office, 6042 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

Executive Development after Ten Years

By MARSHALL E. DIMOCK

Professor of Government

New York University

Executive development programs,[1] that is, attempts to sharpen administrative skills of employees who are thought by management to possess leadership potential, have leaped into prominence in many countries since the end of World War II. Distinguishing such programs from regular academic study, customarily the employer selects participants and pays all or most of their expenses. Distinguishing them from other in-service training which usually concentrates on specialist techniques, emphasis here is on leadership. While in all cases the objective is the same, the motivating needs depend on the stage of a country's industrial and governmental development. In the United States and Great Britain, for example, the need for executive development is induced by a combination of overspecialization and bureaucratic procedures—significantly related to large size—which threaten to drain institutions of their initiative and vitality. In underdeveloped countries, the motivating factors are the need to develop administrative skills that can facilitate industrialization, to secure a better balance between the respective roles of business and government in the economy, and to overcome certain traditional cultural factors that limit administrative effectiveness.

A year ago, an executive of a large corporation in New York showed me a list of forty executive development programs for American businessmen; eighteen of these programs were considered "major" by this particular corporation. Most of them were identified with universities. My informant expressed the opinion that since the war, executive development programs had expanded by something like 400 per cent, with the end not yet in sight. When a movement grows so fast, one wonders whether it is not merely a passing fashion, whether many of the programs freshly launched will not prove short-lived, and whether there is not the danger of overselling the idea. The answer, I suppose, is that since the need for executive development is great, the demand for training will continue, and that if present formulas and procedures are found wanting, they will be improved. Since many of these formulas and procedures have in fact been found wanting, the present paper is an attempt to discover the reasons for the deficiencies and to suggest the means of overcoming them.

Differing Program Levels

Executive development programs are commonly offered at three levels, each with its own goals and methods. Courses at the primary level are designed for relatively inexperienced men and women needing orientation and initial stimulation in the area of administration. Such programs are usually conducted by the employing institution itself, in connection with the process of induction and probation. They constitute a kind of apprenticeship for executives.

[1] Although I am stressing courses, it should be understood that they are only part of a larger strategy of executive development that includes the whole shaping of a man's career both by promotion and changes of work as well as by internal and external programs of instruction.

Courses at the intermediate stage are for men and women of from ten to fifteen years of experience who are in the ranks of middle to top management. Such programs are the most numerous, both in business and in governments around the world. They attempt to give specialists the viewpoint and the élan that will equip them to become rounded executives; these courses are what has made executive development training so widely known, and it is here that most criticisms are centered.

Courses at the third level—still, for the most part, in the experimental stage—offer training for top management, for people who have top power if not top age. Since this type of program is much less common than the other two, there is less debate about it except for a growing realization that some such training is needed. The approach here must depend upon the aims and success of executive development at lower levels. If executive development does not require continuous attention throughout one's whole career, it would seem better to concentrate our resources at the lower, formative stages than to try to change the set patterns of men in their fifties and sixties. On the other hand, if executive development is a career-long need and the policy responsibilities of the executive increase with rank, then surely, training also must be a continuing process extending through all three levels of the executive's career.

Although the goals and methods at each of these three levels of training may be different, they have at least two objectives in common: first, to prod and mature the individual's philosophy of administration, and second, to prepare him to undertake policy planning and decision-making as his job increasingly requires it. At the intermediate level especially, this means opening up some wide and difficult areas of public policy with which the enrollee must tussle.[2]

The Need for Executive Training

The higher an executive is promoted, the more must he deal with policy decisions of the most complicated and demanding kind. Will a proposed action, for example, advance the enterprise toward its destination? Will it strengthen the institution and help to guarantee its future vitality and security? Will it enhance the institution's reputation? These are not merely intellectual decisions; they involve questions of judgment and good taste. Indeed, a decision made solely on intellectual grounds is likely to be inadequate; as Chester Barnard has explained,[3] the higher one goes in administration, the greater is the importance of values and judgments growing out of the intuitive and the nonlogical.

The relevance of this line of reasoning to an assessment of executive development programs now appears. We must train men and women to become better operators; but we must also train them to become good judges of policies and of enduring values, a combination that includes both character and the wisdom of philosophers. But if we are to develop sophistication in the matter of policies and values, we cannot very well train people up to the age of forty or so in nonpolicy and nonphilosophical subjects and then expect them suddenly—like a shrub—to blossom forth in the larger area simply by pouring a little fertilizer around the roots.

Or, to change the analogy, we cannot expect a narrow specialist suddenly to take on the glow of executive inspiration, like a sinner responding to a revivalist, simply because we have exposed him for a week, or six weeks, or even twelve weeks, to the magic of an executive development program. Unfortunately, in our enthusiasm for a new method, we have been guilty of entertaining such absurd notions.

We Americans can take some pride in the efficient way we have learned to teach business and public administration over the past twenty-five to thirty years. Relying on the contributions to the administrative process of

[2] The objectives I envision for executive development —including coming to grips with overspecialization and loss of institutional vitality—cannot be achieved simply through this process. Social explorations are needed into the proper balance between business and government, optimum size of institutions, undue concentrations of power, and the feasibility of financial and intercorporate decentralization through deliberate limitations on size and the strengthening of competition. We may have to learn more about the relations between bureaucracy and enterprise before executive development courses can wholly escape superficiality.

[3] Chester A. Barnard, "Mind in Everyday Affairs," *The Functions of the Executive* (Harvard University Press, 1938), appendix.

scientific management, the human relations approach, and more recently on those of psychology and sociology, we have created a respectable body of knowledge concerning institutional organization and functioning and have learned how to communicate this knowledge to others. But the executive's biggest problems are not always administrative in the conventional sense; they are more often concerned with policy and survival issues: pressure groups, institutional size, competition, labor relations, administrative ethics, and so on. Men are not being trained in our universities or in the early stages of their business life to tackle such issues any better than their seniors do.

Executive development courses are a possible answer. In attempting to sharpen the goals of such courses, therefore, I suggest that we begin to emphasize training for policy decisions and that we stop talking about training men to become members of a "team" and begin to think about producing men who are outstanding individuals in their own right. A dozen experts meeting around a table and trying to substitute their combined knowledge of a problem for the knowledge and power to integrate that should be in the head of the top man, will invariably impede administrative decision, slow the pace of execution, and make the process bureaucratic in the objectionable sense.

Criticisms of Training Courses

WHAT are the causes of dissatisfaction with training programs in the United States? A group of executives in large corporations gave the following replies to this question:

The first criticism was that these programs do not meet the need we have been discussing —preparation for policy-making; that they concentrate instead on administrative techniques and process. Nor is concentration on decision-making as a process sufficient; a better understanding of the elements of desirable policy seems necessary. Second, training methods as well as content tend to follow set formulas which gradually acquire rigidity, slowing the search for what these people feel they really need. The conventional classroom methods, for example, have little appeal for persons who have reached middle years and teaching gadgetry often is mistaken for something that grows up inside a man and gives him impetus to go on educating himself. A short course with its play-acting and prestige may be mistaken for destination rather than departure; or men may get so used to role-playing that they sometimes forget what it's like to be themselves. Finally, there is too much emphasis on the group and too little on the individual, the whole man and not merely the mechanistic man in his limited work role.

On the basis of first-hand experience with executive development programs in some other countries, plus observation of those in which I have participated in the United States, I believe that the questions raised by these business executives are similar to those bothering public administrators.

Possible Improvements

IF THESE criticisms of training courses are valid, then several major guidelines emerge.

We should spend less time on the *processes* of decision-making and more on *what* is being decided and *why*. I have listened to discussions in executive development programs where it was apparently assumed that if the processes of decision-making could be perfected, the results would be as reliable as the calculations of an adding machine. Fortunately, most practical executives are too skeptical to believe such hocus-pocus, but it must be admitted that a glib talker, equipped with just the right "scientific" lingo, can cast a spell. Instead, we must also teach the wisdom and moral philosophy inhering in the decisions themselves, or at least we must somehow produce individuals who are capable of such decisions.

Training at the top level should be more emphasized than at present, partly because the need for training is continuous and partly because of its tonic effect on the intermediate and primary levels of training. The harder policy decisions become, the greater is the need for peers to come together in a common program and to share the stimulation of joint endeavor. Moreover, when senior executives become favorably inclined toward executive development courses, through direct contact with them, junior executives are more likely to be encouraged to participate in the same type of work.

If top executive training is to catch on, however, both the method and the content will have to be improved over much that is offered at present. There is a greater need for faculty members who understand the field of public policy, which is a combination of disciplines and includes also a measure of practical experience, and less need for men who are narrowly trained as economists or administrative technicians.

Today, many employers in large-scale industry and in government agencies are trying to decide whether to launch executive development programs of their own, as some have, or whether to support and improve those operated by independent institutions. The conception of broad policy-centered training helps to decide this. It seems clear that they should decide in favor of the independent institution. The educational role of the employer is on-the-job training for people needing special skills, which is a large assignment, and the matter should stop there. Administrative agencies have no business organizing advanced executive development programs of their own. They do not have the personnel to teach such courses unless their top executives can spare the time to act as teachers, and of course they cannot. Moreover, the employer, try as he may, will find company policy and method being confused with objective standards in both of these areas, which further increases the process of bureaucratization. Moreover, the independent executive development programs permit officials to get away from their own outfits for a spell and to secure a fresh point of view by associating with men of differing outlooks and experience. And finally, if an employing institution runs its own program, it is hard to resist the temptation to indoctrinate, and if carried too far, the result is more or less open revolt against it.

How long should the course be? If we need executives who are humane and gifted and hence capable of growing in grace, how much time must be devoted to that end? I do not, of course, assume that executive development programs or any formal educational scheme, unaided, can do the whole job. But a substantial program of this kind can doubtless accomplish more than a "quickie" course can hope for. It is argued that a good deal can be accomplished even in a long weekend if the personalities are stimulating and the locus is remote and congenial. At the other extreme it is contended that twelve full weeks, under ideal circumstances and with no interruptions from the outside, is hardly enough if results of lasting and measurable importance are to to achieved. The answer, I suppose, comes down to what it is hoped to accomplish. If the objective is to impart specific knowledge and ideas, then a few hours might suffice; but if the aim is to change a man's outlook, his motivation, and even his personality, then twelve weeks is a short time no matter how favorable the circumstances.

A few summers ago I attended an international conference at Geneva where the subject was methods of evaluation in technical assistance programs. The sociologists, and especially the social anthropologists, talked a good deal about changing what goes on in a man's mind, and I must confess that I had some difficulty in understanding what they were driving at. Later, but not at the same conference, I began to see the point, and I think now that it offers the answer to the question of duration.

Put it this way: as a result of stimulus-and-response experienced in the course of several weeks in a training program, does the ethos, or outlook, of a man perceptibly change so that his boss and his associates notice it? Is he himself aware of what has happened, and is his family aware of it? I must confess that when I put these thoughts into print they sound a little like the come-on of a Madison Avenue man. Nevertheless, when with my own eyes I have seen this metamorphosis during an executive development program, I cannot help but believe in it.

Actually, there is no mystery about what happens. At a certain point in this particular type of program a man tumbles to the fact that administration is a philosophy, a way of life, something that is not only challenging in his job but that could even unify his personality and interests in a way he had never suspected. In terms of money and status he has no more ambition or motivation than he had before, but in terms of his attitude toward his job and his fellows he has considerably more of both. I believe that this shifting of point of view occurs when a man sees that

administrative techniques and policy decisions are a single element rather than separate ones, when he sees that job and personality fulfillment must go together. I have seen this transformation occur in most members of a group of sixty or so men after nine or ten weeks—not before that—and hence I conclude that we are vainly hoping for miracles if we plan and conduct courses ranging, say, up to six weeks.[4] And I must add that even a twelve week course must be of the highest quality or little observable effect is produced.

A short course can succeed in communicating information, in broadening a man's outlook, and in setting him to thinking, and these are all worthy objectives, but developing top executive material takes longer. Once a man is touched to the quick by the offerings of a first rate course, however, he is set for a long time and does not need the same shots in the arm and frequent returns to school that his less fortunate colleagues do.

Content and Method

Now, how is the objective of producing executive leadership translated into method? Is there, moreover, a right method of training executives in business and a different one best designed for executives in government, or is there a common method suitable for both groups? Even with two separate methods, it is necessary in each to duplicate much of the content and procedure of the other in order to make either program successful, because both business and government operate within the same culture patterns and belief-systems, both are trying to produce effective leadership, both are interrelated at many points, both are concerned with public policy, both deal with the same elements of administration, and both tend increasingly to fall into a common pattern.

Is it possible in a training program to deal with policy problems as effectively as with administrative techniques? I think there is already enough evidence to show that it can be done. The business school courses on policy-making that make use of case materials, the arts and sciences courses on business and government, the skillful admixture of policy and administrative techniques in the curriculum of the Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames, England, all convince me that it can be done. And it will be done when we begin to understand that a proper administrative technique is only half the solution, and that under modern conditions it is not even the more important half.

It must be recognized at the outset, I believe, that no one method by itself will do all that needs to be done. My observations and those of others I have talked with indicate that lectures should be kept to a minimum; cases should be used sparingly and only when they are related to the main subject under investigation; general discussions and debates should be scheduled only after the subject has been thoroughly explored because then (hopefully) most enrollees will have developed enough humility, in the face of the complexity of the problem and its solution, to be disinclined to talk merely for effect.

The curriculum of an executive development course should be arranged to produce a unified, fully integrated result, which is enthusiasm for the process-policy activity known as administration, in a way that will enable a man to form his own philosophy and provide his own on-going stimulus to improvement. Concretely, a man must learn all about the administrative process and all about the main issues of policy that he will have to decide when he reaches the top ranks of management; he must learn to relate these two bodies of knowledge and to realize that they grow out of a single administrative situation.

In all of the executive development experiments I have observed, this feat of integration is more successfully performed at the Administrative Staff College at Henley than at any other place.[5]

There, the course leads up to the question, "What is needed in order to strengthen a vital

[4] I do not mean to be dogmatic about this. The point at which "illumination" occurs may vary with the number and level of knowledge of the individuals in the course; thus, in a small group of sophisticated enrollees, the point at which policy integration reaches its climax may occur earlier than with a larger group of less experienced people.

[5] I described the program at Henley in "The Administrative Staff College: Executive Development in Government and Industry," 50 *The American Political Science Review* 166-76 (March, 1956).

national economy?" The matter is approached through the questions, "What can be done to promote foreign trade on which the future of Britain depends? What can be done to maintain administrative vitality in business and in government so that the nation will maintain a leading position in the world? What do these two issues mean to me? What do I need to do?" Except for the matter of foreign trade which is of special importance to Great Britain, I submit that all of these questions are universally involved in most administrative decisions, including those that seem at first glance to turn primarily on a matter of procedure or technique.

Where policy is concerned, furthermore, there is an internal and an external aspect of almost every question. In the handling of people, for example, personnel management is largely internal and industrial relations is largely external; in finance, budgeting is largely internal and taxes are largely external; and it is the same with administrative decentralization and laws governing the location of industry; with internal operating rules and regulations, and the regulation of public utilities by a legislature. This means searching for the principles of political economy on which the future of the national economy and the vitality of its institutions both public and private, seem to depend. Appealing to the intelligent patriotism and to the self-interest of executives as this unified approach does, there is no problem of securing sustained interest and stimulating independent thinking.

Course administrators achieve this objective by carefully thinking through the kind of impact they want to make on enrollees, the number of subjects needed, their interrelationships, the sequence of topics, the variety of possible methods, the materials to be made available, and the time schedule. All of this is worked out in detail, nothing is left to chance.

When enrollees are selected for the course, each man is chosen to fit into a team called a syndicate, the ten members of which are about equally divided between the private and the public sectors of the economy and, in addition, represent a cross section of administrative skills. As the course begins, the enrollees themselves take over, the course directors stay very much in the background, exerting their influence largely through personal social contacts.

Each syndicate member must act as chairman or as secretary of a particular project during the twelve weeks that the course lasts. The projects are arranged under a few major headings so that a week or more can be spent on a single major area, such as personnel, finance, decentralization, business and government relationships. Each project is the subject of a "brief" prepared by the College which states the problem and describes the report which the syndicate is expected to present to be discussed by all the syndicates meeting together.

To help secure integration and show interrelationships among the subject-matter of the different projects, two or three issues may be worked on at different times of the same day. The number of projects is not too large, and hence there is time for reading and reflection, an opportunity notably absent from most of the short programs I have observed. Integration and broadening take place also as industrial and government officials begin to realize that their responsibilities are not dissimilar, that accountants and salesmen are both essential, that an economy, like a management team, must be rounded. The men learn that external policies are the stuff of influence and survival, and that the higher you go in administration the more of high policy there is. But at Henley these lessons appear from the context; they are never taught or drilled into the enrollees. Men, in syndicates and in the evening forums where reports are discussed, are cast in the role of a board of directors or a management committee considering a decision which is likely to have lasting consequences.

In this group method, how do you resolve the age-old conflict between the individual and the group? How do you guard against the appearance of the "organization man," the spineless conformist who is the opposite of the enterprising executive? You do this by combining the best of two methods. Within the group there soon comes to be a division of labor, but at the same time the members all

work together on analyses, reading assignments, reports, and so on. They produce a report attempting to solve the problem in question and containing statements of principle covering both administration and policy, and they defend this report together against the attacks of other syndicates as an executive would justify himself when he appears before his policy board or legislative committee.

But enrollees learn also that it is *individuals* who provide leadership and initiative; and that the group is only as strong as the quality of its members. Within the group and among the whole membership of the program, a man speaks for himself and his traits of independence and leadership, if he has them, soon appear in group discussion. He does not hesitate to disagree with the majority so long as he thinks he has the better case. Emphasis is on originality and dissent, initiative and enterprise; conformity as conformity is held in low esteem.

What the administrator should know about the national economy, the enrollees learn for themselves by group discussion, independent reading, and mature reflection. This core of knowledge includes legislative-executive relations, pressure groups and the public interest, resource management, national production, foreign trade, money management, labor relations, monopoly policy, technological and economic change, bureaucracy and enterprise, and decentralization policy. In Great Britain the focus will be foreign trade; in the United States, it is more likely to be the domestic economy. At the Administrative Staff College each subject is stated as a current issue of policy and decision and not as a matter for general philosophical discussion. The philosophy is there, but it derives from the issue; although it is a major goal of the course, it is indirectly achieved and hence indoctrination is avoided.

I have gone into some detail on the subject of content and method, relying mainly on the Administrative Staff College for illustration, because I wanted to make certain points clear. First, the problems dealt with by the enrollees seem different from those with which they are familiar in their normal administrative life because they are shown in a larger setting and as related to other large issues, and external influences are shown to be pertinent. The enrollees soon recognize that their experience, as related to the solution of these large issues is limited; they need lift their sights and identify relationships never noticed but always there.

Second, the majority of administrative decisions are seen as having some impact on public policy, as offering some kind of contribution to national economic strength. As a by-product, a better understanding is brought about between business and government as the men in each area learn to appreciate the distinctive and necessary role of the other.

And third, by the time the twelve weeks of the course are up, it is clear to all that administration and policy are inseparable, that every aspect of administration is related to and tested by the touchstone of policy objective.

The Future

WHAT of executive development in the decade that lies ahead? My guess is that there will be fewer programs, with refresher courses as needed, but better ones; that significant new advances will occur in the training of top executives and that this will have a beneficial effect on departmentation and training in the universities; that an increasing number of programs will be set up to train top men in both industry and in government; that public policy will come to be more emphasized than administrative techniques; that the administrators of executive development programs will spend most of their time on planning and evaluation and that the actual conduct of the program will be handled primarily by the members themselves on the ground that self-learning provides a continuing motivation and momentum.

And last, I believe that when it is widely appreciated that there is no magic that will produce a qualified executive, especially if he has had the wrong start, then management both in business and in government will increasingly look for workable methods of limiting the size of institutions, decentralizing operations, and favoring the active, independent executive in the interests of an enterprising program.

A Coordinator for State Agencies

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AMONG the many contributions which former Governor Earl Warren made to the governorship of California were the rational organization and strengthening of the executive office. Warren began early in his administration to organize the staff for maximum assistance for the discharge of the duties of his office. He specialized the functions of his secretaries and established rational office routines and records. The budgeted staff increased from approximately twenty when Warren took office in 1943 to fifty-five in 1953 when he was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. More significantly, the office became firmly institutionalized. The formal organization of the executive office has been retained by Warren's successor and will probably be continued by other governors because of its demonstrated value in providing staff services to the chief executive.

The organization of the executive office is entirely within the governor's discretion. Shortly after entering office, Warren appointed an executive secretary with responsibility for over-all direction of the office. Secretary positions were created to assist the executive in handling his personal affairs, clemency and appointments to public office, press and public relations, research for speeches, legislation, travel and invitations. Staff assistance was thereby provided for two of the governor's major responsibilities: legislative relations and public relations; but for the third major responsibility, administration, no specialized staff was provided. The need for assistance in coordinating, controlling, and communicating with the state agencies was not met until Warren had been in office for over two years, when a departmental secretary was appointed.

Development of the Departmental Secretary Position

BEFORE that appointment, Governor Warren's regular communication with the state departments was limited to receiving written monthly reports from department heads and meeting with them monthly in the Governor's Council. In addition, he received some information through his secretaries, each of whom was responsible for liaison with specific departments particularly on public complaints and urgent matters. However, this liaison was a secondary assignment for these secretaries. Soon the regular communication channels were judged inadequate to keep the governor abreast of departmental performance and provide policy coordination among the departments themselves, particularly in these first years of California's rapid post-depression growth. As a result, Warren set up the departmental secretary's position primarily to aid him in his administrative role. The post evolved from quite meager beginnings and without specific guidelines. What it has become is due largely to the initiative and imagination of its second incumbent.[1] In his tenure

[1] M. F. Small served as departmental secretary to Governor Warren from 1948 until early in 1953. He became administrative assistant to U. S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel when Warren announced that he would not seek a fourth term as governor.

—the last five years of Warren's administration —the office grew from two people to five and achieved a marked influence among California state agencies. By 1953, when Warren left the governorship, the responsibilities of the departmental secretary had become well established:

1. To serve as liaison to the public on departmental policy and operations.
2. To serve as a communication link between the governor and state agencies on executive policy and agency performance.
3. To coordinate executive policy among the state agencies.
4. To serve as secretary to the Governor's Council.
5. To perform for the governor routine tasks related to departmental operations which are required by law.

There were important limits on these responsibilities from the outset. First, neither he nor the other secretaries to the governor were in any sense supervisory to the governor's department heads. This was clearly understood in the departments and in the executive office and was in keeping with Warren's policy to uphold the actions of his appointees until it was established "beyond peradventure that they were wrong." Second, the departmental secretary had no significant responsibility for the budget or the fiscal program. California has a strong, centrally organized Department of Finance whose director is appointed by the governor and serves as staff to the governor on fiscal policy and administration. Third, personnel staff programs and processes are the responsibility of an independent constitutional agency, the California State Personnel Board, whose five-member governing board is appointed by the executive but is otherwise independent of executive control.

Liaison to the Public

THE departmental secretary's role as liaison between the public and state agencies on departmental operations began as a fairly routine function of answering complaints for the governor. Both the governor's staff and his department heads gave high priority to complaints from the public and, as this activity of the departmental secretary developed, it became a useful device for executive control and evaluation of department performance. Complaint letters to the governor's office were reviewed by the departmental secretary's office though usually answered by the state agency concerned. The most serious complaints were brought directly to the governor's attention, generally by the departmental secretary. In addition, the governor was given monthly summaries which showed numerically by departments the number of complaints received. Another more elaborate summary was prepared for him which listed the name and address of the complainant, the department cited, and the nature of the complaint, for example, "discourtesy," "procedural deficiency," "deficient facilities."

Often, cases gave rise to joint consideration by department officials and the departmental secretary of policy or procedure changes. Where the number and nature of complaints warranted, other staff resources were used to conduct independent investigations of department operations; frequently the Management Analysis Section of the Department of Finance was so used. From the time this procedure was initiated in 1947 until the end of Warren's administration, over 150 such investigations were made and formally reported. These investigations were conducted with the full knowledge and cooperation of the agencies concerned, so the relationship between the governor's staff and the department heads was kept within the policy laid down by the governor.

Investigations initiated by action involving the departmental secretary ranged widely over state activities: charges of mistreatment of patients in mental hospitals, protests of dismissed employees, inspection of out-of-state vehicles for illicit agricultural products at border inspection stations, and the organization of the Department of Motor Vehicles at a time when vehicle registration procedures failed to keep pace with the tremendous postwar increase of motor vehicles in the state.[2]

[2] The Management Analysis Section study of agricultural products inspection resulted in simplified procedures which cut complaints from 111 in 1946 to 12 in 1952 while the number of vehicles inspected increased from 1,800,000 per year to 3,065,000. A major reorganization of the Motor Vehicle Department resulted from the section's study there.

Communications among State Agencies

RELATIONSHIPS between the departmental secretary and state agencies went far beyond those generated by complaints. After the office became established and accepted, department heads dealt with the departmental secretary far more than with the governor himself on department matters. He and his assistant also had innumerable day-to-day informal personal and telephone conversations with officials at the division and bureau level. He often stimulated interdepartmental cooperation, as when he brought together officials of the Department of Public Works, the State Personnel Board, and the Department of Finance to speed the recruitment and selection of engineers and architects in order to expedite the state's postwar building program. Also, he was a member of the Deputy Director's Conference, a group which meets monthly to discuss problems of general state management, and both he and his assistant served on conference committees.

In periods of emergency or stress, such as during the floods of 1950, critical labor strikes, a time of serious crop loss due to drought, freeze, or excessive rain, the departmental secretary kept in close touch with the state departments most concerned and coordinated communication between the governor's office and those agencies.

The departmental secretary's duties as secretary to the Governor's Council, a monthly meeting of state department heads, also aided him in his state agency liaison role. He was responsible for the council agenda, he prepared for the governor a brief of monthly council reports submitted by the department heads, and he followed up many matters discussed at the council. Governor Warren met privately with council committees the afternoon of the meeting and the departmental secretary was present to record and follow through on decisions which were made. The council role thus became an integral part of the secretary's relationships.

Finally, in establishing and strengthening the ties between the governor's office and state agencies, the departmental secretary kept in touch with some of the more important boards and commissions, particularly those on which there was no state department representation. The secretary attended meetings of the State Highway Commission from time to time and met informally with other boards and commissions to discuss such of their problems and policies as were related to executive policy.

Tangential to executive agency coordination, inquiries from legislators and from other levels of government were channeled through the departmental secretary, and frequently he participated in informal conferences to resolve intergovernmental conflicts and coordinate intergovernmental programs.

Working Relationships with the Governor

TO BE effective as a staff man, the departmental secretary had to keep the governor and the other secretaries informed. In this there is no guide to a magic optimum of information to be communicated. Governor Warren had a rare capacity to assimilate, digest, extract and put to use the information, almost any information, which came to him in his role of chief executive. Consequently, memoranda and digests of reports flowed constantly into his office to keep him abreast of state government programs and performance. The departmental secretary prepared brief reports on conferences, meetings, and consultations which he held; reported immediately the serious problems which came to his attention; and digested in summary form the biennial and numerous other departmental reports which were made to the governor. These memoranda and reports were reproduced for general staff circulation.

The departmental secretary also acted for the governor in the citizen committees and conferences he used extensively to stimulate discussion of broad public policies. Generally statewide conferences on particular issues were organized by the state agency responsible in that subject area, but the departmental secretary served as liaison between the governor's office and the sponsoring department and on a few occasions was conference secretary. In each case he represented the governor in the organizing and managerial aspects of the undertaking as well as reflecting, as needed, the governor's distinct philosophy regarding the basic public values of such meetings.

Among the detailed responsibilities of the

governor handled by the departmental secretary are: (1) approving—as required by statute—travel for state employees beyond bordering states, (2) approval of certain departmental reorganization proposals, (3) representing the governor at departmental functions and expressing the chief executive's policies and his views on programs.

An Evaluation

How should we assess the effectiveness of the departmental secretary position and the desirability of continuing it? It has been functioning in the California governor's office for over twelve years, continued by Governor Goodwin J. Knight much as it was developed during Governor Warren's administration.

Though far from a radical solution to state management needs, the departmental secretary seems to have aided two governors in coordinating, controlling, and evaluating the activities of the loosely organized California state government. This organization of about fifty state agencies, 200 boards and commissions, and six constitutional elective officers is otherwise unified only by a Department of Finance and a State Personnel Board, the latter not even responsible to the governor. But the success depended a great deal on the personal qualities of the man. The secretary must, more than other aides of the governor, know state operations well. (Indeed, there is argument for appointing a career civil servant, particularly in California where he has the right to return to his career position after an exempt post. However, an appointee from the career service must be aware of a primary loyalty in the new role to the governor rather than to the civil service system or his former department.) Second, he must clearly understand staff work and his proper relationship to line department heads. Finally, he must be unusually competent and persuasive. Given such a person, California experience would indicate the departmental secretary can serve a good purpose in state government.

Reform Tends to Continue

. . . I have become convinced that in all but extremely exceptional instances the level of performance, once raised, never drops back all the way. A permanent net improvement in any local governmental or administrative establishment always follows any markedly intelligent, well-planned advance to higher ground. The frog may slip back as he attempts to climb from the bottom of the well, but at every jump he makes a net gain.

—Louis Brownlow, *A Passion for Anonymity* (The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 203.

Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging

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WHEN the first textbooks in public administration appeared in the United States a little more than thirty years ago (Leonard D. White's *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (Macmillan Co., 1926), and W. F. Willoughby's *Principles of Public Administration* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1927)), they were based upon premises and concepts about the executive branch and its administrative agencies which had been at least a half century in the making. The civil service reform movement beginning in the late 1860's and culminating in the Pendleton Act of 1883, Woodrow Wilson's essay on "Public Administration" in 1887, Goodnow's *Politics and Administration* in 1900 (MacMillan Co.), the work of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research and its counterparts throughout the country, the scientific management movement in industry, the reorganization movement (including the Taft Commission studies of 1910-12, the Illinois and New York reports of 1915), the city manager movement beginning in 1910, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Classification Act of 1923, the New York state governmental reorganizations under Governor Smith—all these, as well as other events and writings, helped to provide the raw materials for the syntheses attempted in the pioneer textbooks in public administration. These texts, in turn, not only provided the first effective teaching instruments for the new field of study; they also codified the premises, the concepts, and the data for the new public administration.

NOTE: This paper served as a basis for discussion at one session of a conference on Education and Training for Administrative Careers in Local and State Government sponsored by the Fels Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania, June 12-14, 1957. The papers and discussion summaries of the Conference and of the administrators' workshops preceding the Conference will be published.

The Textbooks' Codification

THE main elements of this codification of 1926-27 may be very briefly summarized:

1. The politics-administration dichotomy was assumed both as a self-evident truth and as a desirable goal; administration was perceived as a self-contained world of its own, with its own separate values, rules, and methods.

2. Organization theory was stated in "scientific management" terms; that is, it was seen largely as a problem in organization technology—the necessities of hierarchy, the uses of staff agencies, a limited span of control, subdivision of work by such "scientific" principles as purpose, process, place, or clientele.

3. The executive budget was emphasized as an instrument of rationality, of coordination, planning, and control.

4. Personnel management was stressed as an additional element of rationality (jobs were to be described "scientifically," employees were to be selected, paid, advanced by "scientific" methods).

5. A "neutral" or "impartial" career service was

required to insure competence, expertise, rationality.

6. A body of administrative law was needed to prescribe standards of due process in administrative conduct.

In these pioneer texts the responsibility of administrative agencies to popular control was a value taken-for-granted; the responsiveness of administrators and bureaucrats was not seen as a problem because everyone then understood that politics and policy were separate from administration, which was concerned exclusively with the execution of assignments handed down from the realm of politics.

The events of the 1930's—depression, New Deal, the rise of Big Government—served at first to confirm the premises of the texts. The expansion of government, especially the great growth in the size, complexity, and discretionary power of administrative agencies, was regarded as making all the more relevant and urgent the tools of rationality which public administration offered to the practitioners in the new and expanded agencies of the executive branch. Many of the teachers and the students of public administration themselves became practitioners.

The *Report* of the President's Committee on Administrative Management and its literary companion-piece, the Gulick and Urwick *Papers on the Science of Administration* (Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University), both appearing in 1937, represent the high noon of orthodoxy in public administration theory in the United States. In the Gulick and Urwick *Papers* were brought together eleven essays constituting the classic statements then available in the United States and Europe, in business and public administration, of the elements believed to be embodied in *the science* of administration. (It is perhaps worth noting that of the ten authors only Gulick wrote as a political scientist.) The *Report* of the President's Committee, for its part, set forth in eloquent language the prescriptions of public administration made orthodox by the texts of 1926-27. The significant and impressive managerial changes in the executive branch of the national government which were made as a result of the *Report* strengthened the prestige of public administration as a body of precepts.

Post-War Dissent

BUT the high noon of orthodoxy had a brief hour of prominence. World War II interrupted the further development of public administration research and literature, and at the close of the war the resumption took the form of dissent and heterodoxy. Prewar orthodoxy, it is true, was reasserted in the *Reports* of the two Hoover Commissions, in most of the textbooks, and in the rash of post-war administrative surveys at state and local government levels. There was, however, a strong ferment of dissent in the monographic literature, in the journals, and elsewhere. The dissent took three main lines:

1. The assault upon the politics-administration dichotomy.

This keystone of pre-war orthodox public administration had always been viewed with some skepticism by a considerable number of political scientists (particularly by those mainly concerned with political theory or with the political process); to them, all administrative agencies and their staffs seemed to be involved in politics. This view was now to recruit strong support from within the public administration fraternity itself. The first textbook to appear after the war—Fritz Morstein Marx (editor), *The Elements of Public Administration* (Prentice-Hall, 1946), with 14 political scientists among its contributors—brought a new, if still mild, emphasis upon the involvement of administrators and administrative agencies in policy formation, in the use of discretionary power, and in the general political process. In 1949 Paul H. Appleby's influential monograph, *Policy and Administration* (University of Alabama Press), boldly and persuasively described administration as "the eighth political process." In 1950 the second post-war text—Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (Alfred A. Knopf) —presented a systematic exposition of public administration as a political and group process. In 1952 the first casebook in public administration—significantly titled *Public Administration and Policy Development,* Harold

Stein (editor), (Harcourt, Brace and Co.)—emphasized in each of its case studies the political role of the administrator; and, in the introductory essay, Harold Stein wrote incisively of "public administration as politics." These several illustrations serve to reveal the stages by which public administration as politics, as involved deeply in policy and values, was firmly established in the literature of public administration within a few years after the war. Even the most orthodox texts yielded some ground on the doctrine that politics and administration were separable.

2. The assault upon the claims to science and to universal principles of administration.

The premises which pre-war public administration had borrowed primarily from scientific management were of course necessarily subjected to criticism by all those who were asserting that administration was a political process. These critics were soon joined by the students of the history and development of administrative theory. When, for example, Dwight Waldo published in 1948 his important study, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (The Ronald Press), he demonstrated how value-loaded, how culture-bound, how political—in short, how "unscientific"—were the premises, the "principles," the logic, of orthodox public administration.

To these powerful critical voices there was soon added a third group: the prophets of a new science of administration. The outstanding representative of this school of thought has been Herbert Simon whose *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations* (Macmillan Co., 1947) not only attacked the orthodox "principles" of public administration as being merely "proverbs" but also presented a new administrative science based upon the argument of logical-positivism that facts must be separated from values. For Simon, the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy was to be replaced by the new fact-value dichotomy.

These critics have successfully made their point. The claims to scientific principles and to their universal applicability have been placed on the defensive although they have not entirely disappeared from the literature of public administration. But the claims of a new science of administration have not been widely accepted.

3. "Sociological" studies of bureaucracy.

Another stream of ideas and knowledge contributing to the post-war growth of dissent from orthodoxy has been the "sociological" study of the public bureaucracies as representing in themselves a form of political power. The primary impact of these studies has been upon the orthodox doctrines of the neutral career service. Philip Selznick's *TVA and the Grass Roots* (University of California Press, 1948), for example, revealed a career bureaucracy deeply involved in the political process, demonstrating that the creation and maintenance of a career bureaucracy is more a problem in values and politics than a problem of administrative science.

Emerging Reformulations

The post-war decade of dissent and heterodoxy has not yet revealed the clear outlines of an emerging new body of comprehensive doctrine. But perhaps we can anticipate some of the major components of the reformulation now in process. The premises around which the new consensus—perhaps to become a new orthodoxy—would seem to be forming, may be stated somewhat as follows:

1. Public administration doctrine and practice is inescapably culture-bound. It is also bound to more specific values: to varying conceptions of the general public interest, to particular interest-group values, to the values of a specific administrative organization or bureaucracy at a specific time.

2. Public administration is one of the major political processes. The exercise of discretionary power, the making of value choices, is a characteristic and increasing function of administrators and bureaucrats; they are thus importantly engaged in politics.

3. Organization theory in public administration is a problem in political strategy; a choice of organization structure is a choice of which interest or which value will have preferred access or greater emphasis. Organization is, therefore, as Robert A. Dahl and

Charles E. Lindblom suggest in *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (Harper & Bros., 1953), a determinant in bargaining.

4. Management techniques and processes have their costs as well as their benefits. Each new version has a high obsolescence rate, its initial contributions to rationality declining as it becomes the vested interest of its own specialist guardians and/or other groups with preferred access.

5. Public administration is ultimately a problem in political theory: the fundamental problem in a democracy is responsibility to popular control; the responsibility and responsiveness of the administrative agencies and the bureaucracies to the elected officials (the chief executives, the legislators) is of central importance in a government based increasingly on the exercise of discretionary power by the agencies of administration.

Why Young Men of Quality Should Enter Public Service

I am all for young (and also old) men of quality going into public life and government service * * * Why? Not because I am persuaded that they are under any duty to sacrifice their lives for Jimmy Hoffa's children, but because there is no better or fuller life for a man of spirit. The old Greek conception of happiness is relevant here: "The exercise of vital powers along lines of excellence, in a life affording them scope."

. . . [O]utside of aesthetics and teaching–religion belongs to both–the requirement of "scope" is hard to come by in this age outside of public life.

Surely vital powers are exercised in the whole vast task of feeding, clothing, housing us, as I am sure Mr. McElroy was aware in making soap and being handsomely paid for it. But I am equally sure that he now feels a zest, a sense that the only limitation upon the exercise of all his vital powers is his own capacity, that he never felt before. . . .

Today, more than ever before the prize of the general is not a bigger tent, but command. The managers of industry and finance have the bigger tents, but command rests with government. Command, or, if one prefers, supreme leadership, demands and gives scope for the exercise of every vital power a man has in the direction of excellence.

How then, does one present to young boys a life of public service? Not, I am sure, as an evangelist appealing to the young squires to turn their backs on the world and dedicate themselves to a sort of secular order for ministering to the peasants. . . . Rather, I think, one educates them to know the world in which they live; to understand that government will go on whether they take part in it or not; that command is too important to be entrusted to the ignorant, even though they may be well-meaning and dedicated, and to an understanding of the good life, of happiness as the Greeks saw it. . . .

In addition, they might learn, as an authority on the process of revolution has pointed out, that "Brave men are not uncommon in any system, but there is a tendency in most systems to make courage and a disciplined openness of mind to the significant facts mutually exclusive. This is the immediate cause of the downfall of every ruling class that ever falls * * * ."

–Letter from Dean G. Acheson, former Secretary of State, reprinted in the "Washington" column of James Reston in the *New York Times*, February 2, 1958.

The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge

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IN THE Winter, 1958 issue of the *Review,* I described the plan which the President approved on August 2, 1957 for the orientation of top-level noncareer executives of the federal government. I also discussed some of the problems involved and some of the limitations of a completely government-operated program of orientation. Such a program cannot, of course, presume to pre-package the art of public administration and hand it to each new appointee for rapid consumption and digestion, but it has a number of merits, including helping officials to see where the principal pitfalls are hidden, accelerating the adjustment and effectiveness of such officials, and otherwise being generally helpful. It may also, if skillfully and thoughtfully handled, open some avenues of exploration for the alert public official who conceives of his new assignment as a challenge to improve governmental administration. It is this opportunity with which I am especially concerned in this article.

The organized governmental orientation program is usually confined to the first two or three weeks of each new official's service. Although the program continues in readiness for other appointees, it is short-lived with respect to each individual. The fact that the program, as it seems to be presently conceived, ends its contact with new officials after a short time without provision for a continuing link with the literature, the academic centers, and the "wise old birds" of public administration and political science is unfortunate. I commented in the previous article that, standing alone, without this link, the orientation program seems to ignore the efforts of many careful, scholarly, and wise people to organize and record the lessons of experience in the field of government.

A Continuing Fund of Knowledge

BRINGING the body of public administration knowledge to new presidential appointees is my focus in these two articles, but the problem may be seen more broadly as one of distilling public administration experience and research results for all the mature men and women entering the field, including elected and politically appointed state and local officials. Though one may not realistically expect that a large proportion of the top policy officials of the government will both find the time and have the inclination to avail themselves directly of the most usable parts of the literature and experience of public administration, political science, and politics, the opportunity should exist and should be made appetizing. No one can foretell how much of the recorded wisdom in this field may be absorbed and used by present and future public officials if arrangements are so devised as to facilitate this objective. If this is a function which the federal government is not at present in position to perform, perhaps other

means of achieving the objective can be devised.

Since the body of recorded knowledge, analysis, and comment related to public administration includes a great deal of history, certain elements of law, especially constitutional law, much of what is generally classified as political science, a substantial amount of economics, some sociology, psychology, and a few other related disciplines, as well as most of what falls under the narrower and more recent classification of "public administration," it is not susceptible of being offered to public administrators for cafeteria-style choice. A key problem is whether it is possible to communicate pertinent elements of this literature, in usable form, to administrators, either at a time when they need the material to assist them in making decisions, or at other times, with the expectation that it will be generally useful. A related question is whether, if they had the information in suitably excerpted or digested form (since much of the literature is too detailed to expect a busy administrator to take the time to read in full), they would read it and put it to good use. Still a third question is whether, if they were willing to use what seemed to them to be directly pertinent data, the reservoir of objective material is large enough to give administrators a feeling that it is worthwhile to turn fairly frequently to this source for some enlightenment on selected problems.

The answers to these questions can never be satisfactorily obtained, it would seem, until a genuine effort is made to provide administrators and other officials with more of the material they need and want, in a form in which they can use it. An underlying difficulty is the fact that many of the professionals who write in this field address a group of their confrères in the academic world and hopefully some of the less busy career people in government who have the taste for reading and the capacity to digest academic writing. Addressing other academicians in professional jargon and oftentimes at considerable length is, of course, very useful but does not, unfortunately, serve the simultaneous purpose of direct communication with officials at the vortex of government who have large amounts of decision-making power in their hands and heads. It may be validly argued that it is unfair to expect scholars to address articles and studies to the very tiny audience of public officials, even though these people are in the best position to use the material—assuming it is objective, pertinent, and logical. This would unduly hamper and cramp the scholars. They have far more to say on a particular subject than can be read and absorbed by a harassed public official. But granting that, is it not somebody's function in our society to put the best of this material, or at least the most pertinent of the good material, into succinct form so that it can be used by those who need it most? Even the career staff people, whose business it is to select relevant material for staff papers for top officials find it impossible to keep up on the literature. Individuals or groups making studies may not feel responsibility to prepare digests for a select few. But somebody should if the studies are good and relevant to current problems.

Subjects Needing Study

ANOTHER related problem is that too small a proportion of the existing literature in the field of public administration has direct enough pertinence to the specific problems faced by public administrators. And I am concerned that the drift seems away from studies of direct relevance to the decisions of top government officials. I do not decry the theoretical; I simply hate to see so many opportunities wasted to help administrators obtain better answers than they now have for certain very important, practical problems. Perhaps it would be helpful to illustrate, in an area that I happen to be familiar with, the need for some good studies of direct value to administrators.

Many departments are faced, from time to time, with major policy questions of a kind which seem to demand scrutiny from a group of distinguished citizens. One of the devices which has been used to meet this need has been the appointment of *ad hoc* presidential or other citizen commissions. Under what circumstances is the appointment of such a commission desirable? What are the alternatives, and the advantages and disadvantages of each? What are some of the difficulties of getting such a commission appointed and financed? Is

it necessary or desirable to obtain legislation authorizing such a commission before establishing it, or can it be done by presidential directive? What are some of the problems of staffing and of organizational relationship and responsibility which arise after such commissions are established? What has been the history of accomplishment of such commissions?

Experience on these related subjects is considerable, but unfortunately much of the most significant of that experience has never been written down in a manner which makes it useful to those who are faced with the need to make intelligent choices. Alan Dean of the Bureau of the Budget has recently made a useful start on this project with his paper entitled "Advantages and Disadvantages in the Use of *Ad Hoc* Commissions for Policy Formulation," presented at the 1957 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. But a great deal more needs to be done on this subject.

Another kind of problem with which many department and agency heads are faced concerns the manner of administering appropriated funds. They are often faced with the problem of how much latitude they have in spending the funds in a different manner than was intended and stated in the budget justifications submitted to the Congress. This is not a problem of legal authority but of maintaining relationships of mutual trust with the appropriations committees or sub-committees of Congress. A Cabinet officer or one of his principal subordinates may inadvertently damage relationships with appropriations sub-committees by deciding suddenly to depart from long-established practice and exercise his full legal authority to shift funds from one activity or purpose to another without consultation with or information to the two appropriations subcommittees. Committees often expect that the financial plans set forth in the detailed justifications will be carried out by the department approximately as stated, and that any major departure from those plans should be the subject of discussion with the Committee chairman, or, at the very least, the subject of a letter of explanation at the time it becomes necessary to make such departure. A newly appointed official who is not used to this problem may well chafe under what he is told are long-established practices. He may wish to try to extricate himself from what seems to him an overly confined and restricted position. His problem relates to the inevitably different perspective of the legislative and executive branches of the government, and wise means of accommodation between the two. He may ask whether a good study of executive latitude in administering appropriated funds has ever been made. If and when he does, he will be disappointed to learn that there is no general comparative study of this subject in existence, and very little written information of any kind. He will have to depend on information he is able to obtain by talking with selected people who have been through the mill. This subject, and broader matters of executive-legislative relationship, represent an area deserving of far more study than has been attempted. It should also be noted that this is an area requiring great sophistication and skill to produce useful writings.

A third subject on which many administrators, sooner or later, feel the need for more information and guidance than is readily available, is the subject of whether their departments or agencies or commissions are soundly organized. Some aspects of this problem are suitable for careful comparative study. The organization of the field service is a classic example, but nevertheless a very inadequately studied subject. The extent to which the field service in a multi-purpose department can represent the Secretary's broad interests and point of view, and the extent to which it must be a series of narrower direct line operations of subordinate units of the Department, is a complex subject deserving of much more study. Similarly, the problem of how to arrive at a wise balance between the economy of consolidated housekeeping services for diverse field units of a multi-purpose (or multi-organizational) department and the off-setting difficulties is a question on which hardly any work has been done.

Poor communication between top government officials and research scholars and students appears to be a major reason why more of this sort of study is not carried out. Most scholars like to feel that what they do has potential usefulness (though some would be the last to admit it), and the more certain they

feel about the likelihood of such usefulness, the more they are spurred to action. We should establish better channels of communicating to potential researchers the subjects on which administrators have a clearly felt need for good, objective studies.[1] This is not to suggest that research scholars in the field should concentrate on those subjects which public administrators say they need studied, to the exclusion of other significant matters; it is to encourage better analysis of these problems than has so far been achieved.

Available Material Needing Suitable Form

But despite the obvious need to increase the number and pertinency of studies of the administration of the federal government, there are, of course, many useful books, articles, and reports in existence. Especially since Woodrow Wilson, writings by men who combined experience in the public service with keen observation and reflection, have grown steadily. The writings of the past two or three decades in the fields of public administration and political science have been replete with the contributions of such men. There is certainly enough meat in them so that a careful selection of relevant morsels should be provided to newly appointed public administrators who have not previously been introduced to them. The case study approach has also enlivened the literature with material which should be more widely used than it has been. Such writings as the fascinating and edifying account of Elihu Root's creation of the General Staff of the United States Army contained in Philip Jessup's biography of Elihu Root,[2] George Wharton Pepper's disarmingly titled little book, *Family Quarrels*,[3] and, more recently, the excellent case studies made first under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council and subsequently under the Inter-University Case program, are a few examples of significant literature which could be put to better use than it has been. Significant committee and commission studies sometimes are too soon forgotten. In the recent concentration on the two Hoover Commission reports, the *Report* of the President's Committee on Administrative Management of 1937 tends, unfortunately, to be treated as an historical document, of greater interest to scholars than administrators. It has much continued relevance to the current scene.

In seeking historical perspective, the field is vast and the problem is one of selection. In general, it does not appear useful to attempt condensations or digests, but a good bibliography which described briefly the scope and approach of historical works of particular value to public administrators might be provocative.

In the field of critical analysis of policy, there is a great deal of material. In foreign policy and military policy, the amount and quality of material are sufficient to warrant suitable full-time staff in the Departments of State and Defense to condense and excerpt for top policy consideration the most significant of the writings in these fields. Elsewhere the amount of material produced does not seem sufficient for any single department or agency to have a specialist in condensing the literature for departmental use. This becomes a function which, though desirable, is normally performed by nobody.

Alexander Leighton's *The Governing of Men*[4] is classified as sociology, but belongs in a bibliography for officials who seek to understand the roots of public administration. Some of the recent studies of executive leadership and communication within organizations and of the reactions of individuals and groups to various types of supervision likewise deserve to be put to better use by public administrators.

There are, of course, a number of excellent works on the Presidency. This, it seems to me, is a subject which every high policy official in the executive branch should take a particular interest in. If presidential appointees are adequately to discharge their roles as agents of the President, they must understand what his job is. They may acquire much insight into this subject by reading the best of what has been written on this subject as well as being

[1] Among the groups considering this problem is the Committee on Research Needs and Resources of the American Society for Public Administration.

[2] Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938.

[3] Baker, Voorhis and Company, 1931.

[4] Princeton University Press, 1945.

briefed by a designated representative of the White House.

Developing Sources of Knowledge

Administrators deserve both the best of what is currently available, in a form which is usable by them, and better studies of a number of subjects than anything which has so far been done. It seems to me that we should be able to arrange matters so they will be able to get both. It would be even better if we could simultaneously make them contributors to the better answers, as well as users of them. The art of public administration could be much enhanced if a substantial number of presidentially appointed officials, as well as career officials, were to think of their service in the federal government as both an opportunity to draw upon and to contribute to an organized and recorded body of knowledge about the operation of government. But I do not think that this could feasibly be accomplished initially through attempting to enlarge the responsibility of the intra-governmental orientation plan for top policy-making officials, previously described. Though it can validly be argued that this is a proper governmental function, at least initially it seems clear that it requires a separate and nongovernmental approach.

There seems to me to be an unusual opportunity for a suitable nonprofit institution, probably supported by foundation funds, to establish in Washington a developmental and demonstration project the major purpose of which would be to facilitate (but make no attempt to monopolize) the two-way communication between the men who carry the heavy responsibilities and make the decisions of the executive branch of the federal government and those who study the processes of government with an effort toward objectivity. A related purpose would be to provide stimulation of, support for, and service to the new government orientation program for presidential appointees.

Such a staff might have the following purposes and perform the following functions:

1. Consult at intervals with top administrators and other officials and determine what problems they face which (a) are of concern to a number of officials, (b) are of a kind which could be studied objectively without insuperable obstacles, and (c) have not been competently studied previously or at least not recently. This would be followed by an effort to enlist the interest of appropriate persons in undertaking studies of these subjects.

2. Conduct a continuing experiment in digesting, excerpting, and otherwise putting into usable form, from the standpoint of a busy federal official, significant articles and studies and undertaking to see that they are provided to people who should be in a position to make effective use of them, including particularly top-level career assistants to presidentially appointed administrators. Digesting has obvious limitations and should be thought of primarily as a means of signalizing the availability of the fuller text and giving a limited idea of its content. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated in the field of scientific abstracts, it can serve a very useful purpose.

3. Conduct the same kind of two-way exchange with key career officials as with non-career executives.

4. Feed into the intra-governmental orientation system certain useful training materials and aids which are developed as an element or a by-product of this program.

5. Make available to other training programs—such as those being conducted for federal executives by the Brookings Institution and the University of Chicago under Ford Foundation grants and, on an intergovernmental basis, by ASPA—some of the materials developed for top-level non-career executives under this plan which may be equally useful for career executives.

6. Serve as an important auxiliary source of orientation when officials are, for any reason, not satisfied with the orientation they receive from the intra-governmental system. This function would be particularly important at a time when there was a change of administration.

7. Enlist the assistance and support of administrators in certain types of study of governmental operations to which they might contribute, including, wherever possible, agreement to confidential interviews in depth on a variety of subjects.

8. Work out an arrangement whereby administrators can be informed of the availability of ex-officials—both career and political appointees—with distinguished records in the field of public administration, who would be willing, for a reasonable honorarium, to act in a consulting capacity on subjects with which they are particularly familiar.

9. Assist departments and agencies to develop bibliographies, and hopefully small personal collections, kept in the office of each presidential appointee and tailored to his needs, of useful ma-

terial of both general and specific relevance to the position. As each appointee serves, he may both add to and comment upon, for the information of his successors, the contents of such collections.

Three Major Steps

THE last three items deserve some elaboration.

A diplomatically executed effort to enlist the aid of top policy-making officials in enlarging the body of recorded knowledge of federal administration might well serve the purpose of making it more likely that currently available knowledge might be put to good use. This, of course, again presumes that a method can be worked out for putting significant portions of that knowledge into briefer and more usable form than at present. When I speak of enlisting the aid of officials in enlarging the body of recorded knowledge, I do not mean persuading them to keep diaries and write their memoirs (although some of these are fascinating and valuable). I mean several other things. Being alert to recognize areas which need and are susceptible of objective and comparative study, exploring how such studies can best be made; welcoming nongovernmental scholars to make studies (including some which may not seem immediately useful), even at some small but not unreasonable inconvenience to the organization; encouraging personnel in the organization to engage in professional study and writing, including suitable leave for such purposes; writing, if the spirit moves and his experience yields something worth writing about, as it likely will; and finally, participating at intervals in a confidential interview in depth about his experience and the trend of his thinking as a public official. Such depth interviews may offer substantial possibilities for enlarging the body of knowledge of federal administration. If conducted by representatives of a responsible and scholarly institution, such interviews could be handled in accordance with the desires and stipulation of each official. Statements could be designated as completely nonquotable and impersonal, usable only for statistical or mass treatment; quotable in part, but without attribution; or quotable after a specified number of years, etc. This type of interview would help later public administrators by providing insights into why certain courses of action were taken, and what the alternatives seemed to be at the time. It would also permit a comparative study of the changes in attitudes of administrators and other public officials on subjects to which they brought certain preconceived ideas at the time of appointment.

Before the storehouse of experience and wisdom of distinguished former officials and others with broad experience in public administration—many of whom are more or less retired—passes out of reach, an organized effort should be made to mine this gold deposit. One way to do this is to enlist their interest in and availability for part-time consulting work on subjects with which they have special familiarity. Some of these men would be glad, if asked, to share their experience and wisdom with newcomers to government. A suitable scale of honoraria should, of course, be arranged. Some of the newcomers would be glad to avail themselves of such an opportunity to learn from the old-timers. But the latter are too proud and independent to advertise their availability (in some cases it would even take a good deal of persuasion to make them available), and it rarely occurs to the latter that this would be a good source of advice. So the two sets of people who could form a mutually profitable relationship never get together. A respected nonprofit institution could usefully perform the service of matching needs and talents. It goes without saying that even distinguished and successful former administrators are not without their prejudices, and that some of the current circumstances may place sharp limits on the applicability of some of their tediously acquired wisdom. Even so, such men have much to offer.

A related step needs to be taken. That is, making a collection and a highly readable compilation of the useful lore known to these experienced "old hands." If a Cabinet officer or agency head has been designated (either explicitly or implicitly) by the President as the principal official responsible for attempting to pilot through the Congress a bill sponsored by the administration, it would be extremely helpful to him, assuming he has never

been through the experience before, to read a good summary, with interesting case examples, of how this sort of thing has previously been done, successfully and unsuccessfully. This involves, of course, at least a partial understanding of parliamentary procedure and tactics as well as personal cultivation of key senators and congressmen. More than that, it involves weaving together a variety of types of knowledge and wisdom. The lore of how people have become particularly effective in their jobs, as distinguished from being simply efficient and correct, adds life and color and reality to what might otherwise be a dry study of procedure. A good deal of this sort of thing is recorded in memoirs, often with a particular slant and often with only half or a third of the story told which should be written down. Putting this kind of material into a form which could attract and hold the attention of high government officials, adding to its scope, and organizing it usefully, might prove a valuable undertaking.

It should be particularly noted that the usefulness of such a plan is not predicated on the assumption that a high proportion of new appointees to the top echelons of the federal government will eagerly embrace the kind of plan set forth above and make extensive use of it. Many will not. Even if, however, only a minority of newly appointed officials were to make use of it initially, such a plan has the potentiality of growth and acceptance as it demonstrates its capacity for usefulness. The experienced career men who are in direct contact with the top appointive officials are also, of course, in a position to make use of such a service, and many of them can transmit useful ideas and material to officials who, themselves, would make no direct use of this service.

Many elements of sophistication and wisdom have been learned by bitter experience; they have the potential of preventing other bitter experience, but only if systematically passed on. This sort of activity falls into no institutional bailiwick. Being nobody's business and being the kind of function for which appropriation requests seem improbable, it is unlikely to be assumed very soon by any governmental agency. If it is to be done, it seems clear that it will have to be undertaken, at least initially, by a nongovernmental institution.

As I have said, I think the set of functions described above could not feasibly be initiated as an adjunct of the intra-governmental plan of orienting presidential appointees, but could feasibly and effectively be developed by a respected nongovernmental organization with a small, flexible staff. This should be a very challenging opportunity to such an organization.

The existence of the governmental orientation program and the favorable climate which surrounds it would enhance greatly the opportunities of such a nongovernmental activity, and vice versa—the likelihood of long endurance and healthy development of the governmental program would be markedly increased, particularly during the infancy of such a governmental program, by the existence of a nongovernmental staff of the kind described above. Each would strengthen the other's work. Both should go beyond the description of structure and process and help administrators and their first lieutenants understand how problems with some similarity to those which they now face have been dealt with elsewhere and previously, thus to provide a better springboard into the future. If successfully developed and demonstrated, the federal government may conclude, in due course, that this type of activity is an essential function of complex, space-age government, and find a suitable permanent place for it within the federal structure.

Toward City-School District Rapprochement

By ROBERT L. MORLAN

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In terms of the size of the public served, the importance of the service, the number of public employees involved, and the magnitude of total budgets, the administration of public education in the United States is truly a major segment of governmental activity. Yet it has functioned in relative isolation from other public services and almost completely out of touch with the rest of the public administration profession. Public education is in large measure administered through more than 50,000 separate, independent units of government. Its practitioners rarely take academic training in the broad field of public administration, and they are brought up through a system of intellectual inbreeding within the collegiate departments and schools of education. Professional contacts tend to be limited to the education field; only occasionally does a representative from the public schools participate in an association of public administrators. Not uncommonly there is a measure of guarded verbal sniping across the very real boundary between the two fields.

This verbal battle of separation versus integration has been waged in a desultory fashion for a great many years without much visible success for either side. There have been few if any notable conversions, perhaps in part because of the rather dogmatic and unbending nature of the arguments expressed by spokesmen for each point of view. Is it not time to consider seriously the possibility that there may be certain merits in both sets of arguments, and to discard the uncompromising "all or nothing" approach in favor of attempting to develop more significant avenues of intergovernmental cooperation in this area?

The Separation-Integration Argument

Every profession quite naturally develops not only its own jargon but also certain creeds of orthodoxy. The desirability of operating schools through independent districts has traditionally constituted one such creed among the educational administrators, something to which each neophyte must subscribe in order to be a respectable member of the fraternity. While hardly a burning issue in other areas of public service, the mere suggestion of possible advantages in the integration of public educational and general units of local government can raise blood pressures rapidly within this group. On the other hand, most students of public administration have been conditioned to believe in the benefits of integrated organization as a virtually unvarying principle, almost regardless of special circumstances.

The educators have contended that education should be separate because it is so big, because it is not like other functions of government, because independence insures better financial support for the schools, because it keeps the schools "out of politics," and because it focuses public attention upon the schools

and thus guarantees greater interest and support.

In turn, the "political scientist-general administrator clan" has replied that education from an administrative point of view is no more different from other functional services, such as social welfare and fire protection, than they are different from each other, and that the logical extension of the principle of independence would be the chaos of a separate unit of government for every major governmental service. Experience, they say, does not indicate that the schools suffer financially in the integrated ("dependent") systems that exist, nor does it appear that school districts have been unusually immune from corrupt politics. In the proper sense of the term "politics," moreover, school systems ought to be *in* politics—actively responsive to the people they serve—a theme vigorously supported by the education profession. Further, extensive public interest is hardly apparent at present in the notoriously small voting turnout in the average school board election or in the attentiveness of the public to the board's actions once elected.

In a more positive vein, the generalist administrator would contend that the citizen-taxpayer would benefit from a more comprehensively planned budget and tax program which included education with other local government services, that a great deal of costly duplicating activity could be eliminated, and that responsibility to the public would be enhanced by ending the confusion caused by the existence of these separate governmental units and focusing attention upon a single one.[1]

A special problem area of current significance, to which very little systematic attention has been given, is that of direct conflicts between governments arising where separate city and school governments serve essentially the same community. While a certain amount of intergovernmental cooperation normally exists, there are an increasing number of friction points—particularly in areas of rapid growth. When the school district builds a new building can the city require it, like any other developer of property, to put in street improvements and sidewalks and to plant trees as a condition of permission for development? If not, is the city responsible for a condition it did not create? If facilities are constructed in a previously undeveloped area, is the city obliged suddenly to distort its engineering budget to construct access roads and water mains? How much of the summer recreation program can the city expect the school district to handle? Is it the city's or the school district's responsibility to hire crossing guards on city streets adjacent to school buildings? And the list goes on.

Each government has a limited budget; as a rule neither is eager to assume any tasks that are not clearly its responsibility. Complete separation of school districts either creates or intensifies such difficulties; a single authority contributes to the planned and orderly solution of the various problems.

How Different Is Education?

While the functions and problems of administrators in different governmental activities may be fundamentally similar, they tend to have their own peculiar characteristics. Is it true that education is a basically distinctive function? What are some of the features which may make educational administration look "different"? Certainly the sheer magnitude of the job being accomplished is in itself impressive—some 30 million children in the schools, involving the work of over 1.25 million teachers and a total annual expenditure of more than $8 billion. School systems are faced not only with burgeoning enrollments but also with steadily increasing demands as to what they should be doing for this multitude of children.

In the second place, school administration

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[1] For discussion of these conflicting points of view see: Ernest A. Engelbert, "Educational Administration and Responsible Government," 75 *School and Society* 33-36 (January 19, 1952); responses in the same publication by Frederick C. McLaughlin, "Local Government and School Control," and W. G. Fordyce, "Independent School Board," 75:211-14, 214-16 (April 5, 1952); rejoinder by Engelbert, 76:73-75 (August 2, 1952): Eldon L. Johnson, "Co-ordination: The Viewpoint of a Political Scientist," 302 *The Annals* 136-42 (November, 1955); Nelson B. Henry and Jerome G. Kerwin, *Schools and City Government* (University of Chicago Press, 1938); and Robert L. Morlan, *Intergovernmental Relations in Education* (University of Minnesota Press, 1950), esp. pp. 50-53 and chap. 2.

commonly operates in a comparatively favorable public relations environment. With only occasional exceptions the press tends to handle school matters relatively sympathetically and with a minimum of sensationalism. There is rarely a continuous focus of attention upon them. Moreover, the American public is conditioned to a belief in the desirability of public education and is inclined to accept rather readily proposals which are said to be for the good of the schools. The public is also less likely to think of the school system as "government," and it thus escapes some of the effects of the basic American antagonism toward government and politics.

In this connection, educational administration benefits tremendously from the solid backing of a "built-in" pressure group, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers. Here is a large body of citizens, feeling an obligation to be a part of the organization while their children are in school, who by the very nature of the relationship are easily influenced by the school administration. It in no way detracts from the very real importance of the PTA to note its usefulness to the administrator as a sounding board and a base of support on policy questions. While many administrative agencies have a special clientele group which is similarly useful, few are blessed with one of such size and malleability, which, at the same time, represents such a complete cross-section of the population.

Differences in personnel and budget matters are essentially differences in degree. The educational administrator is no less concerned with personnel management than is the general administrator, but the problems tend to be more narrowly channelized. The majority of the personnel are professional people, a situation which provides its own headaches, but the process of recruitment is simplified and no really elaborate classification system is necessary. While it is difficult at present to secure adequate numbers of qualified teachers, eligibility is determined through a procedure of state certification based primarily upon academic training. The common practice of providing a formal system of "tenure" for the professional group injects an added complication. For so-called "noncertificated" personnel, principally clerical, service, and maintenance, a more familiar pattern of recruitment, testing, and classification is prevalent.

Stretching a limited budget in the attempt to cover all needs is of course a universal administrative challenge, but it may be true that tax increases and bond issues are often a bit easier to secure for schools than for other purposes. At least the school district finds fewer problems of allocation than does a multipurpose unit of government. It performs a single function, and the bulk of its current funds goes into salaries. There is normally very little variety in revenue sources, dependence in most communities being almost exclusively upon the general property tax and state aids.

Since school districts are ordinarily able to concentrate upon the sole function of education, they need not be concerned with functions incidental to the main task, such as assessment and collection of taxes, which are necessarily major activities of the general unit of government. Such services are usually performed for them by county governments. Indeed, it is a striking fact that although school districts are so often independent of the cities which share much the same area and population, they are commonly more dependent than other units upon both the county and the state.

While the states, of course, exercise authority over all local governmental units, they have tended to subject school district activities to unusually detailed regulation. For example, the state legislature may fix the minimum length of the school term, provide that a certain percentage of school funds must be used for teacher salaries, and prohibit paying a salary to any teacher who is not certified by the state. The state department of education not uncommonly has power to approve or reject proposed building plans, to prescribe the use of certain texts, and to require specific physical equipment. Its influence is greatly extended through the issuance of various manuals and curriculum guides, the sponsorship of conferences and other training programs, and through inspections, audits, and report requirements. A considerable amount of this state control is exercised through the mecha-

nism of the ordinarily extensive state grant-in-aid programs.

The Case for Partial Integration

WHILE it would seem to be apparent that administrative differences provide no significant grounds for separation, yet size, tradition, and other considerations may nevertheless justify for education a relationship different from that which prevails for other local functions. Not only is opposition to integration strong among most public school administrators, but the volume of business and number of difficult problems already facing the average city council will not lead many councils to seek the addition of school responsibilities.

The logical development seems to lie in the direction of a type of semi-integration of the schools and general government whereby most of the advantages of an integrated organization might be accomplished while retaining areas of independence for the schools. Under such a proposal the school system might become a part of city (or in certain cases county) government, but continue to have its own board for certain policy determinations and the selection of the "superintendent." Such an arrangement might, incidentally, tend to keep the schools from being embroiled in controversies involving other departments, and vice versa.

In view of the immensity of their expenditures, it is probably desirable to retain a separately designated tax levy for the schools. This is useful from a public information point of view, and the public also is perhaps better able to swallow two tax bites than one all-inclusive one.

Despite these features of separation or independence, the significant advantages of cooperative budget and tax planning, centralized assessment and collection, a single treasury management, centralized purchasing, and so on could be realized through partial integration. Bond issues may often be sold by such a joint unit at a more favorable rate than a school district alone could hope to secure, and the shifting of temporary fund surpluses may not uncommonly reduce or eliminate costly tax anticipation borrowing. There is no good reason why the city attorney's office cannot serve as legal counsel for the school system, why the services of the city engineer's office should not be made available, or why the central personnel office should not handle personnel matters involving noncertificated school employees. Much needless conflict and confusion in the field of physical planning could be avoided. Integration in some of these areas already exists in certain places, but frequently it is haphazard and at best it includes only a minority of districts.

As city administration continues to become more and more professionalized, some of the existing barriers to city-school integration may be broken down. It is undoubtedly true that little advantage could be gained by integrating the schools with a city government which is itself unintegrated, and there is interesting evidence of a more favorable attitude on the part of some educators toward a degree of integration with council-manager-type city governments.

Much could be achieved by a sincere effort on the part of those in the public administration profession and their counterparts in the education field to improve their understanding of one another's problems, methods, and accomplishments, especially through the informal contacts possible in the local and regional professional associations. In the colleges and universities there is an obligation on the part of the departments and schools of education and of political science and public administration to consider ways in which the traditional chasm may be bridged through better mutual understanding. This may take the form of cooperatively taught seminars and the wider acceptance of credits toward "majors" for courses given in the other departments; but at least it should involve the inclusion of relevant materials and discussion in courses in the respective fields. There are also numerous untapped opportunities for significant cooperative research.[2]

[2] Such developments as have occurred along these lines in recent years have received much of their impetus from the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration, fostered by the Kellogg Foundation. Reports are available on experimental programs at several universities, but most touch only incidentally upon the problems discussed here.

Educational administrators and those of the generalist point of view have traded rather fruitless arguments at arm's length for long enough. Can they not turn now to a cooperative approach toward coordination and integration that will enable the citizen to benefit from better and more economical local government services?

Father of the "Lakewood Plan"

To The Editor

Public Administration Review

I have just finished reading a most interesting article in *Public Administration Review,* Summer of 1957, entitled "Metropolitan Coordination in Los Angeles" by Judith Norvell Jamison and Richard Bigger.

It is, in the main, an excellent article which serious students of improving government should study carefully.

However, there is one statement in it which simply is not accurate. It reads: "Only a few years ago, under his [Robert Andersen] tutelage, Lakewood became the first city to secure all of its municipal-type services from Los Angeles County under a type of all inclusive, general services contract."

There is no desire on my part to detract from Mr. Andersen's brilliant record and ability as an administrator. However, I am sure, knowing him as well as I do, he would want these statements to be correct.

The facts of record are that the contract referred to was devised by City Attorney John Todd, working in close cooperation with Los Angeles County Counsel Hal Kennedy. Most of the principal contracts the City of Lakewood is operating under today were in force and operation before Mr. Andersen was hired to be City Administrator.

. . . a group of citizens interested in incorporating Lakewood had asked Mr. Todd the feasibility of such an idea because of the enormous expense of setting up a city under traditional methods. The contract operation was Mr. Todd's answer, and one which, the article so justly implies, is having a profound effect in this area. . . .

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. BURNS
Councilman,
City of Lakewood, California

In reply:

. . . I am very happy that Mr. Burns wrote to describe in detail the manner in which the first contracts between Lakewood and the County of Los Angeles were created. The creation of these contracts and the idea of the "Lakewood plan" was very important indeed. However, Miss Jamison and I are perfectly well aware of the origin of these contracts, and we did not include this story in the article because we felt it had been published elsewhere. Our only reason for describing Mr. Andersen as we did was to indicate the facts that (1) the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County employed the one person who had the earliest and most extensive experience with administering the general services contract from the cities' point of view, and (2) that they had hired a professional administrator in an attempt to do a professional job of administering metropolitan government.

Sincerely,

W. RICHARD BIGGER,
Professor of Political Science
San Diego State College

Flesh for the Bones of Principle

(In which Socrates Explains the Case Method of Teaching Public Administration and Almost Becomes an Administrator Himself in the Process)

By JOHN D. MONTGOMERY

Head, Academic Instruction Section

Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group

Nearly forty years ago, the case approach to administrative behavior was introduced into the American classroom. It is now well established there, but in other countries where the United States is extending technical assistance it has not yet been accepted. The essay below, which first appeared in the Vietnamese journal Nghien-Cuu Hanh-Chanh *(Administrative Research) is an effort to clothe this new approach in respectable garb. It is perhaps not inappropriate to note that the roots of the case method stretch back twenty-five hundred years to Socrates and his successors Plato and Aristotle. Here is how Socrates might have introduced the method to his Athenian friends if he had happened to think it necessary to supplement the education of philosopher kings with a little practical work in public administration:*

SOCRATES: That was indeed an eloquent speech of Protagoras; yet I am not sure just what I have learned from him today.

GLAUCON, a student: You are not easily satisfied, Socrates. Is not Protagoras our most famous teacher of administration? Has he not written the most useful formulas for the organization of men? And are not his principles the most acclaimed of all the teachings of our learned men?

SOC.: That is true, and I may be at fault for not knowing how to master his principles and put them to good use.

GLAU.: You would be the last man I should accuse of stupidity, Socrates.

SOC.: So indeed I am.

GLAU.: But what could be simpler than his advice regarding "span of control," or the "scalar principle"; or his teachings about the division between "line" and "staff?"

SOC.: Simplicity is indeed a virtue.

GLAU.: I know what you are going to say, Socrates, and I will anticipate: that the truth is a greater virtue than simplicity.

SOC.: Will you then go further and tell me how we can learn the truth about the public administration?

GLAU.: I have heard you too often not to have an answer to this question: you learn it by observing and reflecting upon the work of good and bad administrators and by deriving general principles which can withstand the criticism of thoughtful men.

SOC.: You have learned my simple wisdom very well.

GLAU.: Now you are taunting me, Socrates. Do you not agree that Protagoras'

principles are reasonable as well as simple?

SOC.: They are impressive when he teaches them.

GLAU.: Your words are words of praise, but in your mouth they have a critical sound.

SOC.: Then I must speak further, so that you will not think me jealous of Protagoras or that I do not prize his wisdom and eloquence.
I know that his lecture was a model of organization and presentation, and that what he has said is commonly thought about the sciences and arts of administration. And yet, as you have suggested, I am dissatisfied. For what have we surely learned from Protagoras? How will you prove his principles? Which of his students shall we rate the highest?

GLAU.: Here are many questions, Socrates, but I shall try to answer them honestly. First, we have learned the rules of administration. Second, we shall prove them as we apply them in our public careers. Third, we must finally rate highest the man who has achieved the greatest success as an administrator: and in the meantime we shall give the best grades to those students who have best learned the rules of administration.

SOC.: And how shall we be assured that those of his hearers who have learned the rules can best apply them? I see that this question displeases you; so let me ask another. How do we know that the rules themselves are wise?

GLAU.: But this is administration itself: the rules agreed upon by wise men and preserved by the traditions of scholarship and inquiry. These rules are the alphabet of the language of administration.

SOC.: And does knowledge of the alphabet make a great poet?

GLAU.: No, but there are no poets who are ignorant of the alphabet.

SOC.: Is this knowledge a part of poetry, or does it rather enable the poet to communicate his works to those who cannot hear him speak?

GLAU.: We are straying, Socrates. Surely you are not proposing that an administrator should not trouble to learn the rules of administration.

SOC.: That is true. Just as the teachers of the alphabet are useful in society, so are those who explain to us the rules of administration. Yet the poet does not think of the alphabet at all as he works. Is not the administrator as well too busy to worry about the precepts of Protagoras? But I see you do not need to answer this question, for here comes Iphicrates, who has spent his life in the service of the state, and who can therefore answer these troublesome questions better than either you or I. Iphicrates, can you stop and talk with us a few minutes?

IPHICRATES: I will gladly talk, and still more gladly listen; but as I am nearly late for my next appointment, I must ask you to walk along with me while we converse.

SOC.: This is still better, Iphicrates, for we can in this way learn your principles of administration while you are at work.

IPH.: I have no principles except to be on time.

GLAU.: Is this the only advice you can give to me in preparing myself for the public service?

IPH.: The only way to prepare for the public service is to work for the state. I myself have served that master since I was conscripted into the army many many years ago, and there is no teacher—not even Socrates—who can equal experience as a source of wisdom and knowledge.

SOC.: Least of all, Socrates, I should have said; and Socrates would be the last to deny the pre-eminence of experi-

ence as a teacher of men. But not all men can have the richness of experience that you have enjoyed, Iphicrates; and fewer still can learn as much from it. Shall we not work to the end that Glaucon and others may learn from your experience, and from your ability to convert each experience into knowledge?

GLAU.: Socrates is in danger of contradicting himself now, for he is asking you, Iphicrates, to develop principles of knowledge that I may learn; but a few moments ago he told me that principles were of little practical use to an administrator.

IPH.: I cannot formulate general principles, in any case, for I am a practical man rather than a follower of theories of government.

SOC.: Before I allow myself to become inconsistent, I must ask another question.

IPH.: You will learn, Glaucon, that Socrates never contradicts himself, for he never commits himself to anything, but only asks questions so that those who answer may be guilty of contradiction rather than he.

SOC.: It is true that I am more interested in asking questions than in hearing answers too readily given; and yet I have committed myself today by saying that I do not think the teaching of rules and principles of administration is a sufficient means of training men for the public service. Do you agree, Iphicrates?

IPH.: I do. But I confess myself discomfited by Glaucon's question, and yours, Socrates. Must all men wait until experience has ripened them into good administrators? Must the state suffer the errors of its apprentices while men are adding to their own private wisdom at the public expense?

SOC.: Is that how you learned your art, Iphicrates?

IPH.: Indeed it is, Socrates, for no one made more mistakes than I in those early years when I first had charge of the work of other men of even less experience.

SOC.: Did you learn from errors only, or did your wise decisions also furnish the basis for further action? Cannot men learn from their successes as well as their failures?

IPH.: I think adversity is the better teacher.

SOC.: You are saying, are you not, that one can surely learn from experience only those things which he should *not* do, and must use his imagination to find some other solution if he is to avoid similar mistakes in the future? If this is so, then how is anything well administered except by accident? Must all administrators proceed solely by using their imagination to avoid the errors of the past? Is there no virtue in the past which can be brought into the present and the future?

IPH.: I cannot think this is right, Socrates; but I have no time to answer you further, for we are already at my office door, and I see that I am just in time for my appointment.

GLAU.: I am not satisfied with our progress, Socrates.

SOC.: Nor am I. Iphicrates, before you go you must answer one more question.

IPH.: Please make it a practical one, then, Socrates, for my mind does not work by abstractions and fine distinctions.

SOC.: It is this: do you think that if Glaucon went with you and observed your day's work he could learn how you have proceeded in finding the solution to the problems of this day? For I know that each day at your office you are compelled to resolve questions of some public importance.

IPH.: I confess that I do not see how my own processes of making decisions can instruct another.

SOC.: Can he not learn from your present wisdom how you avoid the mistakes of your own past? In this instance I shall

suggest that Glaucon talk not with you alone, but with others with whom you will work in resolving today's question and with those whom it will affect and those who have an interest in its outcome. When he has learned from all these sources what your problem really means, perhaps he (and I, too, if he will tell me all he has learned) can know as much about the problem as you do.

IPH.: More, I should think, because I cannot take the time to see everybody who will be affected by the decision I must make today. In fact, in this case I doubt if even he can consult all the interested parties, for I am working on the interpretation of a tax law, and every citizen in Athens will be affected by what I decide.

SOC.: In that case, can we not invite Cepalus and Polemarcus to look into this matter as well, so that we may have as much information about it as possible?

IPH.: But I do not see how this can be of any practical use, for by the time you have finished your study the decision will already have been made. My decision cannot wait until you have organized your question-and-answer parties into an interview schedule and finally written up a case history of this question.

SOC.: That is true; but if we have learned what you know now and can find out what else can be known today, can we not also determine how adequate the information was upon which you had to act? And can we not speculate upon the additional or alternative means that could have been employed in reaching a wise decision? Can we not thus see how the rules or common sense of administration can be applied in similar future cases?

IPH.: You are going, then, to attempt to recreate the circumstances of this day's decision so that it may be better understood by others and by myself?

SOC.: If you have no objection.

IPH.: But even if you succeed in reproducing the immediacy of one of my experiences today, how will this help Glaucon become a successful administrator? Would it not be wiser to assign him as my assistant, not only to observe, but also to assist me in my administrative operations, and thus gain practical experience as an administrator?

SOC.: What kinds of practical work experience could you assign to Glaucon? He has already had instruction in the law and in administrative organization and has some understanding of the economy of the artisans' shop and of the market place. I can testify to his love of learning and his readiness to absorb the wisdom of his teachers. Does he qualify for service as a professional assistant? And if he does, how will this improve his administrative skill?

IPH.: He can handle my routine affairs and learn how the working of my office is organized so as to reduce the need for constant personal attention to mechanical details. This should be helpful to any administrator, for one of his most important problems is to free himself from details so that he can devote his attention to policies.

GLAU.: I agree that this kind of experience would be helpful, but would repeated participation in mechanical administrative operations help me develop an understanding of the more important problems of administrative judgment? I need to know the work of clerks and messengers, but how will this knowledge teach me the subtleties of supervision and leadership? For I am beginning to agree with Socrates and with you, Iphicrates, that knowledge of principles and rules will not be sufficient.

IPH.: I am already late for my appointment. But before I go, let me propose a compromise: if you will put Glaucon at my disposal for several weeks so

that he may gain the necessary administrative background of my work, at the end of that time I will explain the tax decision I am about to make and give him an opportunity to explore the reasons for it thoroughly. What do you say, Socrates?

SOC.: It is for Glaucon to agree for it is his time that we are about to commit and his career, and those of his fellow students, that we hope to advance.

GLAU.: Of course I agree. I shall return in an hour to learn my new duties if you will be ready for me.

SOC.: And now that we are in the market place, let us seek out Cepalus and Polemarcus and inquire if they would be interested in our proposal. Cepalus, will you join with Glaucon and me in testing some of the administrative principles we heard Protagoras describe so eloquently this morning?

CEPALUS: Good day, Socrates, and you, Glaucon. I do not understand your purpose. Does the obvious need testing?

SOC.: The commonplaces should be examined first of all, since we depend so much on them. And should not this be true especially of the affairs of state, which are so unpredictable, and are yet the most important of men's concerns? We have been discussing the training of public administrators and have agreed that the application of general principles is as important as the principles themselves, yet is often neglected in the discourses on the subject. Iphicrates has just told us that experience is the only way of learning how the general should be applied to the specific, and Glaucon and he have agreed to examine intensively the background of a single important decision he is to make today, so that we can learn from this experience how other similar decisions can best be reached.

CEP.: This seems a promising venture, but I do not see how I can help.

GLAU.: Socrates thinks that while I study Iphicrates' point of view in this case, you can be learning about the same decision from others who participate in it or are interested in its outcome.

SOC.: That is what I propose, if you are willing, Cepalus. And when you and others have finished your studies, we shall gather together to prepare a single history of the case, with all the relevant facts introduced, so that those who come after us may also benefit from our efforts.

CEP.: This seems very accommodating of you, but will not Protagoras and the other lecturers be forced to abandon their labors if the case method proves a successful means of teaching the art of administration?

SOC.: Say rather that their work will become the more effective, for experience enriches theory and the exposition of principles; it does not displace it.

GLAU.: Does not even Iphicrates, who says that he has learned by experience alone, hope himself to gain still more knowledge from our efforts? For through them he can test the adequacy of his own "information system."

CEP.: This language of yours is more suited to the analyses of a technician or an efficiency expert than to the modest dimensions of our case inquiry. Are we, then, to undertake administrative measurements, to plot efficiency scales, and to trace processes and flows on charts and graphs?

SOC.: Certainly we shall use all methods of analysis that are appropriate to our inquiry. For our work is still too humble to scorn the offerings of those who have designed exact measurements of administrative performance. Our task is to press more deeply into the process of administration than the general principles can reach, and

to do this we shall need the resources and the experiences of all the students of government.

GLAU.: Well, good day to you again, Iphicrates, and how is it that you are with us again so soon after your appointment?

IPH.: I finished early and came to inquire whether Socrates has really tricked you all—and himself, too—into joining in this case study. For you know, this will be the first time that Socrates will have trapped himself into doing something instead of just talking about it.

SOC.: That is so, my dear Iphicrates. But I have this one consolation: that if we do our work well, there will be more talking done about it than you or I could do in a lifetime. And my work, and that of others to follow, will be simply to raise questions and to guide those who would answer, by posing further questions. So you see, Socrates will win after all, for his questions will help others find answers.

Efficiency and Values

. . . The efficiency goal as defined in management literature can have little or no value when the decision is primarily an application of a legal standard to facts, balancing of consequences, or choice among values or loyalties.

. . . .

It is possible that the management concept of efficiency has now become so inadequate as a measure of the total process of government that the term "efficiency" should be redefined. It might include success in balancing results as well as success in achieving a satisfactory means-result ratio. It might include skill in applying law to facts. It might include skill in tracing all aspects of a problem and defining the alternatives of solution which are feasible. . . .

. . . But even the broader concept would not supply a completely adequate test for administration in areas where it is recipient of discretionary responsibilities. . . .

. . . .

. . . A military commander may have a clear military objective of winning a battle, but winning it may involve great sacrifice of human life. More human material may be readily available but the commander may still consider the sacrifice too great. Why should he? Because the society he represents is permeated with the ideal of the value of each and every life. I recall a conference in the public service in which I argued that we were concerned in our enforcement efforts only with the "solvency of our program." A fellow bureaucrat protested, "Hell, no! We are interested in the solvency of the system of law." I was interested in getting a job done, as defined in program objectives; he was interested in the effects of the performance of our job on the survival of community values. I readily admit that his was the broader and the more correct vision. No administrator has the right to adopt expedients which save his program but impair the values upon which the success of all public functions depends.

—Emmette S. Redford, *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1958), pp. 16-18.

On the Teaching of Public Administration Abroad

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FOR a considerable period of time, in the United States, we have been trying to teach ideas and skills in public administration to college students and to civil servants. One of the most interesting developments of the postwar years is the growth of organized efforts to transmit these ideas and skills to various foreign groups. This is a task which, while it may have great potential rewards, is not accomplished easily. Some of the problems in these cross-cultural teaching programs may be of interest not only because of their direct application, but because they may have some application also to our domestic activities.

Different Programs Needed for Students and Civil Servants

THE writer of these observations has had the good fortune to be associated over a four-year period with two American-sponsored public administration programs outside the United States. From 1953 to 1956 he was director of the in-service training program in public administration at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. During the academic year 1955-56 he was a part-time participant in and a privileged observer of the Corso di Specializzazione in Scienze Amministrative held at the University of Bologna, Italy, under the aegis of the Law School of that university and with the cooperation of the University of California.

Both of these programs performed two functions—the training of university students in public administration and the in-service training of government employees. Neither program was directly concerned with the related function of performing consultant work to foreign government agencies.

In the Beirut program the two functions are clearly distinguished. A Department of Public Administration was established in the College of Arts and Sciences of the American University of Beirut, which offered a Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in public administration and a Master's degree in public administration. This university, chartered by the State of New York, gives an American type of education that compares favorably with that obtainable in good American institutions. The in-service training courses, except for special sessions held for United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) officials, were open only to Arab government officials. These courses led to no degree, but at the end of the sessions a certificate of attendance was given to those attending 90 per cent or more of the classes. The regular college courses are taught in English. The in-service training courses for Arab officials were taught in Arabic. Since the UNRWA officials, who are almost exclusively Palestinian Arabs, all speak English, these courses were taught in English or Arabic, depending upon the preference of the professor.

The Bologna course is a cooperative endeavor in which the Law School and the economics department of the University of Bologna are associated with the University of California. All courses are conducted in Italian, and the student body is drawn in part from recent university graduates in economics and law and in part from civil servants. In the Bologna program civil servants and graduate students follow precisely the same program. This is, I believe, a weakness in the Bologna program for the following reasons:

1. There is a fundamental difference between the subject matters that should be taught the student and the civil servant. The student needs an over-all view of public administration as well as basic courses in some of the related social sciences. The teaching must be on a sufficiently high intellectual level to stimulate him and to train his mind. Because he lacks the practical experience required to grasp the problems of day-to-day administration, the approach should be in good part, but by no means exclusively, theoretical. The civil servant, on the other hand, is primarily interested in technical training. He cannot benefit from a heavy load of abstract lectures but he can become absorbed in technical problems of productivity and efficiency as related to his work.

2. Government officials are at a considerable handicap when they return to a university environment and are forced to compete with students who have never left that environment. This is particularly true when the subject matter and the teaching methods are both unfamiliar. The older men find greater difficulty in adapting to new methods and in accepting new ideas. The exceptions to this general rule are likely to be persons of a scholarly turn of mind who fit better into university life than into the public administration and will have a very limited impact on the public service.

3. Civil servants and students are best served by different types of teachers. The former, because of their age, their importance, and often their self-importance, are intolerant of the young assistant or the incipient professor. They should be taught by older men with sufficient degrees and experience not to offend the civil servants' well-nurtured sense of dignity. These older men should be in part foreign experts and in part local experts. The latter are particularly suited to offer technical courses on such matters as the public law or the fiscal policies of the states concerned. The foreign experts are better equipped to handle the less specialized or localized aspects of administration.

In training students, on the other hand, there is much to say for relying heavily on native assistants. Many of these men have studied in the United States. After working with a foreign professor for a year in preparing and teaching a course, their enthusiasm and their better knowledge of the local situation make them invaluable interpreters of this new subject matter. Their youth and lack of practical experience, however, are unpalatable to government officials. The ideal relationships between the foreign professor, his assistants, and his students will depend on variable factors, but it would often appear best that the foreign professor have the responsibility of preparing the syllabus and the text of the course, that he give perhaps one lecture a week, and that the other classes be taken over by a native assistant.

4. The advisability of keeping programs for civil servants and students separate is increased by the critical reception that is often afforded the introduction of a new and foreign, and therefore easily suspect, discipline. The critics may well decide that public administration is neither fish nor fowl if the program has to fuse the efficiency expert with the theoretician. There is a place for both, but each should be recognized for what he is and used for what he can do best.

There is, of course, considerable overlapping in the training of civil servants and students, but to my mind the advantages of combining these courses are easily outweighed by the disadvantages. The programs do not have common goals and the preferred teaching methods for each are different.

The Communication Problem

As I see it, the basic problem faced by the American professor, usually armed only with the English language and American experience, when he sets out to teach public ad-

ministration to foreign students is communication. To a considerable extent he may be unaware of this handicap until he has been at his foreign post for some months. The general friendliness of foreign students (at least in Italy and the Arab world) and their delight with the informal manners and the approachability of the typical American professor may tend to postpone the professor's full realization of his position.

This communication handicap, as I see it, is threefold. There is lack of a common cultural heritage, there is lack of a common language, and there is the natural antagonism to the importation of a foreign subject matter.

1. A problem that I assume is common to all public administration programs abroad is the common denominator on which to base the training. American textbooks in public administration, political science, and sociology are often of little help to the foreign student who is not well acquainted with American life. The unsystematic approach of many of these texts is bewildering to him, and the frequent references to American experience that for the most part cannot be understood by the foreigner run the risk of being either meaningless or misinterpreted.

Just as the foreign student is unprepared to accept the American background as the point of departure, so the American professor is likely to be unprepared to make use of the local background. Public administration is not an abstract science; to be meaningful it must be referred to the students' experience. When there is little or no community of experience between the professor and the student, it is difficult to teach public administration successfully.

The problem of communication is further complicated by the pragmatic approach of the Anglo-American to knowledge, exemplified by the case method but inherent in much of our thinking. From the point of view of the foreign student we seem to select certain facts and give them a significance based on unstated, and to him often unknown, assumptions. The logical deductive reasoning to which many foreign students are accustomed may have little value as a tool for coping with reality, but it is aesthetically reassuring, and the absence of it in our approach often constitutes a further barrier to mutual comprehension.

This first difficulty in communication can be overcome by a knowledge of the local social system and by studies in comparative law and administration, where the generalizations are based on, and the facts are selected from, a wider experience, and where both are therefore more readily related to the students' own experience. Recent French studies in public administration (e.g., those of Langrod, Grégoire, and Puget), in which the systematic approach is applied to the raw material of public administration, should be particularly valuable to the American who is willing to go half way to find a common meeting ground with the foreign student.

2. The lack of a common language is a more immediately obvious communication barrier than is the difference in the cultural heritage, but it is too often discounted on the assumption that it can be easily overcome by translation. Translation is a slow and difficult art; when it becomes necessary to translate concepts quite foreign to the native language, obfuscation rather than enlightenment may well result. Although it is possible to invent new words in any language or to give old words new meanings, and by defining them carefully to give a fairly clear interpretation of the original English concept, this practice is not the help that it might at first appear to be. There is little likelihood that the various translators will agree on a single translation for a difficult foreign term, and in consequence the student who must rely on translations is compelled to learn a new vocabulary for each translation. The Italian proverb *traduttore, traditore* (the translator is a betrayer) is unfortunately true; but the problem becomes many times more difficult when the translation is to be made into a language far removed from English, which may also lack the technical expressions needed for the translation of a textbook in public administration.

In the case of the hasty translations often necessary for classroom purposes, the student is likely to become further confused by the inadequately coordinated efforts of several translators working on various sections of the same book. There is also the difficulty caused

by the fact some of our professors do not write with the logical precision and the nicety of language that, although not required for reasonably successful communication with an American audience basically familiar with the material, are almost indispensable to an adequate translation. After repeated consultations with his conscientious translator, who wanted to be certain as to the meaning of portions of his book, one of my colleagues, whose intellectual acumen and English prose rank him at the top of his field, confessed that he would like to have his next book translated before it was published in English so as to be able to correct the manuscript from the expert and critical point of view of the translator.

Translation problems are increased when one has to deal with *ad hoc* translations of classroom lectures. With anyone but an excellent translator who is also well versed in public administration, such classes degenerate into little more than exercises in English for the often limited number of students whose English has reached a certain degree of proficiency. If the translator knows the field sufficiently well to translate adequately, and if he is enough of a teacher to be able to hold the interest of the class, he is probably better equipped than the foreign expert to teach the course himself, because of his greater acquaintance with the students' background. If the choice must be made, simultaneous translation with the use of earphones is probably better than the laborious method of having the professor speak for a few minutes and the assistant translate afterward. It was primarily to avoid this problem that the Beirut in-service training courses were taught in Arabic unless the trainees knew English well.

Another solution would be for the foreign student to learn English. For several reasons, this is more a pious wish than a practical solution. The English language can be mastered quickly only by the most exceptional foreign students and government employees. Some already have, and others succeed in acquiring, a reading knowledge of English, but neither the students nor the civil servants as a whole can be expected to be able to receive and to express ideas through the spoken word in a foreign language. Even if they could be trained to do so, it is not at all certain that such training would have an immediate practical value. So long as the administering these people are doing or will do is in their native language, it is wise that their training be in that language as well.

3. The antagonism to the "Americanness" of public administration is a natural reaction to the inauguration of public administration programs abroad, as there lies in the background the implication that the natives do not know how to govern themselves. Here the resentment is stronger among the civil servants than among the students. This reaction may be increased by the provincialism of the American professor—by his lack of knowledge of (and in extreme cases his apparent lack of interest in) non-American experience. The employment of local talent helps overcome this barrier. I believe it can be further breached by a comparative approach to the subject matter and an increased use of non-American examples. It might also be advisable to employ at least one European in a prominent position in each program, to give assurance that we do not consider public administration an American monopoly.

Another weakness of the present programs is the rapid turnover of American personnel. American professors are often unwilling to spend more than a year (or at most two years) teaching in a foreign institution, and with excellent reasons. Some of the posts are not particularly desirable. Few of them offer adequate educational facilities for American children, and few if any of the programs can offer reasonable assurance of tenure to the professor who is willing to break his ties with his American university. Yet the average American professor is only beginning to be productive at the end of his first year. In the words of Rowland Egger:

> . . . overseas service must be established in the minds of those who prepare themselves for it as a permanent career; it must be undertaken in the realization that it means a life spent mostly abroad. At the present time our overseas operations are gravely burdened by the necessity of coping with ten- and twenty-year problems with four- or five-year projects manned by one- or two-year personnel. . . . We cannot keep repeating the first year of our programs: sometime we have to get on to

the second and third and tenth and twentieth year. This can only be achieved if a substantial central core of the overseas labor force thinks and acts like a permanent professional organization.[1]

Internal Administrative Problems

THE last weakness I wish to discuss is a particularly embarrassing one for public administration experts. This is the complex and inefficient administration that sometimes burdens the programs. An organization chart of either the Beirut or the Bologna program should be sufficient to alarm any conscientious first-year student of administration. The number of governments, governmental agencies, universities, and university personnel involved, the communication difficulties between offices located on different continents, the rapid turnover in the universities and the governments and the consequent inexperience of the new men, and the lack of interest in many of those about to retire or be transferred, bring about an administrative chaos. Authority and responsibility are rarely in the same hands, and the time consumed on administrative tangles that need not have arisen, not to speak of the wear and tear they cause to jangled nerves, divert much of the time and the energies of the teaching staff from their primary function.

This state of affairs becomes acutely embarrassing when it involves the students. In the Bologna project the Italian government and university officials selected, disciplined, and paid the students. In the Beirut program, however, the Americans had to bear the responsibility when the trainees were chosen at the last minute and shipped off unbriefed to Beirut from the various Arab capitals, or when their living allowances were withheld as a result of administrative tangles between the various USO Missions and university offices involved. In fairness to the American officials, however, it should be said that Arab bureaucracy often managed to complicate operations. On one occasion the program was the victim of an internal split in an Arab government: after fifteen government officials had been duly selected by the Arab and American authorities for participation in an in-service training course and after some of the officials had left their local capital bound for Beirut, the Minister of Finance ordered the Minister of Foreign Affairs to stop them at the frontier and withdraw their passports and the Minister of the Interior ordered the frontier guards to disregard this order. As a result, the trainees straggled in from a few days to a month late for a two-month course. Such vagaries on the part of their own administrations, however, did not make the Arabs less willing to imply a certain presumption on our part when the administration of our program in public administration frequently displayed the weaknesses we preached against.

The foregoing observations have been in the main critical of the public administration programs with which I have been associated. The reason, I trust, is obvious. I assume my readers do not need to be convinced of the usefulness of training in public administration or of the undoubted positive results achieved by the programs the United States government has in operation. My purpose has been, rather, the pointing out of some of the problems the solution of which would greatly increase the success of these programs.

[1] Harlan Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone (eds.), *The Art of Overseasmanship* (Syracuse University Press, 1957), p. 150.

Reply to Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"

To the Editor
Public Administration Review:

In the Winter, 1958, issue, the *Review* carried comments by Virgil B. Zimmermann, Louis J. Kroeger, and Edwin O. Stene on my Summer, 1957, article, "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines." These comments fail fundamentally to reach the main burden of my thesis. In the interest of brevity, the analysis that follows will deal only with the essentials of the position they hold in common. This should not be construed to mean that I agree with their numerous peripheral points.

Their position is as significant for the comments they did *not* make as for those they made. They did not state exception to the following specific propositions underlying my conclusion that performance budgeting in the Philippines is not likely to achieve effectiveness in terms of the advantages ascribed to it:

(1) achieving the advantages of performance budgeting depends on overcoming pervasive problems of measurement, personnel, organization, and the role of the legislature;

(2) accounting and measurement systems are not yet able to produce the data required for performance budgeting;

(3) the civil service, because of patronage and *pabagsak,* does not generally produce the superior personnel needed to insure the effective working of a complex system like performance budgeting;

(4) formal change of administrative structure is less significant in determining organizational effectiveness for performance budgeting than what actually goes on within affected agencies;

(5) there are indications that the legislature is unwilling to modify its role so as to facilitate rather than hinder performance budgeting.

It is thus apparent that the three commentators were mainly concerned to differ with my other conclusion that it was unwise at this time for U. S. policy to have promoted performance budgeting in the Philippines. The essentials of this phase of their position constitute mutual acceptance of three myths about U. S. technical assistance. These myths need to be identified and questioned.

1. *The myth that the United States has played a subordinate role in the formulation and development of its assistance policy for the Philippines.* All three of the commentators de-emphasize and play down the importance of American officials in the process of identifying needs and implementing programs. For example, Mr. Zimmermann's account of the American and Filipino roles in the decision to install performance budgeting is an "official" or "for the record" version of what happened, and it varies sharply from "unofficial" or "off the record" versions that I have heard from both Americans and Filipinos, in Manila and in the United States. In the "official" versions, Uncle Sam is depicted as a sort of impassive, good-natured Santa Claus who stands by in detachment while foreign officials decide what they want from a pack that contains anything they could possibly want.

In the spheres of military and economic aid the specious character of this myth is readily apparent. Try to picture the Philippines deciding to reject military assistance and cut their armed forces down to constabulary size, or deciding on U. S. assistance to develop industry entirely within the public sector of their economy, starting with nationalization of all major industries in the islands. The myth is equally specious in the sphere of public administration assistance; how, without allowing for the superior weight of American influence, can you account for the fact that

Institutes of Public Administration have been established as part of U. S. aid programs in diverse countries and cultures all over the world, from Korea to the Philippines, in Bangkok and Saigon, and throughout the Middle East?

The three commentators insist on a narrow, doctrinaire concept of the staff function, playing down its contributions to program formulation and decision making. The experts, they insist, were not on top but on tap. All right, but the point is that they *were* on tap and functioning to guide and influence those on top. Apart from the formal location of authority in an organization, how are policies and decisions *really* made?

Mr. Stene asserts that ". . . requests must be forthcoming and necessary legislation is a prerequisite to an active assistance program. Pressure for legislation is vulnerable to the charge of intervention." (p. 51) To be sure, U. S. operations missions must be discreet and avoid the *charge* of "intervention," yet their chief function in our foreign policy *is* to "interfere"—i.e., to help direct developments and modify conditions in the aided countries. There are many and subtle techniques of influence, manipulation and gaining consent that are more useful in this business than overt pressure and coercion. In this context, U. S. officials have to assume a large share of responsibility for the performance budgeting program in the Philippines as well as for other programs of assistance the country has or has not had.

2. *The myth that Philippine administration and management have been "improved" by adaptation of American "principles."* The three commentators are agreed that whatever has been done is an improvement, and superficially it probably looks that way. They call attention to the fact that a number of studies and proposals in the accounting field have been made; the Bureau of Civil Service is now prepared to "give a number of specialist examinations never before attempted"; several new training programs have been conducted; there are increased job opportunities for public administration graduates; the Auditor General has recently agreed "to withdraw from the detailed pre-audit." Above all, they say, the wage and position classification plan is now in operation. But this seems less significant when one takes into account the more basic patronage character of the civil service, the number of unclassified positions and temporary appointments, the problem of *pabagsak*.

The recently approved reorganization plans appear to be very significant, unless one takes into account more basic, informal factors with regard to organization. As I suggested in the original article, in the matter of ordering human relationships skepticism is warranted regarding "the wisdom of transposing freely from American experience" into the setting of another country; and, most important, whatever the character of the formal reorganization plans, "there is often a marked discrepancy between what actually transpires in administration and what the statutes and administrative orders prescribe." (p. 177) With respect to these points, the recent analysis of another observer is appropriate:

> . . . there is no lack of current interest in administrative structural reorganization.
>
> Unfortunately, it is not the formal pattern of organization which provides an understanding of administrative activity in the Philippines. Habits of administrative behavior which are rooted in Philippine history and culture must be considered. . . . The patterns of conduct which seem most prevalent, representative, and significant are (1) the tradition of centralization, (2) the reluctance to accept responsibility, (3) the prevalence of personalized value premises underlying action, (4) the reliance on procedural complexity, and (5) the resistance to change which challenges established methods or separatist status. In all of these respects, administrative practice in the Philippines varies rather markedly from American practice, despite the likenesses in structure and formal administrative methods.[1]

But the commentators do not concern themselves with such basic problems as these. They are, in Mr. Kroeger's phrase, "imperfections" that "will always exist"; the important thing is to get on with the job of reorganization: "We improvise as we go; but with purpose and principle underlying our improvisation." (p. 49)

[1] Ferrel Heady, "The Philippine Administrative System—A Fusion of East and West," in William J. Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 263.

So, too, with performance budgeting which, for Mr. Zimmermann, "is becoming a significant tool of management" even though it is "only partially effective," (p. 47) or, as Mr. Kroeger expresses it, "performance budgeting in the Phillippines, and all that accompanies it, represents a tremendous step forward, the significance of which is only slightly diminished by the imperfections of the program in its early stages." (p. 49) Thus, there are no basic problems of measurement, personnel, organization, or the role of the legislature that may condition the effectiveness of performance budgeting. These are only temporary "imperfections."

It is in these respects that public administration programs in the Philippines look like a rebirth of the old "scientific management" movement, unencumbered by any of our later reservations about it, only casually aware of unique features of the setting, unconcerned that some problems may be more basic than others, or that values other than economy and efficiency may be important.

3. *The myth that American assistance has been well designed to help make the Philippines a "showcase of democracy" in the Far East.* The three commentators are satisfied that aid has been successful.

They disagree with my conclusion that "overemphasis on the establishment of an efficient and economical bureaucracy before some success is had in coping with such basic problems as generally low levels of living, chronic unemployment and underemployment, and the other problems of a largely underdeveloped economy may help 'keep the lid on' and frustrate change." (p. 179) They are at pains to point out that there has been some American assistance with economic development; that, as Mr. Stene suggests in citing the Bell report, the objective of the entire assistance program has been "to provide an environment in which the people of the Philippines can work out a reasonable solution of their problems"; (p. 51) or as Mr. Zimmermann puts it, "Effective administration—by whatever means it may be won—is in the Philippines a *sine qua non* for the democratization of political power which will make more fundamental reforms possible." (p. 47)

I do not share their optimism. I believe the facts support my conclusion. I believe our Philippine aid policy has overemphasized the need for militarily containing the post-war threat of communism without really enabling the country to come to grips with the conditions that produced that threat, and that the total program of assistance underway for nearly a decade finds the Philippines little closer to solution of their basic problems than before American aid began. Since the late 1940's, the *New York Times'* end-of-the-year reviews of Philippine economic conditions have had substantially the same tone. Witness the latest (January 7, 1958):

> The Philippine economy is admittedly sick. Competent analysts think it is overstimulated by foreign aid and encouragement and undernourished in the elements that could be provided by united purpose and national application to hard work. . . .
>
> Altogether the Government is losing millions of pesos in revenue every month that should go to support public services and personnel. Foreign analysts believe the revenue would be ample to balance the budget if taxes were collectible and the money went to the right places.[2]

The article goes on to point out that the nation does not produce enough food, smuggling is a major industry, the black market in dollars is thriving, there is no break in the inflationary trend, rising rice prices are distressing to low-income groups, and at year's end foreign reserves had declined from $288,000,000 the preceding December to "a record low of $145,000,000."

The very next issue of the *New York Times* (January 8, 1958), carried this announcement:

> The Philippine Government has authorized Carlos P. Romulo . . . to seek a $44,000,000 loan in Washington. . . . President Carlos P. Garcia also said $100,000,000 worth of Philippine bonds would be sold in the United States.[3]

In conclusion, my original article, "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines," was an attempt to outline problems in two senses: first, that a system like performance budgeting must be seen in relationship to other aspects of public administration; second, that public administration must be seen in relationship to

[2] *New York Times,* January 7, 1958, p. 70.
[3] *Ibid.,* January 8, 1958, p. 6.

political, social, and economic aspects of its setting. Within this structure the view was developed that some administrative needs are more basic than others, and that "much of the effort that it takes to produce the appearance, if not the reality, of improvement in public administration can become, as it has in the Philippines, a means of concealing inability or unwillingness to undertake needed action on other fronts." (p. 179)

In our continued concern to cope with the threat of communism, it may be well for us to remember that problems in countries like the Philippines have been in the making for a long, long time. We are not going to solve them merely by spending money and introducing the latest techniques of American enterprise.

Sincerely yours,

Malcolm B. Parsons
Professor
School of Public Administration
Florida State University

Affirmative Administrative Action

The danger of the rise of a bureaucracy aggressively grasping for unwarranted power is probably much less than the danger of drifting into a condition in which the bureaucracy is a purely negative force. A seasoned bureaucracy, without heroic measures to the contrary, tends to become attached to the time-honored ways of doing things, hostile toward innovation, lacking in initiative, and timid. These qualities are admirable at the right time and place, but the next few decades in the United States will hardly be the time and place for pleasant habituation to the customary.

This is not to argue for a bureaucracy that will usurp the functions of Congress and the President; the contention is, rather, that present conditions demand a bureaucracy that will minimize the magnitude of the tasks of Congress and the President. How may that be done? The pressure on Congress may be reduced by the development of procedures within the administration for the satisfactory settlement of matters unworthy of the attention of Congress; by the eradication of parochialism within administrative agencies and the consequent submission of legislative recommendations that are more likely to meet the desires of Congress; and by the development of internal controls that would reduce the task of congressional surveillance of the administration. The task of presidential direction of the administration increases in difficulty with the growth of the number of administrative agencies; the impression of the President's policy on particularistic administrative agencies becomes an almost impossible job (yet that is the President's responsibility and duty). To make the functions of Congress and the President actual as well as nominal, it is essential to have a bureaucracy dedicated to seeking out the general welfare, yet mindful of the final authority of Congress and the President in defining how the general welfare shall be promoted.

—V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (4th ed., Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1958), pp. 763-764.

Reviews of Books and Documents

The Art of Brain-Picking

By John D. Young, McKinsey & Company, Inc.

The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Technique, and Cases, by Robert L. Kahn and Charles F. Cannell. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957. Pp. 368. $7.75.

The success of the public administrator, the social science researcher, and those in countless other professions depends to a great degree on an ability to obtain accurate information from others in face-to-face communication. The professional manager in both public and private enterprise constantly seeks accurate and speedy information from his immediate staff, from employees in many parts of his organization, and from representatives of the enterprise's many publics. The personnel interviewer in dealing with an applicant, the social worker in developing a client's case history, and the teacher conversing with a parent all are interviewing for information. The physician obtains information from patients on which much of his diagnosis may be based. Finally, the management analyst probably spends more of his working hours gathering information on a face-to-face basis than in any other single activity, and the information he gathers often constitutes the bulk of the facts on which he bases his recommendations for changes in organization, procedures, or systems.

Despite the dependence of so many professions on the information-gathering interview, there has been little training for it. What there has been is primarily in mechanics—how to select those to be interviewed and how to set up the appointment. Little or no appreciation and understanding of the basic processes that take place in the interview are conveyed. The psychiatrist and the public opinion survey interviewer are exceptions; the vast majority who depend on the information-gathering interview are untouched.

Thinking and writing in the field go back as least as far as the late nineteen-twenties with such contributions as Stuart Rice's "Contagious Bias in the Interview: A Methodological Note."[1] Since 1940 there has been a growing body of written material, but a rather intensive review of the literature reveals no conceptual framework to serve as a vehicle and background for training in interviewing skills. Most of the literature deals with mechanics; that relating to the theory of interviewing is fragmentary at best, and the consensus of writers on interview theory has been that the information-gathering interview is still in the "art stage" and probably will remain there for some time.

It is against this background and interest that the writer began to read the recently published *The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Technique, and Cases.* I started with considerable skepticism—if the title was anywhere near descriptive of the contents, the authors had set for themselves a large undertaking, one, to my knowledge, never previously attempted.

Developing a Conceptual Framework

Interviewing is not a simple process in which the respondent spews forth answers, without being influenced by the interview itself. Kahn and Cannell center their book on this point—that the information-gathering interview is basically the interaction of respondent and interviewer. The authors analyze this process to provide a conceptual framework against which the interviewer can employ spe-

[1] 35 *American Journal of Sociology*, 420-423 (November, 1929).

cific principles and techniques to control and direct the process of interaction in such a way that the basic objectives of the interview are met. Thus, they come to grips with the problem of bias in the interview.

". . . interviewer bias becomes the intrusion of *unwanted* or *unplanned* interviewer influence in the interview process. A biased interview contains the results of kinds of interaction between interviewer and respondent that were not planned for and may well have been unrecognized." (p. 59)

The authors contend, and rightly so, that to be a successful interviewer, a person must first know and understand the basis for the interaction that takes place between the interviewer and the respondent, for "without such understanding, the acquisition of technique becomes superficial and of limited value."

In developing a theory and a set of principles for the interaction that takes place in the information-gathering interview, the authors have drawn on (1) the findings of social scientists regarding the process of communication between people, with particular attention to investigations in the field of communication between small groups, (2) the studies of clinical psychologists on the relationship between the therapist and the patient in the psychotherapeutic interview, and (3) the work of various groups in the field of data-collection techniques and sources of bias.

Kahn and Cannell base their theory of the interview interaction process on:

The general approach to human behavior . . . developed by Kurt Lewin and his associates, commonly called *field theory*. According to this theory, any given behavior is the resultant of many forces within the individual—forces which often exert pressures in different directions, and which interact or conflict with each other. The pattern or constellation of such forces at any given time constitutes the "psychological field" of the individual, and his behavior as of that moment becomes understandable in terms of the properties of that field. (p. 31)

The authors describe and illustrate motives, goals, perceptions, and tensions in terms of this theory, and they define attitudes, defense mechanisms, and memory in relation to the interaction of interviewer and respondent. With this framework they analyze respondent motivations.

Motivating the Respondent

ANYONE who has used the information-gathering interview extensively will have perceived, though perhaps not clearly, two basic sources of respondent motivation. First, the respondent can see in the interview opportunities to achieve his own goals, such as better working conditions, a better paying job, or preservation of a system he is accustomed to. Second, the respondent receives satisfaction from the communication process itself—providing the process is pleasant and concerns something in which the respondent has some interest. The authors analyze these two sources of motivation and the factors that influence them. In addition, they identify and analyze a third motivation of the respondent, the desire to conform generally to social norms, i.e. to answer questions of a stranger or near stranger and to tell the truth. The techniques by which the interviewer can tap these sources of respondent motivation are well illustrated with examples from personnel interviewing, social work, and medicine.

The shifting of respondent motivation that is typical of the information-gathering interview (though often overlooked by the interviewer) also is pointed out.

When the interview begins, the interviewer must depend almost entirely upon making it meaningful to the respondent in terms of his needs and goals. This is the reason for emphasizing so strongly the introduction of the interview to the respondent, and the ways of handling skepticism and resistance at this early stage. . . . As the interview progresses, however, the interest, support, and understanding of the interviewer increase in importance. The respondent, who may have agreed to the interview only for instrumental reasons and with little enthusiasm, finds it increasingly interesting and rewarding for its own sake. (p. 91)

The analysis of respondent motivation as presented by the authors, along with the specific techniques that follow from this analysis, provides the most satisfactory basis I have discovered for becoming more proficient in one of the interviewer's two major functions—motivating the respondent to communicate.

Achieving Accuracy in the Interview

BUT there is a second major function of the interviewer. In addition to motivating

the respondent, he must direct and control the communication process to assure that the interview measures the things it purports to measure.

Those who have had extensive experience with the information-gathering interview are well aware of the many opportunities for bias to affect the accuracy of the interview as a measuring device. Probably more has been written on the sources of bias than on any other single aspect of the information-gathering interview. Since there are many sources of bias, all difficult to control, it is still sound procedure to avoid using the interview where other more reliable methods exist. I have frequently observed that interviews are used to collect information obtainable from documents, records, or other dependable sources. This is not only expensive but also involves unnecessarily the problem of coping with bias and accuracy of measurement. However, there are many times when the only available tool is the interview. In these cases the problem of bias must be met.

Since the interview is basically a process of interaction, the answer to eliminating bias cannot rest in eliminating interaction between interviewer and respondent. This source of bias cannot be eliminated, apparently except when the interviewer clearly understands the potential sources of bias and how they affect the interview. On the basis of a dynamic analysis of biasing factors, the interviewer can then be trained to control the background and psychological factors that affect his own behavior during an interview.

> With respect to the respondent's side, we must for the most part accept the fact that we can influence the respondent only by controlling the characteristics and behavior of the interviewer. (p. 197)

Some readers will probably be less than happy with the handles the authors provide to eliminate bias in the information-gathering interview. They are frank to admit, however, "There is no simple 'anti-bias' device or procedure which the interviewer can be taught to use." (p. 201)

> What does the interviewer require in order to function effectively and without bias? We have answered this question by saying that he requires techniques for question formulation, for inducing respondent motivation, and for focusing the communication on the content objectives of the interview. We believe, however, that the interviewer needs also a deep understanding and insight into the dynamics of the interaction process of which he is to be a part. The interview process itself is complex, and each case sufficiently idiosyncratic so that no set of rules and procedures will suffice unless the interviewer has such insight into the psychology of the interaction. For this reason we have emphasized, throughout this book, the importance of a theory of interviewing, the importance of the dynamics of the interview process, and of the psychological forces which are active in that process. (p. 202)

An Appraisal

In writing *The Dynamics of Interviewing,* Kahn and Cannell set for themselves three difficult objectives:

1. To establish a general framework for understanding the interactions of the information-gathering interview.
2. To identify and illustrate specific interviewing techniques and procedures.
3. To provide a firm foundation and basis for the acquisition of interviewing skills.

Any one of these objectives would have been a significant and difficult undertaking in itself. However, in my judgment, the authors have achieved to a remarkable degree all three. This is probably due in no small degree to their rich background of formal training and practical experience.[2]

The authors have made major strides in providing a rational basis for the information-gathering interview, while at the same time providing the material required to reach or learn basic interviewing skills.[3]

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[2] The authors are both psychologists who have been working for many years on the large scale collection of social data by means of the interview. Robert L. Kahn is a social psychologist who was formerly head of the Field Division of the Bureau of the Census and is presently Program Director of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. Charles F. Cannell is a clinical psychologist who has worked with the interview as a technique in therapy, counseling, and large scale field surveys. At present he is head of the field staff of the Survey Research Center.

[3] Part II of the book is made up of a series of transcripts of recorded interviews with the authors' comments. These interviews further illustrate the principles and techniques discussed in Part I. They draw on the fields of medicine, business, and social work and provide case material for training in interviewing skills.

Can We Train for "Overseasmanship"?

By EGBERT S. WENGERT, The University of Oregon

THE ART OF OVERSEASMANSHIP, PREPARING AMERICANS FOR WORK ABROAD IN BUSINESS, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT, edited by Harlan Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone. Syracuse, New York: The Syracuse University Press, 1957. Pp. xvii, 150. $3.00.

SINCE 1945, Americans abroad have become a major facet of life in our time. A million and a half travelers each year and over a hundred thousand civilians on jobs overseas make an inescapable impact throughout the world. Moreover, so delicately adjusted are the forces of our divided world that each of these men and women carries overseas some of the burden of the largest issues of the day, of war and peace in an era of nuclear warfare. In *When You Go Abroad—Information for Bearers of Passports,* the Department of State impresses on the prospective traveler: "You can be assured that at no time in the history of our country have our relations with other countries been more vital to the national welfare." Consequently, "the bearer of an American passport automatically has certain responsibilities." The Department explains these in the words of President Eisenhower himself:

> Each of us, whether bearing a commission from his Government or traveling by himself for pleasure or for business, is a representative of the United States and he must try to portray America as he believes it in his heart to be: a peace-loving nation living in the fear of God but in the fear of God only, and trying to be partners with our friends.

To each passport holder the Department also sends a letter from the President to guide his conduct:

> As you travel abroad, the respect you show for foreign laws and customs, your courteous regard for other ways of life, and your speech and manner help to mold the reputation of our country. Thus, you represent us all in bringing assurance to the people you meet that the United States is a friendly nation and one dedicated to the search for world peace and to the promotion of the well-being and security of the community of nations.

Whatever their missions abroad, then, ready for the task or not, some million and a half of our countrymen each year are called on to "portray America" and to "mold the reputation of our country" willy-nilly when they receive their passports. If this is the assignment of all in general, how much more exacting must be the burden assumed by those who go abroad to work, for they choose to put themselves into positions of power and influence over against peoples of other lands. What this means and how men and women might prepare themselves, in the President's words, "to represent us all" is the theme of *The Art of Overseasmanship.*

Overseasmanship: Building Institutions

LIKE the ordinary citizen-traveler impressed into the service of our foreign relations, the man who works abroad often may lack preparation in the demanding "art of overseasmanship." Despite suitable technical skills, he may yet not grasp that the "essence of overseasmanship," in Dean Cleveland's words, "is the building of political and social institutions." (p. 3)

To identify the nature of this art more fully and to consider how it might be communicated to those urgently needing to master it, Dean Cleveland and his colleagues at Syracuse University began late in 1956 to study the matter under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Corporation. In March, 1957, they convened "thirty-five men of wisdom and of experience in overseas operations, drawn from public agencies, voluntary and private enterprises, and the universities" (p. vii) to consider how to train Americans for public service abroad. In this volume are published eleven papers by ten authors, some written for the conference and some growing out of its deliberations, providing commentaries on the proposition: "If there is an art of overseasmanship, its practitioners must not only be picked for the right qualities but also trained in the relevant subjects." (p. viii)

To be fit for "overseasmanship," our officials and armed forces abroad need a "sense

of politics," for the crucial question may be: "Will the United States have a viable relationship with the *next* government?" *(ibid.)* Our businessmen must engage in a "kind of practical altruism, philanthropy with a profit motive, [that] pays off in a coin that the hardest-headed company director can understand: the survival and growth of the private enterprise itself." (p. 4) Missionaries must grasp how growing nationalisms require them to provide "a technical assistance program to native churches" (p. 5) rather than only direct work in saving souls. Voluntary agencies are now called on to furnish "indirect support to organizations which seem to the American sponsors to be pursuing aims consistent with the philanthropic purpose of the American agency." *(ibid.)*

While not all have mastered fully the essence of overseasmanship, Cleveland believes that "the efforts of most Americans abroad are designed to speed up, not slow down, the rate of change in the world." (p. 5) Yet some, possibly in critical positions, though acting from "worthy motives," do not "make sure that the relevance of our actions is at least equivalent to the nobility of our reasons for acting." (p. 7) Consequently, when we fail to build political and social institutions, i.e. when our overseasmanship is lacking, "we are storing up a time of troubles for our friends abroad, and paving the road to war for ourselves." *(ibid.)*

Both Dean Cleveland's optimism about our capacity for overseasmanship and his forebodings about the effects of our failing to master the art find their sources in four papers under the heading of "The New Dimension of Diplomacy." Americans at work in agencies of government often do not practice overseasmanship. On the other hand, seven large business concerns overseas, studied by the National Planning Association, have successfully shaped their policies towards overseasmanship. A number of American church bodies also have changed policies and programs in order to strengthen the capacity of local churches to carry on the work on their own. So, too, some philanthropic agencies have been building institutions within which foreign peoples can become more effective.

Can Overseasmanship Be Taught?

The heart of the matter appears to be at hand in the part of the book treating of "The Elements of Success." If we can learn the conditions under which the art of overseasmanship develops and flourishes, it may be possible to teach the art. What clues do we get from these four papers? Unless they are adaptable and flexible, it is often hard for people to adjust to life in strange settings. Moreover, elements in our heritage both fit and unfit us for easy adjustment. Consequently, those who administer our affairs overseas may need to invent arrangements to enable Americans to do their best. Success appears—in a second paper—to have all sorts of contradictory explanations. The conference of thirty-five would appear to have abandoned the pursuit of a single "Factor X" in the face of the always special demands of endlessly varying circumstances of time and place. The lessons drawn from institution-building in two other papers mainly explain that overseasmanship is hard and slow, often plagued by false starts even with the best of will.

Concluding the volume, two papers examine "The Challenge to American Education." While "Factor X" had seemed to elude the conference in its search for explanations of success overseas, it is now described in the first of these papers to be "not a function of the technical information a man has acquired, but rather of his personal attitudes and his understanding of the institutional environment in which he works." (p. 129) The conference viewed "Factor X" in this sense as partly teachable. To prepare for a kind of "citizenship in the world" a prospective overseasman should seek a knowledge of economics; a grasp of comparative institutions; a feeling for the humanities; a sense of history; and, through anthropology, sociology, and politics, a perception of our own culture. (p. 131) But the members of the conference left the subject with "a gnawing feeling" that "the best kind of education for overseas service was also the best kind of education for citizens who remain at home." (p. 133)

The final paper observes that while scholars and teachers in universities have long concerned themselves with preparation for inter-

national service, they have not always succeeded in teaching specialists what they needed to know for work abroad. In part, scholars still are ignorant of what is required to prepare men and women for work abroad. In part, even what teachers well know about international relations and processes of social and economic development has not been eagerly sought out by students in our universities.

Today, when the alternative to peaceful development may be nuclear destruction, to extend the practice of overseasmanship precisely in Dean Cleveland's terms may be our most pressing need. Indeed, should we fail to build new political and social institutions abroad, we may lose what we value even without nuclear war. For these demanding times, the President and Secretary of State would enlist even the plain tourist to help represent us. More relevantly, Dean Cleveland would enlist those who work overseas, to save our friends from time of troubles and ourselves from war. What could be more urgent? And since the task is one of training people, what is more properly a function of our schools?

Policies Must First Be Resolved

YET in a fundamental sense the problems of overseasmanship are prior to the function of schools. Scholars, of course, may and must continue to clarify the baffling issues of foreign policy and international relations. On teachers, too, falls the work of communicating larger insights into the processes of political and social change. They must continue to search out ways to enable our workers abroad to become effective social inventors. Yet this volume does not compel the conclusion that past failures or future achievements in overseasmanship can in the main be laid to the charge of our schools training overseas workers.

What does building political and social institutions really mean? Overseasmanship would seem first to require that a host of conflicts of interests be examined and resolved. If overseasmanship can reconcile altruism and profits, we may then perhaps reject the political process in favor of a modern invisible hand where on a proper time scale all interests become compatible. But if overseasmanship is built on less radical assumptions, then we need perhaps to place foremost those questions about how we may treat virtually inevitable—though, we hope, mainly short-run—conflicts between our own and other's national interest. For it remains true that many an official foreign operation has been called into existence by Congress to promote *American* agriculture or industry or other interests. So our aims and those of other nations will often conflict in the very course of building institutions abroad.

Military and other aid, technical assistance, grants and loans project upon other nations the goals we have determined to pursue. We hope our ends may be shared by others. We offer inducements to make them acceptable. But at no point have our policy makers even hinted that they are anything but our aims. In this scheme of things, the test of success in overseasmanship must be derived from a study of the relevance of the institutions our overseasmen build for the attainment of our purposes.

Unfortunately, however, even this statement of the context of overseasmanship obscures our uncertainty about the content of our national interests. Sometimes we may insist that the ultimate evil appears when the people of another nation reject our patterns and methods. So we help them "modernize" to insure their devotion to "our way of life." Other times, we are not insensitive to the fact that the differences in another way of life must, in our democratic conception of things, receive high respect. And as a practical matter of effective "selling," we may remember the error of the Connecticut Yankee. (p. 119) Yet we may sometimes suspect, too, that his mistake is of another order, a failure to learn from those contemporary institution-builders —Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev. The "want of grass-roots institutions of democratic participation that might take the place of the monarch" (p. 119) may have prevented enduring change in King Arthur's day; but lack of institutions of consent was not a sure forecast of failure of the revolutions of Russia and China.

We are equally unsure whether to hasten or

slow changes in other lands. We have at hand no precise gauge of our national interest. Overseasmanship itself may threaten to commit us beyond what may be safe limits. Concerns for legitimacy have led us to reject experimentation with revolution in China. Where a revolution has become legitimate, as in Indonesia, we hesitate to support the revolutionary government threatened by insurgency, hoping perhaps that it might temper the revolution. On the fringes of revolutions, too, goals and consequently overseasmanship may reflect contradictions: a development worker would not seek to "eliminate the landlords and thus solve the tenancy problem" (p. 124); although overseas officials might strive to eliminate textile profiteers in Italy in order to provide the needy with clothes (p. 106); but it would be dangerous to interfere with the economic relations of the Shanghai fish market, "a tightly organized monopoly directly controlled by elements of the Shanghai underworld." (p. 112)

To pursue these unresolved issues about our goals and interests is to raise the fundamental question about the extent to which we are or can be committed to overseasmanship—institution-building—as a method of international relations. We are not yet sure enough of ourselves to accept with all of its implications the proposition that "the problem for the aid administrator is how best to use the aid program to help the recipient country help itself more effectively" (p. 105) because "too much cultural empathy might produce softness—and there is, after all, a job to be done." (p. 101) Until we know its dimensions better, we may prefer to save a lot of souls directly; we may quite frankly exploit our allies for our ends; or we may even sacrifice freer international trade to the demands of powerful groups at home.

Like the traveler with his impossible mandate from the President to represent us all, so the overseas worker cannot but reflect the plurality of conceptions of goals and methods in international relations. Even more, he probably finds confusions of purpose and uncertainties of policy as much a limitation on effective overseasmanship as his lack of knowledge or skill or personal adaptability. So the problem takes on another dimension. Before we can pick practitioners of the art of overseasmanship for the "right qualities" and train them in the "relevant subjects" (p. viii), a variety of basic issues need to be resolved, not in the course of academic experience but in the processes of politics. Until then, the schools cannot assume the burden of preparing practitioners for an art whose conditions remain unknown. Indeed, the art may have so many facets that it belies the unity implied in naming it "overseasmanship."

Public Administration: Wider Vistas

By HUBERT MARSHALL, Stanford University

PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTRATION, by Dwight Waldo. University of Alabama Press, 1956. Pp. 143, $2.50.

IN THESE lectures, delivered before the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration, Dwight Waldo continues to play the role of chief appraiser of the literature and hence of the trends in public administration. Standing on a promontory he asks us to view our discipline through the eyes of an outsider. The result is an enlarged vista and new perspectives, presented lucidly and with so many insights that no one who begins the book will leave it unfinished.

I

WALDO begins provocatively by denying the commonly accepted proposition that the natural sciences are more advanced than the social sciences. And he makes a good case for

his assertion. Many discoveries in the natural sciences are simply stumbled upon and basic theories are continually changing, "reversing what have been unquestioned and unquestionable." The recent attack on the concept of parity in physics is a case in point. Moreover, as Waldo says, a strong case can be made for the contention that the rise of modern science stemmed from the development of capitalism and that modern science has been heavily conditioned by our "social technology." On the other side, he argues that we have made impressive advances in human cooperation and social control. The nation-state, the corporation, federalism, double-entry bookkeeping, civil and common law, Keynesian economics, and other social achievements pass in rapid review. And he concludes: "I suggest that we have a profound cultural bias due to the accidents of historical development and that future generations may well be puzzled by the era in which men gaped like peasants at a fair at mechanical gadgets and accepted as 'natural' prodigious achievements in human co-operation."

In his second lecture, Waldo considers public administration from a variety of perspectives. Putting on and taking off in rapid succession a series of vari-colored spectacles, he views public administration through the lenses of law, communication, ideology, ethics, science, politics, and business and military administration. In this sweeping review, and in his subsequent lecture on the relationships between administration and the study of history, Waldo is the dispassionate observer, finding much of value in each perspective. To be sure, he suggests that some approaches to history are more likely to be productive than others (he thinks Leonard White's administrative histories depend too much upon POSDCORB as a framework for analysis), but on the whole Waldo is pluralistic and he makes no apologies for it. If these pages are essentially tolerant, they are nevertheless insightful and full of small surprises and revelations. What a shock to realize that Chapter Three of White's first edition was entitled "The Administrative Machine"![1] And how humbling to those of us who fight a losing battle to keep abreast of the current literature in administration, to have Waldo, without fanfare, discuss the insights he found in Lawrence Harper's *The English Navigation Laws!*

In the past few years the total bureaucratization of our society has led to the publication of many novels with an administrative setting. Students of administration have followed this trend with interest, a few novels have been discussed in the pages of this *Review*, and increasingly some of the better novels find their way into syllabi in university courses in public administration. In a chapter on the "Perspectives of Literature," Waldo also argues that there is much to be learned from the literary treatment of administration. This is so because there is "a difference between intellectual perception and emotional comprehension." Our professional literature offers little on the subjective "feel" of decision-making, although the *Cases*[2] go part of the way toward meeting this need. Then, too, while it may not contribute much to the study of administration, the humorous satire can provide for the harried administrator what the Gridiron Club banquet provides for Washington—a release from tension, a catharsis. Throughout this chapter Waldo intersperses quotations from his favorite novels and closes with poems by Auden and Frost—the first poetry I have seen discussed in the serious literature of administration.

In a final lecture on "Perspectives in Social Science," Waldo asks, "What insights, what hypotheses, what tools of research and analysis are supplied to us by such disciplines as economics and anthropology?" The discussion covers political science, sociology, psychology, and communications as well. Here Waldo is nondoctrinal again, although he does argue that culture is the basic social science concept and that we ignore it at our peril, especially in comparative administration and in our technical assistance programs. Here, too, a final shot at POSDCORB; it is culture bound. Strangely there is no attack on logical positivism and we are not treated to a renewal of his

[1] *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (The Macmillan Company, 1926).

[2] Harold Stein (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development—A Case Book* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952); *The Inter-University Case Program: Cases in Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1952-57).

controversy with Herbert Simon that enlivened the pages of *The American Political Science Review* a few years ago.[3] There is, however, a reference to behavioristic studies and their preference for "is" rather than "ought" questions (and plaudits for Lasswell for his attempts to synthesize the two).

II

Although *Perspectives on Administration* is not polemical, it is an absorbing book. Waldo's common sense, his easy style, and the constant flow of ideas recommend it to everyone interested in administration. Moreover, in places the book is downright fun; like a college annual or an old photograph album it provides frequent encounters with old friends and an opportunity to relive past experiences. His reference to the Service Monographs of the Institute for Government Research brought back my first impression of them—dark green and dusty in the dimly lit stacks. He found them a "supreme symbol of dullness and uselessness" as I did, although we both found them useful later on. And one's old friends pop up too. Literally hundreds of writers cross his stage, lightly, even jauntily, and for a moment there is a happy reunion—but never for long and one must lay down the book if there is to be lengthy reflection on man or idea. That there will be much reflection is a certainty, for Waldo raises the issues and his insights are provocative.

[3] Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," 46 *American Political Science Review* 81-103 (March, 1952); Herbert A. Simon, Peter F. Drucker, and Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration: Replies and Comments," *Ibid.* 494-503 (June, 1952).

P I & E

From the University of Bologna's new Graduate School in Administrative Sciences, Frederick Mosher (Syracuse University), a comparatively new member of the international set, contributes word of a mystery story that he believes will prove *P*rovocative, *I*nformative, and *E*njoyable to readers of this journal:

Probably some of the readers of your PI&E column are addicts of 'whodunnits', as I am. To them particularly, I would like to commend a little book I have just finished called *Gideon's Night* by J. J. Marric (Harper and Brothers, 1957). Don't ask me how I happen to have this little volume in Bologna because I don't know. Although an addict, I have always been somewhat annoyed at most detective story writers' romantic and contemptuous attitude for those public organizations whose missions are to prevent and detect crime. One has the general feeling that Nero Wolfe, Perry Mason, Ellery Queen, Hercule Poirot, and their like are successful only because their nimble minds and dauntless and often stupid enterprise enable them to run circles around the cops. The latter are usually presented as club-footed and club-headed bureaucrats who present about as many obstacles to the amateur genius as does the criminal.

Gideon's Night is about as opposite as it could be; in fact, it is not really a whodunnit at all. It is the story of one night in the administrative life of one commander George Gideon of the Criminal Investigation Division of the metropolitan police in London and is a fascinating, even if exaggerated, story of administration. Here are many different crimes going on at about the same time in different parts of the city, and one receives a real sense of the power and resources of an effective organization in combating them. Gideon himself is presented as a real man, and the relationship between his private and personal life and his heavy administrative responsibility are subtly developed. Most interesting to me, however, was the treatment of the man's administrative problems during a frantically busy night—the decisions as to the allocation of his scarce resources among the many competing and threatening emergencies, the value judgments behind the decisions and with which he

subsequently appraised his successes and failures, the contest in feelings of responsibility among the public, the police force itself, and individuals threatened with crime, his relationships with and use of his staff, and so on. Indeed, it is a fascinating study of administrative decision-making in a situation of tension and emergency. . . . Quite apart from its merits as a study in public administration, *Gideon's Night* is a well written, exciting, and suspenseful story.

LAURENCE RADWAY (Dartmouth College) calls attention to another deserving book describing the administration of criminal investigation and of law. This one is set in Egypt, and a comparison between it and *Gideon's Night* might prove profitable for connoisseurs of comparative government or comparative crime. The book is *Maze of Justice* by Taufik al Hakim (Harvill Press, 1947), and this is what reader Radway has to say about it:

This wise and gentle tale is a treasure house for every student of comparative administration. It describes twelve days in the life of a Legal Officer assigned to a village in rural Egypt.

The Legal Officer takes part in the trial of an old woman who has bitten the finger of Hasan Imara. He investigates a murder with the company ("help" is not quite the correct word) of local police and a vagrant oracle. He is reminded to inspect the village jail before the elections take place, that is, while it is still relatively unpopulated. His reports to the Ministry of Interior omit no detail that might swell each account to the required minimum of twenty pages. All this is told with quiet humor and compassionate understanding.

Officialdom carries the buzzing outside world into this ageless community, reminding the simple farmer that he is "presumed to understand" the Napoleonic Code, and asking a woman who had never laid eyes on a watch in her life at precisely what hour she had experienced the first symptoms of poisoning. The community, bewildered by these demands, fights back when it can, covering up for errant members with the bland cunning that has frustrated officialdom from the beginning of time.

Major characters are sketched deftly. The judge, for example, who rushes up from Cairo on a very early train, dons his robe and sash as he trots into the court room, and fires out decisions like arrows in order to make the 11 A.M. back home. Late appeals were always examined in the station buffet two minutes before departure of the train; and sometimes his Honor would deliver a final judgment from the moving platform, arms loaded with the "real country meat," butter, and cheese that made his excursion into the provinces worthwhile.

Near the end of his slender volume the writer also passes some observations on the relation of administration to politics. He introduces a *ma'mur* (district administrator) who protests that he avoids the cruder forms of electoral chicanery:

> Please believe me. I'm a *ma'mur* with a sense of honor. I'm not the usual sort of *ma'mur*. I never interfere in elections and never bring pressure on the liberty of the people in elections, and I never say "Vote for this man" . . . that's my method with elections . . . complete freedom. I let people vote as they like right up to the end of the election. Then I take the ballot box and throw it in the river. . . .

It does not follow that the civil service constitutes an independent political force; quite the contrary. When regimes changed in Cairo, local administrators had no mind or thought for anything "except to predict how the new ministerial wind would blow, so that they might adapt themselves accordingly."

It does follow, however, that a change in the government has consequences that might have given even Senator Marcy pause:

> We rode back in the car. On our way we passed the village and heard women's voices uplifted in grief and wailing, issuing from the *umdah's* (village head's) house. I stood up in the car and leaned out, enquiring:
>
> "Is the *umdah* dead?"
>
> I beheld a spectacle which I could not understand at first. There was the head *ghafir* and his deputy, and some others, carrying an object in their hands . . . I looked closely to find out what they were carrying, and the pathologist followed my gaze with stupefaction. We saw that it was an official telephone. The doctor exclaimed in astonishment:

"The telephone's got a procession like a bride!"
One of the watchmen passed near us, and I beckoned to him. I asked him what the matter was, and he replied that an order had been issued that day dismissing the *umdah,* and appointing another in his place—a member of the rival family in the village. We understood the whole situation, and the pathologist turned to me with a grin.

"It appears that the *umdah's* telephone is a kind of royal sceptre."

He was quite right. The telephone was indeed the symbol of authority and dominion, as well as the means of communication with the Government. If it was uprooted from the home of the discharged *umdah,* that was a symbol of vanished authority. The voice of weeping with which the telephone was escorted from the former *umdah's* house was a sign of deep disaster.

EMIL SADY (United Nations) contributes a note on a volume that several of our correspondents have recommended for review, *Other Men's Skies* by Robert Bunker (Indiana University Press, 1956):

Robert Bunker's account of his experiences among the Pueblo Indians will appeal to a wide range of readers: (1) policy-makers, administrators, social scientists, missionaries, and technicians who seek to promote the welfare of people anywhere; (2) American Indians and others who are targets of government "development" programs; and (3) those who are searching for universal verities in administration, and in life generally. For those who, like Bunker, also served as trainees in the Southwest Field Training Program of the National Institute of Public Affairs, his book is a precious documentary of memorable experiences, described artistically and interpreted in a highly significant way.

Other Men's Skies is not argumentative, nor is it doctrinaire or political in any sense. It is an autobiographical account of the experiences of a perceptive and sensitive young Indian Service administrator. The experiences he describes reveal the ways in which Indians are adjusting to changes within themselves and their environment.

He, along with others, served as adviser to a Pueblo constitutional drafting committee. "(W)e had ourselves demonstrated how we could be put in our advisory, auxiliary, impersonal place." In a dispute between a stockman and farmer (both Indians) he learned the hard way how thin the dividing line can be between advice and interference. He exposes an attempt by a Pueblo governor to take credit for granting grazing permits to Indian veterans and suffers for it later.

Bunker learned that an administration which may be regarded as efficient by prevailing standards can smother people's initiative and their capacity for growth. He says that Indian Service employees have never found out where the Indians want to begin tackling their own problems. They prejudge what the Indians can do. Experience taught him to do otherwise.

> I had to look at Indians as individuals who might shape their own lives or who might, disastrously, not. . . . Given even a limited choice among meaningful alternatives, they take dramatic effective action. Again and again their seizing of opportunity depends on their having to work out at least some of its details. Only thus can they . . . apply known community strengths.

Perhaps the most provocative thought suggested by this book: the United States is giving substantial support to community development programs in a number of countries. If, as appears to be the case, it is sound to support programs in other countries designed to help villagers do what they want to do, why hasn't the federal government instituted similar programs among American Indians, Trust Territory islanders, and other peoples who are under the direct jurisdiction of the United States? Is it felt that aided self-help programs would not be effective among such peoples? Or, is there lack of communication between the responsible agencies of the government? Or are there different social theories in the federal agencies concerned that ought to be reconciled? What is the reason?

Our thanks to Messrs. Mosher, Radway, and Sady for their suggestions for PI&E reading. To round out the recommendations for this issue there is space to mention briefly two publications, one recent, which seem not only informative and enjoyable but extremely significant. The first is the Summer, 1957 issue of *Law and Contemporary Problems* (the Duke

University School of Law quarterly) devoted to a symposium on water resources and the governmental and community aspects of water resource problems. There are nine contributors, including Ernest A. Engelbert, Roscoe C. Martin, Lyle E. Craine, Robert J. Morgan, James W. Fesler, Irving K. Fox, and Henry C. Hart. The quality of the symposium is extraordinarily high. Readers of this journal who want to familiarize themselves with the governmental and policy problems in the water resources field could hardly do better than start with this symposium, and in the series itself they would be well advised to start with James Fesler's penetrating and reflective piece, "National Water Resources Administration." (pp. 441-71) This is high-level administrative thinking at its best. It is, in fact, so fine that it should prove of value not only to persons interested in the resources field but to connoisseurs of the fine art of analyzing any complex public problem.

A more general piece of thinking about administration and its purposes, but equally rewarding because of the care and high quality with which its analysis is carried through, is Emmette S. Redford's collection of Alabama Lectures, *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1958). The level of analysis can be indicated by quoting the final sentences:

> I think the final answer to those who would charge administration with lack of "well-defined ideals" is that they have not viewed it with perspective. They have not seen organization and process as servants of a society which has demanded an expanded role for government. . . . They have not fully comprehended the subordination of administration to representative government, the many methods by which law and discretion are combined in fair and effective administration, and the means through which the public interest is partially attained. . . . Organization and process are vehicles of rationality and common purpose. They are means by which particular objectives of policy desired by the dominant will are given continuity and force; beyond this, they are the means by which the abiding . . . values of society become ubiquitous in the practice of government. The final safeguard in administration is that the shared will within the society for efficiency, rule of law, informed judgment, competence, supremacy of representative government, and the public interest has been incorporated, and may be further incorporated, into arrangements which check and direct the actions of men, and which in significant measure provide channels for the constitutionalization of administrative practice.

After reading several chapters of Professor Redford's book, a reader pauses and asks himself why this carefully written work is so refreshing. The answer is that unlike many of today's writers on administration, the style of thinking Professor Redford employs is not confined in its reference points to twentieth-century material. There is a strong trace of both the 18th and 19th century in his writing, and it is refreshing to encounter a reflective mind that sees administration not only in terms of twentieth-century thought with its strong behavioral science content but who recognizes the interplay between, for example, administrative discretion, organizational behavior, and the rule of law.

A wealthy benefactor, who bemoans the decline in the writing of witty verses and limericks about the grandeurs, frustrations, and eccentricities of government administration, has granted PI&E the sum of $5 to be awarded—as a chunk or in dollar units—to the writers of the best humorous verse dealing with any aspect of public administration. Publication of winning entries is assured. Deadline is July 10. *Noms de plume* may be employed.

—E.A.B.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

Staff Officer

American Society for Public Administration

Public Information: Continuing Pressure for More

For three years, the House of Representatives Government Information subcommittee has been investigating allegations that information due the public has been withheld. The subcommittee has acted by publicity and negotiation to open news and picture sources closed by U. S. officials. In addition, two bills encouraged by the group are now pending in the Senate, passed by the House:

1. To exorcise from a "housekeeping" law of 1789 the powers successfully claimed under it for agency heads to withhold information they deemed inimical to the public interest.
2. To open to public scrutiny applications of nonprofit organizations for tax-exempt status.

All the federal departments have opposed the former bill as unclear and unnecessary, the Attorney General testifying that it could not eliminate the President's (and through him, his subordinates') right to withhold information covered also by the Constitutional separation of powers. This view has been challenged by Representative George Meader in lengthy correspondence with the Attorney-General. (Released by Representative Meader, March 31, 1958.)

The subcommittee has succeeded in making available to the public names of those passing postmaster examinations, records of penalties for import violations settled administratively, Federal National Mortgage Association price changes, and a comparison of rates paid by Rural Electrification Administration borrowers from private and from public power sources. Also, following discussion with the subcommittee, the Department of Agriculture eliminated regulations allowing the department to censor films made with its cooperation and prohibiting cooperation with wine and beer companies in making films.

Somewhat eased have been restrictions on publicizing names and salaries of federal employees and activities of Coast Guard marine boards of inquiry, Agriculture Department advisory committees, and the Federal Trade Commission's trade practice committees. Also, the Defense Department has taken steps to check for possible declassification a mass of data stored in archives.

The subcommittee successfully opposed a bill suggested by the recent Commission on Government Security to punish anyone who communicates information he has reason to believe may be classified secret or top secret, aimed at reporters exploiting news leaks. In addition, the subcommittee aroused the General Accounting Office to protest a limitation on its audit of classified defense information that had been included in a Defense Department directive.

Generally opposing specialized information

units in government agencies as tending to gild or withhold news, the subcommittee counted as a victory the elimination of the Commerce Department's Office of Strategic Information and the assurance by the General Services Administration that Congress would not be restricted to obtaining GSA information from a new Congressional liaison office. (Committee on Government Operations, *Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies* (Second Report, Progress of Study, July-December, 1956), (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957); *New York Times,* April 17, 1958, p. 17; Press Release from the House Government Information subcommittee, December 9, 1957.) In another instance, however, the subcommittee chairman observed that the specialized information officer may stimulate public understanding: "The public information officer of the tax collecting agency [Internal Revenue Service], after analysing this testimony before the subcommittee, was successful in convincing his bosses that informing the public is part of their official duties." (Address of Representative John E. Moss to the New England Society of Newspaper Editors, Hartford, Connecticut, December 6, 1957.)

The Flow of Scientific Information

The subcommittee is working currently on blockages of scientific information. A recent report, excerpting testimony of scientists, emphasizes that the restricting of scientific information probably may be more of a threat to our defense than too little security because excessive concentration on security wastes efforts of scientists and engineers, walls off from contributions those not working with the government, results in duplication of government experiments, discourages persons from doing governmental scientific work, and inhibits education and research. Scientists testified that Russia is increasingly opening its scientific information to the public.

"The only real national security lies in scientific progress," the subcommittee wrote.

"Scientific progress relies heavily on a free exchange of ideas."

"Excessive restrictions on the free exchange of scientific ideas defeat national security."

The subcommittee proposed a government-wide security clearance for scientists so that there can be exchange of information among all agencies and defense contractors; ready access to all information for those cleared without requiring proof that they "need-to-know" the specific information; and no attempt to hide "the basic laws of nature," since parallel discoveries generally are made elsewhere about the same time in any case.

Overclassification is caused, according to the testimony, by the large number of persons eligible to classify documents (anyone originating them—probably more than one million in the defense effort) combined with the threat of severe punishment for underclassifying but no punishment at all for overclassifying. Furthermore, "[i]t is not possible for these people to work entirely independently of what the public opinion is, and only when public opinion comes to recognize that secrecy is not an overwhelmingly important thing is it possible for anyone to make a decision that is correct and objective," Harold Urey observed.

Automatic declassification after a fixed period was approved by most of the testifying scientists, but all of the services oppose it because it would require a tremendous amount of professional time, now in short supply. However, Clifford C. Furnas, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, asserted that ". . . over a period of years there would be a substantial advantage [in an automatic declassification system]." (Committee on Government Operations, *Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies* (Scientific Information and National Defense), (U. S. Government Printing Office, released April 18, 1958).)

Attitude of the Subcommittee Chairman

Some expressions of the chairman's general attitude: "Secrecy-minded bureaucrats seem to be able to work their way around almost any regulation and hide their activities from the light of public opinion." (Speech by Representative Moss to the American Society of Newspaper Editors convention, Washington, D. C., April 17, 1958.)

"Briefly, the first breeding-ground [of administrative secrecy] is one of attitude—the attitude of the Federal official who, in effect, tells the Press and the public 'it's none of your

business.' It is an attitude in which he—not the public—decides what the public should be told about its own business."

When the administrator withholds data because it might be subject to misinterpretation ". . . he means . . . that the information is subject to an interpretation other than *his* interpretation." (Hartford speech.)

Governmental Secrecy in Perspective

Comparing American information practices with that of other governments, a political scientist finds that "Historically . . . it is clear that formidable obstacles have stood in the way of excessive development of the practice of secrecy within American administration. . . ." Despite new pressures toward greater secrecy, ". . . so long as Congress and the media of communications continue to display the resourcefulness they have exhibited in the past in penetrating and exposing the affairs of bureaucracy, it appears most unlikely that American administration will ever exhibit that degree of secrecy which [Max] Weber considered congenital to bureaucracy." (Francis E. Rourke, "Secrecy in American Bureaucracy," 72 *Political Science Quarterly* 540-64 (December, 1957).)

Resisting secrecy-minded government, he says, are the considerable movement of administrators into and out of government, preventing establishment of a self-conscious bureaucracy, and the American tradition of publicity about government through active investigation by legislatures and mass media.

The new trend toward secrecy is spurred by (1) the increase in diplomatic and defense secrets, (2) the growth of economic regulation often requiring temporary secrecy concerning investigations and maintenance of files containing private industry's secrets, (3) increase of governmental size expanding the normal secrecy concerning job applicants and personnel and involving more and more internal communications which are kept confidential to allow frank discussion while policy is forming, and (4) the institutionalizing of government public relations which mixes the function of advancing the prestige of the agency with that of releasing information and which often monopolizes information disclosure.

Concern at the Local Level

Freedom of information became front page news in New York City last fall when the raw data of a social psychological survey was suppressed following the release of survey findings which tended to be critical of the administration antidelinquency action. A newspaper flurry and threat of court action by opposition political leaders did not succeed in releasing the information. (*New York Times,* September 7, 1957, p. 1)

At the same time, New York's Citizens Budget Commission asked for more than open public records, seeking instead "[t]he acknowledgment of the public officer that it is his duty to provide such information [in a form understandable by the public] *on his own initiative.* . . ." To do this in two areas of public concern, the Commission urged support for two bills, requiring regular publication of job vacancy information and of qualifications of persons appointed to jobs not requiring competitive examination. The Commission also asked for a citizens committee to guide the Mayor in charting the "kind of data necessary and the means for making it public." (News Release of the Citizens Budget Commission Inc., "The Public's Right to Know," August 19, 1957.)

Increasing Attention to Intergovernmental Relations

"For the first time in our country's existence a focal point for continued presidential concern with intergovernmental relations . . . is now in operation," Robert E. Merriam, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, told the American Political Science Association last fall.

Deputy Assistant to the President, Howard Pyle (former Governor of Arizona), Special Assistant to the President, Meyer Kestnbaum who is following up on the report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which he headed, and Mr. Merriam in the Bureau of the Budget all are concerned with smoothing present relationships and studying future roles.

Some achievements of this staff, reported by Mr. Merriam:

> . . . when a group of States wanting to develop a compact to study problems of the Great Lakes found themselves blocked by negative reports from several Federal departments, they were able to come to us for help. We were able to resolve the problem by substituting a policy of cooperation for a parochial negativism based solely on the departmental view. When a Governor wanted to strengthen his tax-collection procedures by making reciprocal arrangements with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, we were again able to substitute a conscious policy of help for a narrower view that there wasn't much in it for the Federal Government. When a water problem involving another interstate compact was stalled because of legal objections, we were able to find a middle ground between abandonment of National rights and frustration of State interests.

All problems under study by the Bureau of the Budget that potentially involve intergovernmental relations are referred to Mr. Merriam's office for analysis and, for the first time, new budget examiners hear the government's attitude toward intergovernmental relations in their orientation course.

> We are in the developmental stages of a policy which will apply to the Federal departments in their intergovernmental relations the same kind of direction and guidance that came with passage of the Budget and Accounting Act. . . .
>
> Quite obviously, basic responsibility for administrative action must rest with the duly appointed departmental and agency officials. But . . . we now have the beginnings of a mechanism that can apply . . . a conscious national policy of trying to do everything possible to insure that every national official is aware of the fact that his decisions and program operations have an effect on our intergovernmental relations in their broader sense.

Other Intergovernmental Developments

Federal-state relations was the first major point raised by the annual report of the executive director of the Council of State Governments to the Council's Board of Managers. He noted that the National Legislative Conference, the Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the Governors' Conference all expressed interest or took steps to improve state-federal relations. (31 *State Government* 4 (January, 1958).) Also, Massachusetts' Governor called for an Office of Federal-State Coordinator in his legislative message this year. (31 *State Government* 45 (March, 1958).)

Staff Work for the President

The White House office force soon will be 70 per cent larger than the 400 who attended the President when he took office five years ago. His close personal staff members have increased from 24 to 46. (President Truman had 15, Roosevelt 14 at the end, Hoover 5.) The White House budget has more than doubled. According to Lester Tanzer, staff reporter of the *Wall Street Journal,* Midwest Edition, April 3, 1958, p. 1:

> . . . Mr. Eisenhower's aides . . . do make many lesser decisions they say former President Truman would have resolved personally. They fill in all but the broadest details of many major decisions the President himself arrives at. In the normal course of events, the staff, rather than the President himself, often deals with Cabinet members and other top Administration officials. They take from the President's shoulders much of the task he finds so distasteful of listening to lawmakers' complaints and persuading them to back Administration programs.
>
> As the White House bureaucracy has swelled, the President's contact with the world outside of Government has diminished. Much of his day is taken up with his staff. . . .

The large personal staff preceded his heart attack. "He set about deliberately to replace President Truman's highly-personalized operation of the Presidency with a complex staff system headed by former New Hampshire Governor Adams." Most of the increase is in special consultants and assistants, for example Gabriel Hauge (economics), Robert Cutler (national security), Lt. Gen. Elwood Quesada (airports and air traffic controls), Maj. Gen. John S. Bragdon (public works planning). The consultants took on staff until they formed a special projects branch of the White House.

Governor Adams, Press Secretary James Hagerty, and Congressional liaison Maj. Gen. Wilton Persons "drop in to see him several times daily; the door is open to them at all times." Specialists "may see him just a few times a week. . . ."

The President has 10 to 20 conferences with staff members each day compared to 3 or 4 official visits from outsiders.

Liaison to the Cabinet

The staff also serves as intermediary to the rest of the Executive Branch, ". . . an increasingly important role these days as the President lets Cabinet members run their own departments with less and less direct guidance." Even intra-Cabinet disputes often are settled by the President's staff.

The President relies on the Cabinet for policy-making more than his predecessors, usually following majority sentiment. Many major issues crossing departmental lines are discussed there. The Cabinet, too, has become highly formalized, with a secretary and a career civil servant as his assistant. "For the first time, a written agenda for each Friday morning Cabinet session is prepared and circulated to Cabinet officials in advance."

The secretary screens issues for the Cabinet meeting with a sub-Cabinet of under secretaries, "works with Cabinet members beforehand to sharpen their presentation at the meeting . . . ," and briefs the President.

To assure carrying out of Cabinet decisions, high-ranking departmental officials meet with the Cabinet secretary immediately after each session to learn new policies affecting their agencies, ". . . and Mr. Rabb rides herd on these special assistants to see that new policies are implemented and to drum up suggestions for future Cabinet topics."

(Note a somewhat similar development in the California Governor's office described by James R. Bell in "A Coordinator for State Government Agencies," p. 98 of this issue of the *Review*.)

New Business and Public Administration Position in U.S. Education Office

A program in business and public administration was inaugurated by the U.S. Office of Education this year, alongside similar programs in mathematics, physical science, engineering, and the social sciences generally.

"We visualize the establishment of close working relationships—on a research, consultation, and services basis—with each of the colleges and universities in the country which offer specialized education programs in these fields," the Commissioner of Education announced. (14 *Higher Education* 84 (January, 1958).)

Projects under way and under study include (1) serving as an information clearinghouse on higher education for business and public administration, (2) developing background data and publications on educational programs in these fields, (3) sampling opinions and practices on public administration coursework, (4) studying present and possible future relationships between public and business administration, and (5) upon request and within resources available, supplying advisory and consulting services to colleges and universities.

In work along these lines, the Office of Education program will be conducted in close cooperation with professional and other groups concerned with business and public administration.

Ward Stewart, who has been an assistant commissioner of education and special representative of the commissioner since 1952, will head the program. He has also served in the Treasury Department, National Youth Administration, and Atomic Energy Commission, and on a public administration mission to Colombia. He holds a Ph.D. in political science and public administration from Harvard and an M.A. in college and university administration from the University of Chicago as well as a law degree.

Career Officials, the Budget, and Congress

Military officers (and by implication high civilian officials?) should be allowed to testify before congressional committees against the specifics of the President's budget as long as they would be willing to "recognize the validity of the President's decision and live with it," Harvard economics professor Arthur Smithies has argued in a letter to the *New York Times*, January 31, 1958, p. 20.

> In contrast to the President, each department considers only what it needs to perform its own function, and largely ignores conflicting claims on the budget. Consequently, it is almost inevitable that when the President makes his budget decisions each department gets less than it thinks it needs. . . .
>
> I believe that our constitutional system requires that the Congress should have the benefit of military opinions concerning the adequacy of the de-

fense budget, and that within limits the expression of such opinions need not impair the officers' effectiveness as members of the Executive branch of the Government. . . .

Such a procedure . . . requires restraint on the part of Congress, forebearance on the part of the President, and tact on the part of the officer concerned. But it would give Congress the information that it needs and save officers from the humiliation of giving evidence that everyone knows to be evasive or untrue.

First State Atomic Coordinator Reports Progress

Ohio's Coordinator of Atomic Development Activities, the first full-time state official responsible for stimulating and meeting special problems of atomic development, reports "general willingness" of state departments to accept these new responsibilities and their "genuine interest" in the field.

Although the Ohio position was established only a year ago, there are now a number of states employing full-time atomic development coordinators and other states with part-time officials. Ohio's coordinator is paid the same as department heads, appointed and responsible directly to the Governor.

The broad interrelationships of atomic developments beyond the obvious ones of public health, insurance, and workmen's compensation, have made the position useful, Ohio's coordinator reports. He advises the Governor concerning development, sits with a broadly representative advisory board surveying the field, coordinates plans of state agencies with those of the U.S. and other states, and keeps all state agencies informed of new developments.

Through the coordinator position, the state has entered the atomic energy field—stimulating its use in industry, medicine, and agriculture while assuring the public concerning safety and health, regulating its use, and providing some planning for the state and aid to local governments—without disrupting existing departments or establishing a new agency in this formative stage.

As to qualifications for the position: "Several of my scientist friends have expressed the belief that it is probably best that the Coordinator not be one particularly associated with a professional group in the field of atomic energy, where interprofessional controversies and prejudices might be a disadvantage to him in dealing with the many implications." It is basically an administrative job, Ohio's coordinator (a former political science professor with some university administrative responsibilities) asserts. (William H. Eells, "Ohio's Atom Law: A New Role for State Government," 31 *State Government* 71-74 (April, 1958).)

The Urban County: More Responsibilities, More Cooperation

The urban county is acquiring more responsibilities and working more closely with nearby units of government, a survey by the National Association of County Officials indicates. Of 300 counties solicited, 96 replied.

Eighty-two report steps to coordinate activities with other local governments, about half in community-wide planning. Periodic meetings of county representatives with those of other local governments are increasing, for example, the inter-county supervisors committee on water, sewers, drainage, recreation, and ports in the Detroit area and, the joint committee of St. Louis County, Missouri and its ninety-four municipalities on area problems.

In addition, there are a number of recent city-county joint projects: Spokane County-Spokane stadium; Shelby County-Memphis flood control, health, and welfare; Tarrant County-Fort Worth hospital. Seven of 24 counties operating airports do so jointly with another unit of government.

Transfers of functions from cities to counties have been made or considered in 70 per cent of the counties replying. Civil defense, election registration, area-wide property tax assessment and collection, and health and welfare programs are the most commonly transferred.

More important is the wholesale reorganization of services recently achieved in Dade County (Miami), Florida where a federal-type metropolitan government was installed headed by a county manager, and the study of city-county consolidation or large-scale reassignment of functions in Harris County (Houston), Texas; Sacramento County (Sacramento), California; Davidson County (Nashville), Ten-

nessee; and Fairfax County (a Washington, D. C. suburb), Virginia.

The urban county is looking to the future: 80 per cent of the reporting counties have planning units and others participate in formal or informal area-wide planning activities. (Bernard F. Hillenbrand, "Recent Trends in Urban Counties," 40 *Public Management* 86 (April, 1958).) A more complete report will be included in the *Municipal Year Book, 1958* soon to be published by the International City Managers' Association.

Federally-Sponsored Basic Research: Good Administration, Uncertain Leadership

Although federal sponsorship of basic research is always uncertain, perhaps due to the indifference of political officials (reflected, for example, in appointments of passive Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Research and Engineering), "[t]he research establishment that McElroy inherits is quite adequate to handle all the funds that may be given it . . .," observes George A. W. Boehm in "The Pentagon and the Research Crisis," 57 *Fortune* 134-35, 153-60 (February, 1958).

Nearly all the U.S. financed basic research is done by universities under contract with the defense services.

> The men who actually decide what research is worth supporting are themselves scientists; some are in uniform, but most are civil servants. In theory they have to justify each research project as having possible military application. In practice, they base their choices on whether the scientist is capable and whether his ideas have scientific merit. . . .
>
> . . . the Department of Defense has been supporting some of the most important work in pure science. . . .
>
> While hardly able to mold Defense research policy, the universities have controlled the kind and quality of research carried out on their premises.

They usually have been able to resist the pressure for applied rather than basic research and to protect scientists from excessive red tape. The big universities maintain government contract offices to handle much of the paperwork. While contracts include payments for overhead, seldom do they completely cover costs. The university, however, gains by having funds to provide assistance for graduate students.

A major problem is long-range planning with uncertain appropriations. The Office of Naval Research has somewhat mitigated this by maintaining a $20 million fund which may be committed a year or two in advance. The fund then is replenished from new appropriations.

The article points particularly to the successful relations between scientists and the Office of Naval Research based on great informality both in considering grant requests and allowing adjustments to conform with new discoveries.

Each service has an advisory committee mainly concerned with basic research: the navy with 15 men, the army with 56, and the air force with 63. Members devote roughly one-tenth of their time to committee work. "But their effect on the Department of Defense policymakers has been slight," according to Mr. Boehm. A few advisers have entered federal service for short periods, feeling it was more useful to devote full-time to government needs for short periods than part-time on committee work for long periods.

The Extent of Federally-Financed Research

Federal expenditures on research and development have increased in less than two decades from $100 million to more than $3 billion in fiscal 1957. About four-fifths of last year's spending was by the Defense Department, 90 per cent on applied research. The $400 million spent through universities comprised 15 per cent of the operating income of those institutions and supported about 70 per cent of all research done in universities.

But there also has been an increase in other fields: spending for medical research doubled in the past three years, agricultural research expenditures were up 45 per cent, and costs of nonmilitary Atomic Energy Commission studies in power development and physical and life sciences nearly doubled.

Private spending for research also has jumped, to about $4 billion, bringing total public and private research to 1.5 per cent of the gross national product. (William D. Carey,

"The Support of Scientific Research," an address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 30, 1957, printed in the *Congressional Record, Proceedings & Debates of the Senate,* January 30, 1958, pp. A830-33.)

Research Workers Respond to Participative Leadership

Although research workers often contend they prefer to be left alone in their work, a comparison of attitudes of subordinates toward twenty laboratory directors in a large government medical-research organization showed that the subordinates were more satisfied with participative leadership in which all take part in policy-making under the direction of the laboratory head than with either laissez faire or more autocratic leadership. Also, those working under participative leaders indicated greater confidence that their present abilities were being used.

Those working under directive leaders did not have as great a sense of freedom for originality or of contributing to basic science as did those working under laissez faire or participative leaders.

These differences are most marked among scientists in higher grades and in smaller laboratories. Comparing only participative and directive leadership, differences are also more striking between those reporting directly to the laboratory chief and scientists further down the hierarchy.

The study was based on questionnaire responses both on attitude and on behavior of the laboratory director. (Howard Baumgartel, "Leadership Style as a Variable in Research Administration," 2 *Administrative Science Quarterly* 344 (December, 1957).)

Executive "Style" Sets Informal Organization Tone

What effect does the top executive's behavior have on informal organization? A recent study of two schools, matched in characteristics but under leaders of different behavior types, indicates that the pattern of informal organization tends to follow the leader's style.

Teachers do not seem to look toward the administrator to satisfy personal needs or to be treated with a great deal of personal attention, preferring the formal, impersonal approach. Their concern is that all be informed, those affected by plans be consulted, and the professional needs of effective teaching be satisfied.

Projecting from this and similar studies, Willard J. Congreve, staff associate, Midwest Administration Center, The University of Chicago, suggests that the administrator's "principal concern should be to maintain the proper perspective. When he becomes deeply imbedded in highly personal interaction of the informal organization of his staff, he may confuse satisfaction of his individual needs with the organizational goals, lose objectivity, and, because he cannot interact at this level with all staff members, lose effective contact with many members of his staff." ("Administrative Behavior and Staff Relations," 6 *Administrator's Notebook* No. 2 (October, 1957).)

Physicists Reject Government Employment

Government is the least attractive employer to physicists, even though they believe government salaries compare favorably with business and are higher than universities, a study of 209 registrants of the placement service of the American Institute of Physics shows.

Only one in eight indicated willingness to work for the government, and most of these said they would be willing to work also for business, universities, or nongovernmental institutions. On the other hand, five out of eight were willing to work for a university, over half for industry, over a fourth for institutions. In interviews, most "were quite hesitant concerning their actual feelings in regard to employment with the Federal Government," and many showed no interest in learning more about it. (George A. Peters, "Scientists and Their Employment Preferences," 20 *Personnel Administration* 10 (November-December, 1957).)

Maintaining Motivation at the Top

What seems to occur in the process of moving up the ladder in an organization is the identification of the individual's motivations with the goals of the organization. At lower levels, the emphasis is on personal achievement, personal status, and per-

sonal power or autonomy, but when the individual reaches the top rung of the ladder, his needs for these goals are generally satisfied. . . .

To maintain interest, he must gradually switch his source of satisfaction to the achievements or status of the organization rather than of himself. Some never make this switch, become bored and unconcerned about management; others transfer the satisfaction of their needs more than ever to non-work ties, for example, family, sometimes to the point of indifference to the organization.

To combat deterioration of top management motivation, about 45 per cent of U. S. corporations provide executive bonuses. However, there is no evidence that these affect motivation or that they in fact reward good management. Other firms set low retirement ages to prevent bad effects of weakening executive motivation.

Other ideas to maintain high motivation that should be explored are:

(1) more recognition and praise for accomplishment by peers (as opposed to subordinates), (2) more diversified activities for top executives, and (3) frequent moves among jobs. (Talk by William A. Hunrichs, Psychology Department, San Diego State College, at the ASPA Southern California Regional Conference held January 31, 1958.)

Assistants-to-President Increasing in Industry

Nearly 70 per cent of 300 corporations surveyed by *Business Week* ("Handy Men With Growing Power," No. 1468 (October 19, 1957) pp. 193-97) now have an assistant to the president position, most established in the last five years. The job varies, however, with salaries ranging from $10,000 to $75,000 a year and responsibilities ranging from special and very limited assignments to very important duties on the ladder to a vice presidency.

Arguments for an assistant to the president:

1. He handles details for the top man.
2. Because he is loyal to the man personally, he is safe for the president to talk to about personality problems in the organization and for trying out half-baked ideas.
3. Gradually the assistant gets a sense of how the president thinks and can really act in his stead. Some firms use the position as a stage of executive development.

Strongly opposed are a large number of industrial leaders, including Ralph J. Cordiner, president of General Electric. Opponents argue that if one person cannot handle the presidency, the job should be divided until he can and, in any case, the need for an assistant probably reflects the president's inability to delegate. The assistant is a stumbling block rather than an expanded communications channel to the top. The small problems the assistant may handle satisfactorily often should get to the president because they are symptoms of greater problems the assistant does not recognize but the president would.

Further Decentralization of Federal Personnel Functions

The Air Force decentralized personnel management program has taken a further step toward field responsibility by providing a tested evaluation manual for self-guidance by field installations. (*Department of the Air Force, A Guide to the Evaluation of Civilian Personnel Management Activities in the Air Force* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957).) At the same time, the 1957 annual report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission also emphasized greater delegation to federal agencies.

Air Force Delegation to the Field

Air Force headquarters teams have been surveying installations and command headquarters since 1947. (The U. S. Civil Service Commission reported in 1956, "It is doubtful that the headquarters of many large decentralized organizations, either federal or industrial, have the current thorough knowledge of field activities that the Air Force program provides.") Ratings of the programs surveyed have constantly risen; in 1947, one-third of the field personnel management programs were called inadequate, in recent years only 10 per cent.

The manual represents an attempt to leave most of the evaluation to the installations themselves. It isolates 133 parts of the personnel management job and classifies them as essential (7), highly important (53), and de-

sirable though not universally applicable or necessarily economically worth while (73). Standards are set for each element. Sampling for evaluation of many of the elements is encouraged (and guidance provided), based on the assumption "that it is more important to study the effectiveness of programs through the discovery and analysis of trends than it is to uncover all individual errors." (Overseas and Field Affairs Division, Directorate of Civilian Personnel Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, *An Analysis of the Civilian Personnel Management Program in the Department of the Air Force* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956).)

Surveys of 39 installations in 1956 revealed that 33 programs were adequate, including 12 excellent. Some of the points most universally satisfactory: support by the commander on personnel management, management cooperation with employee groups, availability of classification and wage standards and guides, and provision of reports and statistical information.

Elements in which a large percentage of installations were below the set standards include: compliance with regulations, allocations consistent with guides and standards, systematic follow up and appraisal of career development programs, administration and management support of incentive awards programs (although progress in the awards program was indicated), vouchering (checking credentials of) all candidates, planned assistance to management, and civilian personnel office staffing.

Delegation from the Commission

Similarly, the U. S. Civil Service Commission *1957 Annual Report* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958) stated: "Current emphasis is placed on encouraging agencies to evaluate their own programs on a planned basis and to follow-up on the results of evaluation." Commission inspections are cooperative rather than investigational: they are always announced in advance and findings are open to the agency.

These inspections have brought improvements in agency personnel practices, according to the Commission, particularly in personnel records systems, incentive awards, recruitment practices, self-evaluation, and use of the Federal Service Entrance Examination.

Particularly in position classification, the Commission extended participation of agencies during 1957. Faced with a very high backlog of needed classification standards at the beginning of the year, the Commission nearly doubled the average production rate of the preceding six years. Further agency participation both in actual drafting of standards and in contributing ideas toward increased efficiency helped, the Commission said, along with experiments in job-element methods of fact-finding and analysis and broadened categories of occupations. Nevertheless, the backlog would take seven years to overcome, assuming the same resources working on it; by that time a backlog of standards needing revision would have developed.

Other Federal Civil Service Facts

In addition to greater delegation of personnel functions to the agencies, the Commission noted that in fiscal 1957:

- Coverage of the competitive service increased a little, with 8-10,000 laborer positions and about 1,200 agricultural agents added—and only 1,000 jobs of a temporary nature withdrawn. In addition, about 15,000 overseas positions were converted to the competitive service since April, 1956.

- The number of indefinite and temporary appointments within the competitive service continued downward, totalling 6 per cent in 1957.

- At the end of the third year of the Federal Service Entrance Examination, 8,200 appointments had been made from 44,000 successful examinees. Over 90,000 persons have been tested.

- The number of employees voluntarily quitting federal service in continental United States rose from 11.2 to 11.7 per cent; the percentage of separations for all other causes remained at 10.4 per cent.

- Appeals to the Commission against personnel actions were nearly one-third fewer than in 1956 and the Commission eliminated its hearing backlog.

Classification a Line Responsibility? A Dissent

Since personnel classification does not legitimately allow discretion, it is not a man-

agement tool but rather a control on management, the former head of the Navy Department Area and Wage Classification Office at Pearl Harbor states.

Nor, he adds, has there been any study of whether line management or a personnel staff office is more effective in the job. Therefore, there was no rational basis for the recent shift of classification responsibility from field offices directly responsible to the Navy's Industrial Relations Office to line administrators in the field, particularly since there was no apparent dissatisfaction with the personnel staff's work. (H. Donald McInnis, "Death of a Program," 18 *Public Personnel Review* 222-27 (October, 1957).)

Major Personnel Problems of Federal Government Analyzed

Four major questions of federal executive staffing are discussed by Paul T. David, Director of Governmental Studies, Brookings Institution (who studied personnel problems for the 1937 President's Committee on Administrative Management and served the federal government fourteen years) and Ross Pollock, Chief of the Career Development Program, U. S. Civil Service Commission (serving his sixteenth year with the Commission) in *Executives for Government* (The Brookings Institution, 1957).

Analyzing alternative answers to each question—the basic objective of the book—particularly in the light of political facts and probabilities, the authors arrive at a number of conclusions.

Qualified Political Executives

• How provide enough qualified political executives?

Generally, the Second Hoover Commission proposals to increase the supply of political executives seem most suitable of recent proposals, including (1) establishment of a continuing advisory committee from all walks of life with a full-time executive secretary, (2) increased salaries, $25,000 for assistant secretaries and proportionate increases for other positions, and (3) identification of junior political executive positions and arrangement for job rotation of persons with potential for later senior political service.

Career or 'Program' Staffing

• Should executives be brought into the government at high levels to man specific programs and, if so, what balance should be struck between promotion from within via relatively clear channels of executive development and such "program-staffing"?

The authors observe the general absence of a career staffing *plan* in federal agencies but also note that difficulties of recruitment above the lower levels have created a career staffing *situation* in most established agencies. Still, "[t]he early program staffing bias has not been wholly lost even in the present emphasis on general entrance examinations to fill career pipelines."

In deciding on a balance between program and career staffing, four different situations are analyzed: stable agencies, new agencies, new programs in old agencies, and expanded programs. "In any new agency, some combination of staffing policies is likely to be necessary that will permit program staffing for most of the positions." The United States has proven itself uniquely capable of staffing new agencies with new personnel, but many times these staffs have been unsatisfactory. As to new programs in existing agencies, we probably never will have enough career executives to entirely staff them, but ". . . it seems clear that it would be desirable to move much farther than has occurred so far in the direction of staffing systems that would make available a greater number of career executives when new programs must be staffed." About expanded programs, ". . . it is often desirable to use the unusual opportunities of program expansion to recruit new talent at high levels . . . [T]he assumption should be resisted that existing incumbents always have a first claim on the opportunities that arise when an existing program enters a period of rapid expansion."

While the separate personnel systems in the federal government, e.g. TVA, Atomic Energy Commission, FBI, probably should not now be replaced, their existence complicates federal personnel administration. One useful approach is to arrange interchange among

separate systems, as has been inaugurated recently.

In general, the authors favor career systems "with ample opportunity for entry at intermediate levels."

Improving the Career System at the Top

• Can a better career system be devised at the upper levels?

Action short of a senior civil service is recommended because of the possible far-reaching effects and widespread opposition to such a formal top executive group. Some proposed changes: (1) systematic review of qualifications for promotion to and within the supergrades and possibly a selecting out process, for example, if a person were passed over for promotion three times, (2) protection against downgrading when reassigned, (3) maintenance of central rosters both in agencies and in the Civil Service Commission of GS-15-17 personnel qualified for promotion, and encouragement to use the rosters for staffing new agencies and for occasional inter-agency transfers, (4) increased salaries, perhaps with longevity increases within grade in view of limited promotion opportunities at this top level. "A widespread development of more effective agency career programs might provide one of the most important alternative courses of action for improving the supply of able career executives. . . . [M]any departments and agencies may soon decide to take action within their own powers and on their own initiative."

Distinguishing Political and Career Positions

• How allocate positions between political and nonpolitical?

Three different kinds of political appointees are identified: (1) persons to whom the job is a political reward (patronage), (2) those appointed to assist the President in his total job of political and administrative leadership, e.g. cabinet positions, (3) persons strongly supporting a particular federal program but often not active in partisan politics and occasionally even of the opposite party. No clear line separating political and career executives is currently possible, the authors argue; rather a buffer zone between, made up generally of the third type of political appointee and using Schedule C as a vehicle, but also including program-oriented appointees in the civil service, may have to be accepted for a long time to come.

Personnel Officials Adopt Ethics Code

Personnel directors of government units in Los Angeles County last year adopted a ten-point ethics code including such points as these:

• "In performing [personnel] service, I shall respect management's point of view, its operating needs, and its ultimate responsibility, for I believe that good management and good personnel administration have a common purpose."

• "I will evaluate my tools and procedures always as means rather than ends."

• "I recognize my obligation under a merit system to provide uniformity of treatment to all, to conduct myself both on and off the job in such a manner as to create a faith in the objectivity and impartiality of my decisions, and to engage in no work or enterprise outside of my profession which would impair this standard."

Public Information Expanded by State Highway Departments

Reports last fall from every state, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia revealed increasing public information activities by highway departments and strong endorsement of them. ("Misinformation, or the lack of information, creates many unnecessary problems that could be avoided if we would use our public relations department to its full capacity" and "It has been my experience that the more informed the public is of our multitude of problems, the more cooperation we receive from the taxpayer and the traveling public" are two comments received.)

Only 9 of the 51 departments had no formal public information unit; 2 more are being organized; 6 of those established are recent.

Staffs generally have 3 to 5 persons.

Forty-eight departments issue press releases, 31 publish employee magazines (four begun recently), 28 publish popularized annual reports, but only 16 have public relations instruction for employees.

The survey was made by the Committee on

Public Information of the American Association of State Highway Officials, which recently changed its name from Committee on Public Relations and Publicity because "[g]ood public relations . . . should avoid the words public relations. They smack too much of a desire to appear well, of painting the surface, of conscious effort to justify our actions simply because they are the actions we have taken . . . ," according to the committee chairman. (Harold L. Plummer, "Public Relations in Highway Departments," 31 *State Government* 36 (February, 1958).)

State and Local Government Manpower Problems

Management skills are "widely desired in state and local government" and "[t]he quality of personnel available . . . is dependent upon the quality of administrative management," observed a summary report of a National Manpower Council Regional Conference on Government and Manpower. (Council Information Memorandum No. 121, January 9, 1958.)

". . . one manpower problem after another [are thrust] on state and local government personnel systems . . ." by high level employment, expanding governmental services, shifting allocations of responsibilities among levels of government, and backlogs of demands on government, particularly for capital improvements, the conference noted.

"The ability to adjust the administrative 'stance' of an organization to the changing demands made upon it is often the key to effective performance. Such adjustment may require the skills of administrative 'generalists,' a need not often understood by public and legislators."

Long-range planning and enhanced prestige for public employment are ". . . important steps in the solution of state and local manpower problems."

Booklets on Government Career Opportunities

Four recently published booklets are designed to interest and inform persons about public service careers.

What's Ahead for Civil Service? by David R. Lindsay (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 258, $0.25 from Public Affairs Pamphlets, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, New York) begins by calling attention to the many federal employees who have worldwide reputations in their special fields but are completely unknown to the public, persons who could earn far more in private industry. It then describes the personnel system that maintains such morale—its hiring, firing, and promotion procedures, pay scale, and organization for personnel administration. The author also advocates changes: elimination of patronage appointments in the Post Office department, high-powered recruitment, higher pay at the top, personal rank, limitation on veterans preference, and more interchange of personnel among agencies.

Government Careers by Jay B. Westcott (Syracuse University Press, 1957) and *Career Opportunities in Government* (Institute of Public Affairs, The University of Texas, 1958) address the undergraduate on opportunities, salaries, and methods of entering public service at all levels of government, including brief descriptions of university training programs in public administration.

75 Years of Merit and Fitness (State of New York Civil Service Commission, 1958) is a lively description and justification of the merit principle's development in government, particularly in New York State.

Broad Internal Audit Encouraged

Internal auditing by federal agencies that goes beyond simply checking books and may include investigations of all operations was encouraged by the General Accounting Office in a statement issued last August. (Ellsworth H. Morse, Jr., "Some Considerations behind the General Accounting Office Statement on Internal Auditing," 7 *The Federal Accountant* 30-49 (December, 1957).)

Noting that the 1950 Budget and Accounting Procedures Act requires GAO to consider the effectiveness of the agency's internal audit when doing its own postaudit, the statement observed:

• Internal auditing is "an element of management control, functioning by reviewing, appraising and reporting to management on the effectiveness of other controls." It may be restricted to financial matters or cover all operations, e.g. response of lower echelons to policy directives, production of statistical data and use of reports, staffing and efficiency, and use and care of materials and equipment.

• With increasing decentralization limiting top management functions to over-all policy and procedure setting, information of this kind is important.

• The internal auditor should only report findings, never be asked to recommend a new organization or new methods since he may later be reviewing his own proposals.

• After reporting to management, he should keep track of the action taken on his recommendations. In large organizations, periodic reports on such action is useful "for focusing top level attention on the activities of the internal audit organization."

• "Academic courses in business management, accounting and auditing can aid the auditor in acquiring some capability in these regards, but much ability to carry out these responsibilities must be acquired by experience."

Changes Noted in Federal Organization

Organizational changes in the federal government for 1957, as reported to the Senate, included the following:

Centralized Administrative Leadership

An Office of Administrative Management was formed in the Department of Agriculture to provide leadership and coordination in organization, work methods, management, and policy and program planning. Similarly, the Bureau of Public Roads established an Office of Administration and the Department of State a management staff in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration to advise "on broad management aspects of basic program and policy questions." The General Services Administration consolidated offices of administrative assistant for administration and for planning into one Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Administrator.

Automatic Data Processing

Data Processing divisions were established in two Agriculture Department Commodity Stabilization Service Commodity Offices, the Census Bureau set up an Electronic Systems Division, and the Bureau of Public Roads an automatic data processing branch in the Office of Administration. The Interstate Commerce Commission began to code the status of cases on punchcards through which causes of delay could be identified, reducing the average age of cases from 7½ to 6½ months. U. S. savings bonds also were put onto punchcards. The Air Force has entered its trained personnel requirements on electronic computers which keep data current on training needs; eventually other personnel requirements data will be programed.

Research

The Agricultural Research Service relieved scientists of administrative duties. A research coordinator was appointed in the Office of the Administrator of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Administration. The Defense Department began organizing a central agency for research and development of outer-space programs, reporting directly to the Secretary. The Bureau of Public Roads placed an Office of Research under an assistant commissioner. The National Science Foundation separated the social science research program from divisions of physical and life sciences and placed it directly under the director. The Defense Department's positions of assistant secretary (research and development) and (applications engineering) were combined into one following a Hoover Commission recommendation.

Decentralization

The Bureau of Public Roads delegated more authority to the field to speed clearances. The bureau also conducted a management survey of field operations "the results of which will be reflected in expansion and strengthening of field administration organizations early in 1958." The Small Business Administration began a close review of field operations, particularly policy conformance and proper program emphasis, and the Forest Service established an internal audit staff to study improve-

ments in executing policy and compliance with laws, procedures, and plans. The International Cooperation Administration developed work standards for participant training, and the Air Force continued to use a "functional utilization system" which "provides for identification and evaluation of manpower requirements by function at each echelon from unit to total Air Force." Reductions of about 10,000 personnel spaces followed the use of this system. The Post Office is discontinuing district offices for operations and transportation; postmasters will report to regional directors. District managers will become representatives of the regional directors but not field supervisors.

Public Information Activities

The Defense Department's assistant secretary for public affairs was divested of legislative relations duties, the Bureau of Reclamation added an assistant commissioner for congressional relations, and the public information office of the National Science Foundation was placed under the director.

Executive Development and Training

The Interstate Commerce Commission began preparing "trained replacements for a large number of key employees who are eligible for retirement." A promotion policy based on an inventory of skills and potential among all employees was begun. The U. S. Information Agency raised the status of training to a separate division in the Office of Administration. (Committee on Government Operations, *Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies,* Committee Report No. 18 (U. S. Government Printing Office, March 21, 1958).)

Interservice Harmony Overlooked by Newspapers

There are "many evidences of interservice cooperation and coordination, none of interservice rivalry" in military field installations, Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times* military correspondent, has observed. (April 24, 1958, p. 16.)

After visiting a number of military posts, Mr. Baldwin wrote: although "sometimes there is inadequate coordination" or information flow, ". . . the belief that one service 'holds out' on another, and that technical information is withheld is entirely erroneous." Particularly he notes that missiles information flows across service lines now, citing many examples of shared experiment results and successful parts and units.

The debate over Pentagon reorganization must be seen against this background:

1. The services "do, on the whole, work well together. . . ."
2. While there are strong loyalties to the service, "defense forces will continue to do their jobs loyally no matter what the organization in Washington."
3. ". . . good men are more important than good blueprints. Cooperation, coordination and command are always at peak efficiency when the top commanders are good."

"The Pentagon, therefore, will somehow 'go rolling along,' regardless of the organization changes determined in Washington."

Four "Personal" Responsibilities of the Top Executive

The top executive has four responsibilities little discussed in management journals: example-setting for subordinates, self-development, concern for the time of other members of the organization, and concern for his life and health. (George W. Peak, "The More 'Personal' Responsibilities of the Top Executive," 22 *Advanced Management* 13 (December, 1957).)

1. Subordinates "will emulate what he does, not what he says should be done. . . ."
2. He should set goals against which to measure his accomplishments and periodically appraise himself. He should learn to seek and accept criticism—and want it. "If he seeks it when he does not actually want it, he will not get it more than once." He must learn by listening, by studying, by reading, and by associating with other managers. "The top executive cannot logically ask others to engage in programs of management development if he is not willing to take steps for his own development."

3. In addition to planning carefully to save his own time, an executive must be concerned about the time of his subordinates. In particular when asking for information, he should inquire how much time it is likely to take and balance the cost against the value.

4. The executive "must recognize that there are limits to endurance and to abuse of the body, and that the penalties for exceeding these limits are sure, if not always swift." He should have the organization prepared for his death, a subordinate trained to step into his shoes, at least temporarily, and orderly affairs someone else easily can inherit.

Effect of Rockefeller Awards After Five Years

Rockefeller Public Service Awards, given to 59 top federal administrators over the past five years, have helped keep personnel in government service, broadened the outlook of award-winners, and generally raised public service prestige, a study by the program's administrators—Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs—indicated.

The winners, selected from 1,700 nominees and applicants, received all expenses involved in studying for six to nine months either here or abroad. (Rufus E. Miles' article, p. 106 is based on part of a study made under a Rockefeller award.)

The typical award-winner was between 40 and 44, veteran of 10 to 19 years of federal service, near the top of the career ladder, and usually in Washington rather than in the field. Personnel of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare have received eight awards, the Defense Department, including the three service departments, nine. Members of sixteen other agencies also have been honored.

Studies have been in social science (22), physical science and engineering (20), administration (11), and law (6).

Research in Progress

ASPA Research Committee Answers Primary Questions

ASPA's Committee on Research Needs and Resources started work this year by commenting on nine basic questions. Replies were summarized by Chairman Donald C. Stone, Dean of the School of Public and International Affairs, Pittsburgh University, and ASPA Assistant Director Don L. Bowen, committee secretary.

1. "In marking out its scope and method, public administration should claim sovereignty over territory on the basis of successful occupation and not be too timid about moving into uncharted areas."

2. Research tools of public administration are those of social investigation generally, and public administration researchers should make use of techniques and results in political science, economics, history, law, business administration, social psychology, sociology, mathematics, cultural anthropology, and social ethics, and might note such new tools as operations research, linear programing, queuing theory, and other methods of problem-solving, scheduling, and programing.

3. The following areas were singled out for emphasis in future research: comparative studies, both domestic and foreign; historical investigations; experiments charting consequences of prearranged differences; subject matter or functional studies; politics and administration; intergovernmental and interagency relations; democratic control; administrative theory. Emphasis was placed on viewing administration in its various settings, public and nonpublic. Identifying future administrative problems and focusing on problems of large sized organization also were stressed.

4. Communication among researchers is very poor, perhaps because there is little that is concrete to communicate and because the field is broad and complex. But a clearing house to discover, abstract, and index research was suggested.

5. Acceptance of research results by practitioners depends upon the administrators' personality and professional competence, so basic efforts to increase research use must be directed at education of administrators, selection processes, and the climate of government offices. Increased research use might be stimulated immediately if administrators were brought into the selection and planning of research and if researchers keep in mind relevance, timeliness, and clear presentation of projects. Better outlets for research should be considered; executive development programs may be good opportunities. Some members proposed establishing administrative research laboratories in government and initiating other research methods that are closely related to the practice of administration.

6. Wider acceptance of research results is a key to greater material and psychic incentive for research.

7. Not only does public administration as a research field receive less attention than the physical sciences and business administration, but also much of the general social science research overlooks public administration as an important field of human and social relations.

8. "As we develop more adequate concepts and statements of the knowledge of the field, the gap between theory and practice [and basic and applied research] will be narrowed." Until then, the decision to do basic or applied research depends on the sponsorship of the study. Operating agencies have first responsibility for applied research and may be inappropriate for some basic research, e.g. relations of policy and administration. Nongovernmental sponsors should beware of doing applied research that might otherwise have been done by a government agency while basic research is ignored by both groups.

9. "Lack of a coordinated plan of research has not impaired public administration research, if by such a plan is meant a set structure of research problems and approaches to which investigators are expected to affiliate themselves. In fact, absence of such a plan has been a distinct advantage. . . ." However, more leadership can be advocated; the Social Science Research Council Committee on Public Administration in the 1930's and 40's is an example of research leadership. Coordination at certain stages of well developed investigations may also be worth while. Current metropolitan area studies in many communities and coordinated resources administration studies in southern university bureaus of public administration are examples of useful coordination.

Evaluation of Executive Development Program's Effect on Decision-Making

An analysis of those taking part in the University of Chicago Program of Executive Development for Federal Personnel and its effects on them will be made by Sidney Mailick, Center for Programs in Government Administration, University College, University of Chicago (research director), and Harold Guetzkow, professor of psychology, sociology, and political science, Northwestern University (consultant). A research associate, Garlie Forehand, of the department of psychology, University of Illinois, will work part-time until fall, then full-time, on the two-year study. Mr. Mailick will spend about two-fifths of his time and Mr. Guetzkow one-fifth of his time on the project.

Characteristics of participants in the executive development program will be compared to those of persons in similar positions who do not choose to take part. Observational studies, depth interviews, and questionnaires—involving former participants, their superiors, subordinates, and peers—will study changes in the participant's administrative behavior following the training, particularly his decision-making in the broadest meaning.

Analyses of the program's content, methods, and aims as well as those of other executive development programs also will be made.

The study is financed by the Ford Foundation.

Cornell Management Research Grant

A management research program is being inaugurated by Cornell University's Graduate School of Business and Public Administration through a $99,000 Ford Foundation grant announced late last year. "A major objective of the research program is to make significant contributions to the theories of administrative

behavior as applied to the top management of large business enterprises," according to the School's Dean. Educational materials will be one product of the study which will be related closely to the School's six-week summer executive development program.

Complete Descriptions Needed of Executives in Action

To learn what is successful executive action and why some succeed while others fail, thorough descriptions of executives in action are needed which consider the interrelatedness of the individual, his function, and setting, according to Carl F. Stover, the Brookings Institution. ("Organismic Study of Executives," 1 *PROD* 30 (March, 1958).)

An outside observer, preferably not one accustomed to studying administration (to avoid imposing artificial form derived from unfounded generalizations widely accepted in the field) should compile such data. This would aid teaching as well as research by providing students with vicarious experience of the executive life beyond the decision process, already described by case studies. At present, Mr. Stover asserts, we are not sure what the executive's job is; we cannot even prove that career executive jobs are generically the same. Nor do we have standards for success encompassing ethics, i.e. beyond survival and continued advancement.

Variations of Interest Groups Due to Governmental Accessibility

An hypothesis has been formulated for testing (by Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) that interest group activities vary according to the accessibility of the legislative and the administrative bodies—that (1) when the legislative body is more accessible than the administrative, interest groups will define their goals broadly, work for them publicly, and claim that they are in the general interest; (2) when the situation is reversed, groups will work less publicly and for particular rather than broad, general goals; (3) when both are readily accessible (as in the U. S. government), they will enunciate universalistic statements but, avoiding rigid ideologies, leave themselves free to negotiate on specifics with administrators; and (4) where both are inaccessible, they will be either apathetic, ignoring politics, or utopian radicals. ("Effects of Legislative and Administrative Accessibility on Interest Group Politics," 1 *PROD* 11 (January, 1958).)

State Research Activity Surveys

Six states whose research activities were surveyed in 1954 under a National Science Foundation grant were then spending between 1.3 and 2 per cent of their total budget on natural and social science investigation, both basic and applied. Between one-tenth and one-third of the research cost came from the federal government, however, and some support came from other sources.

North Carolina and Wisconsin spent more than half of their research money on agricultural questions and Connecticut spent nearly half on them. New Mexico spent nearly half on resource development and public works; New York nearly half on health, education, and welfare problems. California's research spending was split more evenly, one-third on agriculture, one-third on the universities, and one-fifth on resource development and public works.

New York and North Carolina spent more money on social science than on physical science. Only New York supports basic research heavily through direct appropriation, the other states handling it almost exclusively through the universities and agricultural experiment stations. Also, New York carries on a great deal of physical and mental health research directly through line departments, work performed elsewhere mainly through universities. (Clara Penniman, "Science and State Governments," 1 *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 334 (November, 1957).) The full reports should be available soon.

Additional Studies

Carnegie Corporation of New York recently announced grants for further support of research in national security policies to Colum-

bia University ($138,000) and of research and training programs in academic administration to the Institute for College and University Administrators ($95,000).

Two studies, "Federal Administrative Orders" and "Regulation of the Political Activity of Federal Employees" will be completed by Dalmas H. Nelson under a research fellowship of The Brookings Institution beginning in September. He is assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska.

The presidential press conference will be investigated by Fauneil J. Rinn, Ph.D. candidate of the University of Chicago and former publicity director of Public Administration Clearing House, also under a Brookings fellowship.

The effect of new highway construction on urban land values and its relation to metropolitan planning will be studied by Philip B. Herr, graduate student in city planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, under a grant from the Urban Land Institute's J. C. Nichols foundation. (Press Release, April 28, 1958, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)

The New York Metropolitan Regional Council, composed of the elected heads of twenty-one counties, fifteen cities, and five towns in the New York City area, has agreed to join the Regional Plan Association and Metropolitan Council of Planning Agencies in developing a plan for a regional system of recreation facilities.

The urban-regional problems of an eleven-county, three-state area from Trenton, New Jersey to Wilmington, Delaware will be studied by the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Delaware Metropolitan Project, Inc. through a $900,000 seven-year Ford Foundation grant to be matched by local funds. Their purposes include stimulation of metropolitan research as well as direct study of social, economic, and cultural characteristics and interrelationships in the region and encouragement of greater interest in urban-regional affairs among leaders and scholars in the area. (1 *Metropolitan Area Problems* 3, 5 (February-March, 1958).)

Society Perspectives

"YEARS OF DECISION"

Do enough public administrators . . . want a generalist program in administration sufficiently to pay what such a program costs? This is the central question before the Society in 1958 and 1959."

Society officers and the Council answered this question in the affirmative at a meeting in Chicago, December 6 and 7, 1957. "But the vote from the precincts, in memberships and participation," says a Council memorandum, "will determine the issue."

I

What is the American Society for Public Administration?

It is an idea. Is the idea related to the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, the National Education Association? In these organizations the line is clear between the lawyers, doctors, teachers and their other associates in legal, health science, and educational processes. *When* an administrator becomes an administrator is not always clear. But it is highly important, like Holmes said of the law, that they are always "becoming." An incident will illustrate.

As a new Ph.D. serving my first faculty appointment, I traveled cross-country to Washington, D. C. for the December, 1939 meetings of the American Political Science Association. At the registration desk at the Wardman Park Hotel, people were asked if they were interested in the formation of a new society, ASPA. I was—and purchased two tickets to a dinner meeting being held for the purpose. William E. Mosher and others spoke. To the meeting I took a friend, not a political scientist, but an accountant; a Washington, D. C. section chief in WPA. He shortly returned to the state of Utah to direct a new IBM installation for the State Department of Finance. He was still an accountant. But his view of the administrative world had changed. He was, and continued as, an active member of the Utah chapter until his untimely death. He was "becoming" an administrator. The idea of ASPA was at work. As Robert Frost said of the two paths in the wood, that night in 1939 at the Wardman Park made "all the difference."

ASPA is a friendly association. Accountants and many other "specialists" *have* been made welcome at chapter meetings. ASPA also has "general" roots in several hundred universities and colleges. Here, in addition to other important material, something called public administration is professed, taught, thought about, refined, and discussed. The influence of universities on this friendly association will always be important. The influence entered markedly into the national government's civil and armed services during World War II. Subsequently, new faces appeared at chapter and at annual meetings. Today the "hard core" of ASPA represents a wide variety of education and experience. But the central staff, the national officers, the 350 members of five standing committees, and the other members, all represent aspirations to fill the difficult role of "generalists."

II

A profession, however, does not spring into being merely to meet public need. If so, medicine, law, and engineering would have been more prominently identified generations ago. A profession arises when someone, a few, or a group *recognize* a public need, *qualify* themselves, and somehow fulfill it. Conscious public awareness of the need may follow, be simultaneous, but rarely precedes. Any textbook history of medicine will illustrate.

A profession must also profess something

worth while. Its members must believe in its worthwhileness, and to that belief add faith and knowledge. Only with knowledge comes professional virtue; with virtue the profession may then meet the public need. Without virtue, the ability to perform, the profession will remain at the level of the two tailors in Hans Christian Andersen's wonderful allegory, "The Emperor's New Clothes." They may go through the motions, but nothing will really happen. Whatever the processes, belief and faith precede the virtue inherent in science and art. So ASPA as an organization, requires the intellectual and moral assent that it has value.

III

IN THE *Life* series on the Russian revolution, Alan Moorehead recently reminded the American public that "the revolutionary movement in Russia was a growth like no other in the world." He describes Lenin as a "consecrated man." ASPA could use some consecrated men in each chapter, but consecrated to different ends. George Santayana in his *Dominations and Powers* (Scribner, 1951), ruefully opined that in the east-west conflict the West "lacked conviction;" therefore, the "barbarians" would likely triumph. Does ASPA lack conviction?

To advance the science, processes, and art of public administration would seem to require conviction. ASPA will not "go" by itself, any more than the Bolshevik revolution or the American Bar Association or the local PTA. The Society now, more than ever, is dependent on its local chapters. Moreover, the chapters must come to share the kind of responsibility the universities and colleges represent. They must assist in providing continuous post-school centers for objective discussion of the great issues of public administration.

"Great issues in public administration?" some may ask, "Are there any?" If not, administration *is* a detail that *can* be "left to clerks" after doctors have "decided" the issues.

There are great issues in public administration. Administration is wrapped up in the central concerns of political, economic, social, and scientific theory—whether from Explorer to Vanguard, from work program to audit. All questions of state authority sooner or later confront the administrator, in one way or another.

A self-designated profession of public administrators is insufficient to meet these issues. There must be discipline also, and restraint. A profession is known by what it refuses to do or cannot do, as much as by what it does. Interest that leads to public acceptance and professional status rests on the wisdom that sometimes says no—as a wise physician will say no. Without that wise restraint, as well as the conviction underlying qualified performance, the Society will not deserve our dues or support as a friendly association.

But a friendly association based on such conviction, with scientific discussion in each chapter, developing broad professional interests befitting its challenging role not only in American culture but in the cultural pluralism of a world order yet to be realized—such a Society has a future.

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